مشخصات مقاله | |
ترجمه عنوان مقاله | کیفیت کارکنان، محیط نظارت و کنترل داخلی |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله | Employee quality, monitoring environment and internal control |
انتشار | مقاله سال 2017 |
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی | 20 صفحه |
هزینه | دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد. |
پایگاه داده | نشریه الزویر |
نوع نگارش مقاله |
مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article) |
مقاله بیس | این مقاله بیس میباشد |
نمایه (index) | Scopus – Master Journal List – DOAJ |
نوع مقاله | ISI |
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی | |
ایمپکت فاکتور(IF) |
0.531 در سال 2017 |
شاخص H_index | 7 در سال 2019 |
شاخص SJR | 0.33 در سال 2019 |
شناسه ISSN |
1755-3091 |
شاخص Quartile (چارک) | Q3 در سال 2019 |
رشته های مرتبط | مدیریت |
گرایش های مرتبط | مدیریت منابع انسانی |
نوع ارائه مقاله |
ژورنال |
مجله | مجله چینی تحقیقات حسابداری – China Journal of Accounting Research |
دانشگاه | Sun Yat-sen Business School – Sun Yat-sen University – China |
کلمات کلیدی | کارمند، کنترل داخلی، نظارت، سرمایه انسانی |
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی | Employee، Internal control، Monitoring، Human capital |
شناسه دیجیتال – doi |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.12.002 |
کد محصول | E10636 |
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله | ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید. |
دانلود رایگان مقاله | دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی |
سفارش ترجمه این مقاله | سفارش ترجمه این مقاله |
فهرست مطالب مقاله: |
Abstract
1- Introduction 2- Institutional background and literature review 3- Theoretical analysis and hypothesis development 4- Research design 5- Empirical results 6- Robustness tests 7- Conclusions References |
بخشی از متن مقاله: |
Abstract We investigate the effect of internal control employees (ICEs) on internal control quality. Using special survey data from Chinese listed firms, we find that ICE quality has a significant positive influence on internal control quality. We examine the effect of monitoring on this result and find that the effect is more pronounced for firms with strict monitoring environments, especially when the firms implement the Chinese internal control regulation system (CSOX), have higher institutional ownership or attach greater importance to internal control. Our findings suggest that ICEs play an important role in the design and implementation of internal control systems. Our study should be of interest to both top managers who wish to improve corporate internal control quality and regulators who wish to understand the mechanisms of internal control monitoring. Introduction With the advent of the knowledge economy, human capital rather than physical assets has become the essential strategic resource of businesses. Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2000) have formalized the human capital theory of corporate governance. They argue that governance problems are no longer concentrated at the top of a steep pyramid; the focus of corporate governance in the new millennium must shift to the governance problems of employees. However, previous studies provide limited evidence of the extent to which employees influence corporate actions. In this study, we focus on internal control because internal control is a core component of corporate activities and is thus suitable for assuring the achievement of objectives relating to operations, reporting and compliance (COSO, 2013). We contribute to the literature on internal control by examining the relationship between internal control employees (ICEs) and internal control quality, and the effect of monitoring on this relationship. Specifically, we ask two complementary research questions. Our first question examines whether ICE quality influences internal control quality. We argue that high quality ICEs increase the human capital investments in the design and implementation of internal control process, and thus improve internal control quality. Our second question examines whether the monitoring environment modifies the effect of ICE quality on internal control quality. Although we predict that ICE quality has a positive influence on internal control quality, it is possible that this influence may vary between firms that are stringently monitored and firms that are not stringently monitored by regulators, institutional investors and/or top managers. Stringent monitoring could alleviate the employee agency problem and provide ICEs with incentives not to shirk. The increased diligence of employees further promotes the positive effects of ICE quality. Therefore, we expect that the positive effect of ICE quality on internal control quality is more pronounced in firms that are subject to more stringent monitoring. |