مشخصات مقاله | |
ترجمه عنوان مقاله | اهمیت یادگیری اجتماعی برای ارزش گذاری غیر بازاری |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله | The importance of social learning for non-market valuation |
انتشار | مقاله سال 2019 |
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی | 9 صفحه |
هزینه | دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد. |
پایگاه داده | نشریه الزویر |
نوع نگارش مقاله |
مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article) |
مقاله بیس | این مقاله بیس نمیباشد |
نمایه (index) | Scopus – Master Journals List – JCR |
نوع مقاله | ISI |
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی | |
ایمپکت فاکتور(IF) |
4.535 در سال 2018 |
شاخص H_index | 174 در سال 2019 |
شاخص SJR | 1.767 در سال 2018 |
شناسه ISSN | 0921-8009 |
شاخص Quartile (چارک) | Q1 در سال 2018 |
مدل مفهومی | ندارد |
پرسشنامه | ندارد |
متغیر | ندارد |
رفرنس | دارد |
رشته های مرتبط | اقتصاد، علوم اجتماعی |
گرایش های مرتبط | اقتصاد مالی، توسعه اقتصادی و برنامه ریزی |
نوع ارائه مقاله |
ژورنال |
مجله | اقتصاد اکولوژیکی – Ecological Economics |
دانشگاه | Division of Tropical Environments and Society, James Cook University, Townsville, QLD 4811, Australia |
کلمات کلیدی | رفاه اجتماعی، ارزش گذاری غیر بازاری، ارزیابی مشاوره ای، مؤسسات مشاوره ای، تجزیه و تحلیل سود هزینه، Arrow’s impossibility |
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی | Social welfare، Non-market valuation، Deliberative valuation، Deliberative institutions، Cost benefit analysis، Arrow’s impossibility |
شناسه دیجیتال – doi |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.05.019 |
کد محصول | E12896 |
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله | ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید. |
دانلود رایگان مقاله | دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی |
سفارش ترجمه این مقاله | سفارش ترجمه این مقاله |
فهرست مطالب مقاله: |
Abstract
1- Introduction 2- Theoretical background 3- Empirical application 4- Discussion 5- Conclusion References |
بخشی از متن مقاله: |
Abstract Neoclassical valuation methods often measure the contribution that non-market goods make to utility as income compensations. This circumvents Arrow’s impossibility (AI) –a theoretical proof establishing the impossibility of social preferences – but those methods cannot be used in all settings. We build on Arrow’s original proof, showing that with two additional axioms that allow for social learning, a second round of preference elicitation with a social announcement after the first, generates logically consistent social preferences. In short: deliberation leads to convergence. A ‘web-game’ aligning with this is trialed to select real world projects, in a deliberative way, with the board of an Australian Aboriginal Corporation. Analysis of the data collected in the trial validates our theory; our test for convergence is statistically significant at the 1% level. Our results also suggest complex social goods are relatively undervalued without deliberation. Most non-market valuation methods could be easily adapted to facilitate social learning. Introduction The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment emphasized the importance of properly measuring the impact of social decisions on ecosystems given their importance to human wellbeing (Bullock et al., 2018). That this notion has been widely accepted is evidenced by the rapid growth in studies that seek to do that – often using neoclassical non-market valuation methods to generate estimates and with large organizations supporting the endeavor (see, for example, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (Braat and De Groot, 2012)). Neoclassical methods have done much to highlight the importance of numerous non-market goods and services, including various ecosystem services, but cannot measure the value of all goods and services (Cook et al., 2017). They are adept at measuring the value (in terms of income compensation) of simple individual goods – herein denoted as SIG and defined as a good that generates a simple/singular benefit (e.g. more income or more food) which accrues to an individual, but struggle to adequately measure relational values (Chan et al., 2016), with some arguing that neoclassical methods are, by definition, incommensurable with them (Kallis et al., 2013; Oberheim and Hoyningen-Huene, 2009).1 Neoclassical methods are not yet adept at measuring the value of complex social goods (Stoeckl et al., 2018) – herein denoted CSG and defined as goods that generate a diverse range of benefits2 that accrue to a diverse range of people at multiple social scales (e.g. to individuals, families, communities and/or society more broadly). This is because neoclassical methods are essentially partial equilibrium in nature – specifically designed to assess the value of singular/simple goods that generate benefits for individuals, whilst assuming all else is constant (and that individual preferences/utility functions, are independent). The social valuation of ecosystem services (particularly those that are essentially CSGs), which allows one to deduce social preference, thus remains an open problem for contemporary ecological economics (Kenter et al., 2015; Kenter et al., 2016). |