Quality certificates work as signals or cues that provide consumers with information about a firm’s commitment to quality (Terlaak and King, 2006). Literature suggests that the benefits and costs of certification in the hotel accommodation sector are related with some firm characteristics, such as size, hotel rating system or tourist market segment. However, little is known about the investment behavior of hotel chains in quality certifications. We propose two research questions: RQ1. Why do some hotel chains have a great interest in certification, whereas others (with a similar level of quality and price) decide not to certify any of them? RQ2. Why do some hotel chains tend to increase the percentage of certified hotels, whereas others tend to decrease it? This paper aims to answer these research questions analyzing the link between hotel chain features and the adoption level of certification and its change over the time. The type of firm or situation influences the effectiveness of quality certification. The signaling theory (see Connelly et al.’s study [2011] for a review) postulates that the use of signals by consumers not only depends on their informational value but also on the level of perceived risk intrinsically linked to service features and travel situational variables. Thus, certification utility can be substantially different, depending on travel circumstances and tourist profiles (travel expertise, etc.). We are going to use the extant literature about the utility and effectiveness of quality certifications along with the signaling theory to propose several hypotheses to explain differences in managers’ decisions with respect to quality standards’ adoption. We analyze two stages of decision-making: (1) the decision to adopt the standard; and (2) the decision to increase or decrease the number of certified properties. There are different theories and models to explain managers’ decision-making processes (see Lord and Maher’s study [1990] for a review). In all of them, managers’ expectations about the consequences of their decisions play a relevant role. However, in most cases, decisionmaking processes are subject to the lack of perfect information and uncertainty. Making a decision and experiencing its consequences provide managers with additional information that normally clarifies the outcomes and values of those decisions. At the same time, it is possible to examine the relationship between expectations and realizations (Harrison and March, 1984). If the decision is really efficient for the firm, it will improve firm’s results so managers will go on with the policy or even will reinforce it. However, if the decision does not produce acceptable outcomes, managers will decide to limit the resources assigned to the policy. On the one hand, we rely on the quality certifications literature (which, in turn, partially relies on signaling theories) to propose several hypotheses on the effectiveness of quality standards for hotel chains. On the other hand, we rely on limited capacity models to explain the differences between decision-making processes before and after the adoption of the certification system. As two related decision stages are involved, we use an econometric procedure that allows us to analyze both stages avoiding biased results. In that way, we will analyze whether managers overweight or underweight some factors in the first stage of decision-making