Abstract

This study investigated the determinants of financing decisions of firms from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, particularly the effect of public corruption on financing decisions and the effect of disorder following the Arab Spring on public corruption-financing structure relationship. The study encompasses a total of 800 business entities from 14 different countries, spanning the time frame of 2005–2018. Data is analyzed through the application of static fixed effects and dynamic GMM-System models. Results indicate that large, tangible companies prefer debt, whereas profitable companies with more room for growth choose equity. Less corruption is associated with increased corporate debt. The use of debt decreased because of the Arab Spring, and corruption’s effect on leverage became weaker. The speed of adjustment to the target leverage is comparatively slow for book leverage, while it is significantly greater for market leverage. These outcomes are consistent with the pecking order behavior resulted from increasing information asymmetry, but the tradeoff theory has some support as well. The implications of this study entail the need for enhancing investor protection, strengthening control measures, increasing transparency, and fostering the overall growth of the financial system to facilitate enterprises’ use of debt financing, particularly in the post-Arab Spring era. This paper provides fresh empirical evidence demonstrating the effect of the Arab Spring on capital structure and on the relationship between country corruption and capital structure in the MENA region. The paper also expands the body of research on capital structure and corruption across countries by providing empirical findings from a region that has been relatively overlooked in previous scholarly works.

Introduction

Lack of a perfect capital market necessitates the need for capital structure (CS) policy [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. The choice of debt and equity is important not only for stable corporate financial health but also for the role it plays in economic growth [6,7]. Since Modigliani and Miller’s [8] slice-of-the-cake argument, the literature has identified many firm-specific CS determinants [6,9] as well as macroeconomic factors [7,10, 11, 12]. Country corruption facets, such as weak regulations and inconsistent policies at the macro level, may affect financing decisions as they influence agency conflicts of interest, the risk of financial fraud, and resource waste at the business level [10,13]. Such consequences are exacerbated if accompanied by weak disclosure policies that enhance the information asymmetry problem and increase the cost of capital [14]. Consequently, financial market activity reduces as a result of investors’ low confidence.

Public corruption is a potential determinant of CS that is largely ignored. A common link is through asymmetric information as a result of ineffective management transparency, monitoring, and law enforcement [15]. This information gap is also caused by manager-shareholder agency conflicts [16]. Because of poor ruling systems and regulations, emerging countries are deemed more corrupt than developed countries [17]. Non-financial enterprises are less regulated compared with financial firms, and thus they are more exposed to corruption [18].

Conclusions

This study investigates the CS practices of non-financial companies operating in the MENA region. Country-level corruption and the Arab Spring’s effect on CS is analyzed through the application of static and dynamic models. Country corruption has an effect on CS because of the significant agency problems and information asymmetry that are associated with corrupt practices. The developing countries in the MENA region are more susceptible to corruption because of inadequate governance systems and regulations, which make them a suitable choice for this study.

Our contribution to the literature on capital structure is threefold. The study expands the research on CS across countries in a geographic area that has been relatively overlooked in previous scholarly works. Our second contribution is emphasizing the significance of enhancing institutional environments in developing countries to facilitate firms’ access to external finance, particularly when the level of corruption in a country is found to have a significant effect on the decisions that corporations make about their CS. Finally, addressing the effect of the Arab Spring, a period of political instability, on the CS decisions is the first instance in which such an analysis has been conducted. The findings of this research are likely to be significant to other developing countries and regions and carry major implications for emerging economies that share similar attributes.

Abstract

This study examines the role of gamification elements in engaging suppliers of sharing economy platforms in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We expected that engaging business owners in CSR would improve the brand equity of these platforms by leveraging the business owners’ brand loyalty and brand association. The statistical population of the study is owners of Iranian accommodation who use sharing economy platforms. The size of the sample was 323 accommodation owners. The hypotheses of this study were tested using Smart PLS-3. The study confirmed all the research hypotheses and showed that engaging business owners in social responsibility activities using gamification elements on sharing economy platforms can lead to an increase in the brand equity of the sharing economy platforms. These results will reinforce the synergy between the platforms and their users by making both parties aware of it.

Introduction

The sharing economy (SE) is where customers and business owners (suppliers) are brought together by an online platform. It is a means by which individuals may leverage their assets, such as their cars, their property and, of course, their time so that these assets may be utilized more thoroughly. This increases the efficiency of society as a whole while either increasing the wealth of participating business owners, or increasing their work flexibility, or both (Kuhzady et al., 2021). Advocatesof the SE have often painted a picture of a utopia where business owners will be set free from the shackles of employment while their customers would be able to take advantage of the lower prices (Belk, 2007). Well known examples of SE platforms are Uber in the ride sharing (taxi substitute) field and Airbnb in the accommodation sharing (hotel substitute) field, though there are also imitators of these platforms which have different degrees of market presence in different parts of the world.

However, the vision presented by SE tends to place its emphasis on the freedom of individuals, whether customers or business owners, while ignoring the fact that one of the reasons for the lower costs and prices of the SE compared with traditional businesses is the lack of regulation designed to counteract some negative consequences. Criticisms of the SE approach (Kuhzady et al., 2021) have included negative social and environmental impacts (Ma et al., 2018), limited safety and security (Birinci et al., 2018) and lack of certainty caused by unknown parties (Hossain, 2020) that contradict the vision of SE platforms of being sustainable and socially responsible. Consumers demand social responsibility from SE platforms and therefore business owners must also adopt sustainability and corporate social responsibility (CSR) principles in their businesses (Mi and Coffman, 2019). Consequently, sustaining the SE requires the engagement of all stakeholders where platforms, consumers and business owners are stakeholders in making a sustainable and responsible SE.

