In 2014, global oil supply overtook demand and the oil price started to decline from mid-2014. In its November 2014 meeting, OPEC1 decided not to reduce supply and prices fell further. Many oil-market analysts interpreted this as the formal decision to squeeze higher-cost competitors, including US shale oil extracted using hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), out of the market. The Saudi Arabian oil minister at the time (and de facto leader of OPEC) expressed intentions consistent with these interpretations: “In a situation like this, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the kingdom or for OPEC to take any action that would reduce its market share and increase the shares of others…”۲ This decision stood in contrast with OPEC’s coordinated cut during the Global Financial Crisis. OPEC’s actions occurred against the backdrop of weakening global demand for crude and several years of steadily rising capacity from non-OPEC sources—most notably from unconventional sources in the US. Since mid-2014, the oil price fell from above $100 to an average of $50 during 2015. In its December 2015 meeting, OPEC reiterated its commitment to a “marketshare” strategy. Many have opined on whether OPEC is taking a sensible perspective by driving competitors out of business or whether it is a misguided move tantamount to “hara-kiri”.۳ Our goal in this paper is to understand the fundamental market factors that induced the shift in OPEC’s strategy. We present a simple economic model of the oil market: OPEC has a degree of market power and competes against a set of non-OPEC producers who act as a price-taking competitive fringe.4 OPEC has a choice between two strategies. The first strategy, which we call “accommodate”, is to maximize profits via a “high” oil price which allows high-cost non-OPEC producers to remain profitable. The second strategy, “squeeze”, is to drive up production—and hence drive down price—and thereby induce high-cost producers to exit the market.