مشخصات مقاله | |
ترجمه عنوان مقاله | بدهی، سر رسید بدهی و سرمایه اجتماعی |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله | Leverage, debt maturity, and social capital |
انتشار | مقاله سال 2019 |
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی | 65 صفحه |
هزینه | دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد. |
پایگاه داده | نشریه الزویر |
نوع نگارش مقاله |
مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article) |
مقاله بیس | این مقاله بیس میباشد |
نمایه (index) | Scopus – Master Journals List – JCR |
نوع مقاله | ISI |
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی | |
ایمپکت فاکتور(IF) |
2.752 در سال 2018 |
شاخص H_index | 83 در سال 2019 |
شاخص SJR | 1.748 در سال 2018 |
شناسه ISSN | 0929-1199 |
شاخص Quartile (چارک) | Q1 در سال 2018 |
مدل مفهومی | دارد |
پرسشنامه | ندارد |
متغیر | دارد |
رفرنس | دارد |
رشته های مرتبط | اقتصاد |
گرایش های مرتبط | اقتصاد مالی، اقتصاد پولی |
نوع ارائه مقاله |
ژورنال |
مجله | مجله امور مالی شرکت – Journal of Corporate Finance |
دانشگاه | Huizenga College of Business and Entrepreneurship, Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314, United States |
کلمات کلیدی | هزینه های نمایندگی، ساختار سرمایه، سررسید بدهی، عدم تقارن اطلاعات، سرمایه اجتماعی |
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی | Agency costs، Capital structure، Debt maturity، Information asymmetry، Social capital |
شناسه دیجیتال – doi |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.001 |
کد محصول | E11444 |
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله | ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید. |
دانلود رایگان مقاله | دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی |
سفارش ترجمه این مقاله | سفارش ترجمه این مقاله |
فهرست مطالب مقاله: |
Abstract
1- Introduction 2- Data and research design 3- Main analyses 4- Extensions and robustness checks 5- Conclusion References |
بخشی از متن مقاله: |
Abstract We find that both firm leverage and short-term debt ratios are negatively associated with social capital (i.e., the altruistic tendency and mutual trust among people within a community). This relation is more pronounced in cases where information asymmetry problems are more severe and is robust to using alternative measures of key variables, addressing endogeneity issues, employing alternative model specifications, and simultaneously estimating leverage and short-term debt. An analysis on debt structure (bank loans vs. public debt) shows consistent results. Our findings are in line with the idea that social capital lowers the need for corporate borrowing mechanisms as a means to alleviate agency problems for firms. Introduction The capital and debt structures of a firm can affect its value in many ways. One particular channel is through how they alter managerial incentives and impact investment decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this regard, finding the optimal levels of leverage and debt maturity involves trading off the benefits and costs associated with them. For instance, using more leverage and shortening debt maturity can both alleviate problems that arise from management entrenchment (Harris and Raviv, 1990; Jensen, 1986), but at the same time introduce shareholder-creditor conflicts and liquidity risk, respectively, in addition to financial distress (e.g., Johnson, 2003; Myers, 1977). 1 Thus, an economic variable that bears the function of substituting the benefits of leverage and short-term debt, thereby lowering the associated potential costs and allowing the reallocation of resources, can be valuable to the firm. In this paper, we hypothesize that social capital fits such a role. Following Guiso et al. (2004), we define social capital as the degree of altruistic tendency and the level of mutual trust among people within a community. Plainly speaking, high social capital regions comprise of individuals that are more trustworthy, more cooperative, and less self-centered (see, for instance, Hasan et al., 2017b; Jha and Chen, 2015; Jha and Cox, 2015). We propose that managers in these areas are less likely to misbehave or take actions that may harm investors. This can be due to their society reflecting who they are, shaping who they become, or forcing them to be more concerned about reputation losses before taking value-destroying actions (Mead, 1934, p. 178). Through each of these channels, the managers are more likely to be perceived by investors as trustworthy. |