مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد توانایی مدیریتی، کارایی سرمایه گذاری و خطر سقوط قیمت سهام – الزویر ۲۰۱۷

مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد توانایی مدیریتی، کارایی سرمایه گذاری و خطر سقوط قیمت سهام – الزویر ۲۰۱۷

 

مشخصات مقاله
ترجمه عنوان مقاله توانایی مدیریتی، کارایی سرمایه گذاری و خطر سقوط قیمت سهام
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله Managerial ability, investment efficiency and stock price crash risk
انتشار مقاله سال ۲۰۱۷
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی  ۱۳ صفحه
هزینه دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد.
پایگاه داده نشریه الزویر
نوع نگارش مقاله
مقاله پژوهشی (Research article)
مقاله بیس این مقاله بیس میباشد
نمایه (index) scopus – master journals – JCR
نوع مقاله ISI
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی  PDF
ایمپکت فاکتور(IF)
۱٫۴۰ در سال ۲۰۱۷
شاخص H_index ۲۷ در سال ۲۰۱۸
شاخص SJR ۰٫۵۴۸ در سال ۲۰۱۸
رشته های مرتبط  اقتصاد – مدیریت
گرایش های مرتبط اقتصاد مالی – اقتصاد پولی – مدیریت مالی – مدیریت اجرایی – مدیریت منابع انسانی
نوع ارائه مقاله
ژورنال
مجله / کنفرانس Research in International Business and Finance
دانشگاه School of Accountancy, Massey University, Private Bag 102904, Auckland, New Zealand
کلمات کلیدی توانایی مدیریتی، کارایی سرمایه گذاری، کیفیت گزارشگری مالی، خطر سقوط قیمت سهام
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی Managerial ability, Investment efficiency, Financial reporting quality, Stock price crash risk
شناسه دیجیتال – doi
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.048
کد محصول E11748
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله  ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید.
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فهرست مطالب مقاله:
Outline
Abstract
JEL classification
Keywords
۱٫ Introduction
۲٫ Prior literature and development of hypotheses
۳٫ Research design issues
۴٫ Sample selection and descriptive statistics
۵٫ Main test results
۶٫ Conclusion
References

بخشی از متن مقاله:

Abstract

We examine empirically the effect of managerial ability on firm-level investment efficiency and how this affects future stock price crash risk. Using a managerial ability measure developed by Demerjian et al. (2012), the paper documents consistent evidence that the more able managers over-invest compared to their not-so-able counterparts, even after controlling for the effects of financial reporting quality and other firm specific determinants of investment efficiency. This evidence is robust to alternative proxies for investment efficiency. The empirical evidence also suggests that crash risk increases for firms with more able managers, primarily through the investment inefficiency channel. Overall, the study contributes to a better understanding of the influence of managerial ability on investment decisions in the context of diverging opinions regarding manager-specific effects on organizational outcomes.

Introduction

We examine empirically the effect of managerial ability on firm-level investment efficiency and how this affects future stock price crash risk. Our study is motivated by the desire for a better assessment of the management’s impact on investment decisions and on stock price crash risk: an outcome of direct economic consequence for investors. According to the optimal investment argument proposed in the neo-classical framework, managers should continue investing until the marginal benefit of capital investment equals marginal costs. This proposition, however, is based on the assumption of no friction in the capital markets, i.e. managers obtain financing for positive net present value projects (NPVs) at the prevailing economy-wide interest rate and return excess cash to investors (e.g., Abel 1983; Hayashi, 1982; Yoshikawa, 1980). However, the agency theory view suggests that managerial self-interest might produce sub-optimal investment decisions resulting in both over- or under-investment. For example, both moral hazard and adverse selection imperfections inherent in the information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital, can adversely affect investment efficiency.

Managers intending to maximize their personal welfares are sometimes inclined to make investments that are not in the best interests of shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). Since there is divergence of incentives between mangers and investors, models of moral hazard suggest that managers will invest in negative NPVs. Models of adverse selection, on the other hand, suggest that if managers are better informed than investors about a firm’s prospects, they will try to time capital issuances to sell overpriced securities (i.e. a ‘lemons’ problem). If they are successful, they may over-invest these proceeds (e.g., Baker et al., 2003).

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