Abstract

This study investigated the determinants of financing decisions of firms from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, particularly the effect of public corruption on financing decisions and the effect of disorder following the Arab Spring on public corruption-financing structure relationship. The study encompasses a total of 800 business entities from 14 different countries, spanning the time frame of 2005–۲۰۱۸٫ Data is analyzed through the application of static fixed effects and dynamic GMM-System models. Results indicate that large, tangible companies prefer debt, whereas profitable companies with more room for growth choose equity. Less corruption is associated with increased corporate debt. The use of debt decreased because of the Arab Spring, and corruption’s effect on leverage became weaker. The speed of adjustment to the target leverage is comparatively slow for book leverage, while it is significantly greater for market leverage. These outcomes are consistent with the pecking order behavior resulted from increasing information asymmetry, but the tradeoff theory has some support as well. The implications of this study entail the need for enhancing investor protection, strengthening control measures, increasing transparency, and fostering the overall growth of the financial system to facilitate enterprises’ use of debt financing, particularly in the post-Arab Spring era. This paper provides fresh empirical evidence demonstrating the effect of the Arab Spring on capital structure and on the relationship between country corruption and capital structure in the MENA region. The paper also expands the body of research on capital structure and corruption across countries by providing empirical findings from a region that has been relatively overlooked in previous scholarly works.

Introduction

Lack of a perfect capital market necessitates the need for capital structure (CS) policy [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. The choice of debt and equity is important not only for stable corporate financial health but also for the role it plays in economic growth [6,7]. Since Modigliani and Miller’s [8] slice-of-the-cake argument, the literature has identified many firm-specific CS determinants [6,9] as well as macroeconomic factors [7,10, 11, 12]. Country corruption facets, such as weak regulations and inconsistent policies at the macro level, may affect financing decisions as they influence agency conflicts of interest, the risk of financial fraud, and resource waste at the business level [10,13]. Such consequences are exacerbated if accompanied by weak disclosure policies that enhance the information asymmetry problem and increase the cost of capital [14]. Consequently, financial market activity reduces as a result of investors’ low confidence.

Public corruption is a potential determinant of CS that is largely ignored. A common link is through asymmetric information as a result of ineffective management transparency, monitoring, and law enforcement [15]. This information gap is also caused by manager-shareholder agency conflicts [16]. Because of poor ruling systems and regulations, emerging countries are deemed more corrupt than developed countries [17]. Non-financial enterprises are less regulated compared with financial firms, and thus they are more exposed to corruption [18].

Conclusions

This study investigates the CS practices of non-financial companies operating in the MENA region. Country-level corruption and the Arab Spring’s effect on CS is analyzed through the application of static and dynamic models. Country corruption has an effect on CS because of the significant agency problems and information asymmetry that are associated with corrupt practices. The developing countries in the MENA region are more susceptible to corruption because of inadequate governance systems and regulations, which make them a suitable choice for this study.

Our contribution to the literature on capital structure is threefold. The study expands the research on CS across countries in a geographic area that has been relatively overlooked in previous scholarly works. Our second contribution is emphasizing the significance of enhancing institutional environments in developing countries to facilitate firms’ access to external finance, particularly when the level of corruption in a country is found to have a significant effect on the decisions that corporations make about their CS. Finally, addressing the effect of the Arab Spring, a period of political instability, on the CS decisions is the first instance in which such an analysis has been conducted. The findings of this research are likely to be significant to other developing countries and regions and carry major implications for emerging economies that share similar attributes.