Mergers and acquisitions have drawn many attentions in corporate fnance. One of research streams is to examine the performance of glamour versus value frms1 around merger and acquisition announcements. While several studies have examined the performance of glamour versus value frms in M&As (e.g., Rau and Vermealen 1998; Sudarsanam and Mahate 2003; Andriosopoulos et al. 2015), none of prior studies takes into account the market timing to explore this issue in M&As. It is not clear as to whether the market timing plays a role to infuence the performance of glamour versus value frms in M&As. Thus, this study intends to fll up this gap. Prior studies have proposed the theory to explain the performance of glamour versus value frms in M&As from the perspective of bidding frms. Rau and Vermealen (1998) propose the performance extrapolation hypothesis and argue that the market may overextrapolate the past performance of bidding frms when evaluating M&A transactions. Prior studies argue that glamour frms are frms with high past stock returns and these frms appear to have high past growth in cash fow and earnings (Lakonishok et al. 1994; Rau and Vermealen 1998). While glamour frms tend to have better past performance prior to M&A transactions, managers may overconfdence their abilities to manage the deals due to the presence of hubris perspective (Roll 1986). In this regard, managers of glamour frms are more likely to engage in value-decreasing M&A transactions. Alternatively, value frms tend to have low growth and may in general have poor past performance. These value frms appear to have low share price. When engaging in mergers and acquisitions, managers of value frms may be more prudent to evaluate the transactions resulted in higher synergies to their shareholders. Thus, it can be expected that there is a diference in announcement returns for glamour versus value frms in M&As. In addition, several studies focus on the behavior perspective to explain frm performance in relation to the market condition2 (Shleifer and Vishny 2003; Rosen 2006; Chidambaran et al. 2010; Tebourbi 2012). Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Chidambaran et al. (2010) argue that mergers take place during the periods of high market valuation. Rosen (2006) also reports that the market reaction to a merger for bidding frms is positively related to merger announcements by other frms in the recent past during the hot market. As there may have many investment opportunities in the hot market, managers of glamour frms may be hubris their ability to manage the deals due to their better past performance. Managers of glamour frms may be more likely to engage in value-decreasing transactions in the hot market condition that may damage frm value in M&As. Alternatively, as value frms in general have poor past performance, managers of value frms would be careful to evaluate the deals regardless of the market timing. Hence, it can be predicted that announcement returns to glamour versus value frms can difer within diferent market timing.