مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد پیامد ناشی از کشور عضو CARICOM در جستجوی بازار حمل و نقل هوایی

مقاله سال 2016

1.1. Air transportation in CARICOM Bertrand (2011) asserts that CARICOM countries (Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and The Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname, and Haiti) (CARICOM, 2011) (see Fig. 1) claim to have liberal aviation policies among themselves but do not practice them in reality. There have been past studies analysing the aviation in CARICOM (e.g. World Bank, 2006; Bertrand, 2011, 2006; Warnock-Smith, 2008), however, few improvements have actually been implemented towards a more liberal aviation environment in the region. This research seeks to explore the underlying cause of this inertia. Intraregional travel is of significant importance for the integration and socio-economic development of CARICOM. Without intraregional travel, many of the smaller economies in CARICOM would face enhanced economic pressures due to their reliance on intraregional travel for business and leisure tourism. Moreover, the socio-economic integration of the region, and thereby the very relevance of the economic integration policy of CARICOM, called the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME), is extremely reliant on an efficient regional air transport system for the movement of people and for trade. Therefore, this research analyses intraregional tourism and CARICOM integration as primary motives for intra-regional liberalisation.

The inductive approach to this study differentiates it from existing studies of the region and augments the literature on aviation liberalism in the CARICOM region. Whereas other studies (Warnock Smith, 2008; World Bank, 2006) took the deductive approach by analysing what benefits could accrue from a more liberal environment in CARICOM, this study begins by analysing whether the objectives of the existing regional multilateral air service agreement are actually obtained in reality. It should be noted though that the mere existence of a multi-lateral agreement in CARICOM clearly suggests some intent towards intra-regional liberalisation. Hence to fully understand the propensity for effectiveness of any subsequent intra-regional air transport liberalisation policy in the region, it is crucial to examine pre-existing constraining factors which must be addressed for any successfulAccording to Forsyth (2008), aviation regulation impacts on tourism by placing controls on ownership and control of carriers, prices, airline routes, and competition; therefore influencing demand. This indicates that a direct correlation exists between the level of regulation and tourist arrivals. On this premise, Prideaux (2000) argues that if the transport access costs to an equally attractive and competitive destination are lower, then the tourist is likely to opt for that alternative destination. Alternatively, Page (2003) also suggests it may lead to suppressed demand. Accordingly therefore, Seetaram (2010) proposes that airfares are indicators as to the level of performance of many tourism destinations. The level of demand for air transport is arguably both a determinant and a consequence of regulation, and is facilitated through the regulative policy of air service agreements.

However, regulation is often viewed as necessary to prevent the anti-competitive behaviours that could emerge from the oligopolistic, sometimes monopolistic nature of the airline industry (Tacker et al. 2013). Hanlon (2007) recognizes that the challenge with airlines as oligopolies is that actions on price taken by one airline could have significant implications for competitors and it may result in collusion between them. Wensveen (2007) calls this ‘mutual dependence’. If the carriers do not collude, the reasonable expectation is that the competitors would also make similar changes to their prices to maintain their market shares, effectively leading to a price war in the industry (Wensveen, 2007). Proponents therefore argue that regulation is essential to prohibit collusion and avoid price wars.