Introduction

In recent years, enterprises have vigorously put resources into corporate social responsibility (CSR) in order to enhance their corporate images, shift the interaction with stakeholders, and strengthen investors’ confidence. However, can CSR treat altruism as the starting point and achieve the corporate goal of ethical egoism? Recent studies on the relationship between CSR of a firm and its corporate financial performance offer inconsistent findings. One research stream supports stakeholder theory, which posits that stronger CSR involvement is likely to enhance the company’s reputation, improve the satisfaction of customers and suppliers, protect employee rights, and help provide reliable financial reports, thereby improving corporate performance (Chih, Shen, & Kang, 2008; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2014; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & Mishra, 2011; Gelb & Strawser, 2001). Another stream argues that businesses should simply comply with shareholder theory and maximize shareholder wealth. This view holds that CSR activities constitute an inefficient use of corporate resources at the expense of shareholder interests and preferences, resulting in a transfer of wealth from shareholders to stakeholders (Devinney, 2013; Reinhardt, Stavins, & Vietor, 2008). Moreover, some studies have even proposed that market investors are not likely to reward CSR events, especially when the firm’s financial performance is already high. Such views posit lower marginal benefits of socially responsible investments (SRIs) and the probability of a nonlinear association between the degree of CSR involvement and firm performance (Becchetti, Ciciretti, Hasan, & Kobeissi, 2012; Cheung, Tan, Ahn, & Zhang, 2010; Groening & Kanuri, 2013). Recent CSR studies have highlighted the need to consider agency problems. Independent managers with weak monitoring are more likely to strengthen their pay–performance link and overspend firms’ resources on CSR projects to satisfy stakeholders. These unprofitable CSR projects benefit special interest groups but put firms at a competitive disadvantage (Becchetti, Di Giacomo, & Pinnacchio, 2008; Cespa & Cestone, 2007; Pagano & Volpin, 2005; Prior, Surroca, & Tribó, ۲۰۰۸). Increasing ownership concentration may restrain this type of agency problem. However, several leading studies show that without effective legal systems and governance mechanisms, owner-managers may participate in CSR not to balance interests between insiders and outsiders but to gain noneconomic utility (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Barnea & Rubin, 2010), such as by creating a positive image, receiving recognition for social activities, and enjoying respect in the community. Managers who pursue CSR activities that hamper profits commonly risk losing their jobs. However, controlling insiders, particularly family CEOs, remain safe due to their affiliation ties (Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006); thus, they may perform social activities to enhance their reputations instead of performing win-win strategic social investments (Cespa & Cestone, 2007; Chih et al., 2008; Prior et al., 2008).