مشخصات مقاله | |
عنوان مقاله | Banker on board and innovative activity |
ترجمه عنوان مقاله | بانکدار در هیئت مدیره و فعالیت نوآورانه |
فرمت مقاله | |
نوع مقاله | ISI |
نوع نگارش مقاله | مقاله پژوهشی (Research article) |
سال انتشار | |
تعداد صفحات مقاله | 10 صفحه |
رشته های مرتبط | مدیریت |
گرایش های مرتبط | بانکداری |
مجله | |
دانشگاه | مرکز تحقیقات و آموزش پیشرفته مالی، بانک رزرو هند، بمبئی، هند |
کلمات کلیدی | مدیر بانکی، تحقیق و توسعه، شركت كننده |
کد محصول | E7343 |
نشریه | نشریه الزویر |
لینک مقاله در سایت مرجع | لینک این مقاله در سایت الزویر (ساینس دایرکت) Sciencedirect – Elsevier |
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله | ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید. |
دانلود رایگان مقاله | دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی |
سفارش ترجمه این مقاله | سفارش ترجمه این مقاله |
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1. Introduction
Ever since the time of Schumpeter, the technological capability of an economy has been identified as an important driving force for improving its growth and competitiveness. In this context, the relevance of innovativeness has been an important area of research (Cohen, 1995; Hall & Lerner, 2010). An important aspect of this innovative behaviour is the conduct of research and development (R&D) by firms. Given the growing emphasis on knowledge and skills as a key factor driving economic growth going forward, the relevance of R&D as a key ingredient in this process has assumed relevance. A growing body of literature has focussed on understanding the factors affecting firm R&D activities (Brautzsch, Gunther, Loose, Ludwig, & Nulsch, 2015; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002; Jaffe, 1986). Another strand of literature highlights the importance of bankers in enhancing corporate governance in firms. Booth and Deli (1999) find that bankers on boards provide certification and offer expertise for raising debt. Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider (2010) show that bankers on board of non-financial firms promote their banks as lenders and advisers. The theoretical literature regarding the impact of a banker on a firm board is not unambiguous. Using the Forbes 500 database for 1992, Kroszner and Strahan (2001) report that lenders opt out of firm boards when the cost of monitoring outweighs the benefits. As compared to this, Booth and Deli (1999) find limited support for a positive role of commercial bankers on board of their borrowing firms. |