A growing number of studies have documented that information asymmetry theory can explain the underpricing of firms’ initial public offerings (IPOs) (Rock, 1986; Cai et al., 2007; Zheng and Stangeland, 2007). Jog and McConomy (2003) find that IPO firms that do not include earnings forecasts face higher underpricing, although this difference is concentrated among small firms. Schrand and Verrecchia (2005) conclude that firms with more frequent disclosures before the IPO are associated with lower underpricing. Leone et al. (2007) document that IPO underpricing decreases when issuers disclose more specific information in the ‘‘uses of proceeds” section of their prospectus. In addition, Boulton et al. (2011) study the relationship between earnings quality and international IPO underpricing and find that IPOs are underpriced less in countries where public firms produce higher quality earnings information. Although there is a sizable body of research on the impact of information asymmetry on IPO underpricing, the vast majority of that research focuses on equity markets. Given the inherent differences between equity markets and bond markets, such as market liquidity, conclusions drawn from studies of equity underpricing may not provide reliable indications of the patterns of bond underpricing (Cai et al., 2007; Liu and Magnan, 2014). Due to the asymmetric payoff function and their fixed claims on corporate assets, bondholders have stronger incentives than equity investors to demand high-quality financial reporting to reduce the information asymmetry problem (Ball et al., 2008). More specifically, Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008) point out that a corporation issues bonds at different points in time with contracts that vary in terms of bond features, and that these distinct bonds are traded separately. From this perspective, bonds differ substantially from equity; therefore, bond and equity investors could have different expectations of the supply of financial information. In this study, we consider corporate bond offerings made by public firms (including initial bond offerings (IBO) and secondary bond offerings, (SBO)).1 We then focus on the quality of borrowers’ financial information and examine how it relates to bond underpricing in the context of the information asymmetry problem in China. In addition, a growing number of studies have documented that reputable underwriters can signal and certify the quality of issuers’ financial information during IPOs (Chemmanur and Krishnan, 2012; Yang et al., 2017). Cooney et al. (2001) show that there is a negative relation between underwriter reputation and underpricing, which is consistent with the certification role of underwriters. Brau and Fawcett (2006) find that hiring a top investment bank to underwrite an IPO is a positive signal, and Kim et al. (2010) also provide evidence that reputable underwriters are able to differentiate the quality of issuers and to reflect this information in the underwriting spread. Thus, reputable underwriters can reduce information asymmetry between issuers and public investors (Dong et al., 2011), which to some extent can mitigate the negative impact of low information quality on bond underpricing.