Discussion and conclusion

The study examined the role of gamification elements in engaging accommodation owners in CSR activities and enhancing their experience on SE platforms and how it leads to enriching brand equity through mediating effects of accommodation owners’ satisfaction and trust that leads to brand loyalty and brand association.

ads to brand loyalty and brand association. The gamification elements have a significant effect on engaging accommodation owners in CSR activities on SE platforms based on selfdetermination theory. Analysis of the collected data showed that gamification can have a significant and strong effect on engaging accommodation owners in CSR activities on accommodation sharing platforms. This is consistent with previous research on the power of gamification. Researchers have shown that gamification can be used to transfer complex information and promote green behaviour among users (Souza et al., 2020). In this study, it was shown that gamification elements can be used, not only for customers, but also for the accommodation owners and can engage them in behaving sustainably and responsibly. Analysing the collected data indicates a significant effect of gamification elements on the experience of accommodation owners on SE platforms. This also is consistent with previous studies which indicate that gamification can activate hedonic emotions and ultimately enhance the user experience (Hsu and Chen, 2018). It was also concluded that this hedonic experience is not limited to customers but also includes the business owners.

Abstract

Fintech revolutionized the traditional banking business models in emerging countries. The effect of fintech on banks’ operating efficiency and risk-taking behavior is still inconclusive. The study is aimed at exploring the effect of fintech products on banks’ operating efficiency and risk-taking behavior. The study used a quantitative research approach by collecting secondary data from annual reports of 50 commercial banks from emerging countries, namely, China, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, for the period 2014 to 2021. The study used panel data for path analysis and structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the theoretical mediation model by using STATA. The results show that the fintech product reduces the bank’s risk-taking behavior by enhancing the bank’s operating efficiency. The path analysis results show that operating efficiency mediates the relationship between fintech products and bank risk-taking behavior in emerging countries. The paper offers useful recommendations for central bank and commercial bank policymakers. The study is also beneficial for commercial banks that use fintech solutions to increase operational effectiveness and reduce risk. The study is the first empirical investigation into the connection between the growth of fintech products, bank operational effectiveness, and risk-taking behavior in developing nations.

Introduction

The global financial industry has been rapidly changing with the advancement of financial technology over the last few years. New emerging technologies such as Internet finance, blockchain, and mobile banking are penetrating, forming the fintech that revolutionized the whole financial industry. It offered lower-cost services with more choices for consumers to buy financial services that shift their financial behavior to digitalization. The rise of financial technology (fintech) has brought about significant changes in the financial industry, including the way banks manage risk. Fintech has introduced new tools and technologies that enable banks to more accurately assess and manage risk, as well as new business models that challenge traditional approaches to risk-taking.

The pace of fintech development in developed and emerging economies countries is different. In developed countries such as the UK, USA, and Europe, fintech extended the financing transaction methods through algorithmic trading, helping the manager to build better compliance systems to manage risk, and it also improves the electronic payment systems for both domestic and cross-border payments [1]. However, in developing countries, fintech adoption has been slow despite having growth and expansion opportunities in the digital economy (Zhang et al., 2020). Fintech has expanded financial services digitally across countries, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, the usage of fintech services and products has increased tremendously as identified in research [2].

Conclusion and Recommendations/Implications of the Study

The evolution of digital technology has changed the world drastically. The COVID-19 pandemic changed the whole business structure. The customers’ increasing demand for fintech products increases the competition in the financial industry. To retain their customers and remain competitive in the industry, traditional banks adopted fintech products. So that they can deliver efficient, accessible, and low-cost financial services to their customers with the help of technology. Fintech has facilitated the banking industry with better user experience and lower costs by using technological advancement.

The primary objective of the study is to explore the relationship between fintech products and bank risk-taking behavior with mediating role of a bank’s operating efficiency using a sample of commercial banks from China, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The empirical evidence shows that the bank’s risk-taking behavior decreases, and bank stability is improved with the development of fintech products. Fintech products improve the bank’s operating efficiency. The effect of fintech products on bank risk-taking is more pronounced in countries such as China and India because they are extensively using fintech products in their operations. Banks are adopting fintech products such as artificial intelligence blockchain, mobile banking, and Internet banking. The results show that the banks adopting fintech products in their initial phase increase the bank risk-taking behavior, and then later on, it decreases the bank risktaking behavior by improving their operating efficiency.

Abstract

Purpose – Recent studies on the securities market’s differential pricing of earnings components indicate that cash flows from operations are valued more highly than extreme total accruals. However, no previous study has examined whether cash flows from operations have a higher valuation than moderate total accruals. Therefore, this study examines the securities market’s differential pricing of cash flows from operations and both moderate and extreme total accruals

Design/methodology/approach – The study’s sample is divided into two sub-samples: a moderate total accruals sub-sample; and an extreme total accruals sub-sample. To evaluate whether cash flows have a higher valuation when compared to total accruals, for the entire sample and for each of the two sub-samples, the study examines the statistical significance of the difference between slope coefficients of cash flows and total accruals for regression of returns on both unexpected cash flows from operations and unexpected total accruals

Findings – Consistent with prior research, results from the entire sample show a differential higher valuation of cash flows when compared to total accruals. Another finding, consistent with recent studies, is that cash flows from operations have a higher valuation when compared to extreme total accruals. However, there is no higher differential valuation of cash flows over moderate total accruals. These findings support the decomposition of earnings into the components of cash flows from operations and total accruals only when total accruals are extreme (rather than moderate).

Practical implications – A possible explanation for these results is that since accruals predict cash flows, total accruals – when moderate (i.e. not extreme) – are priced similarly to cash flows. These results reveal that when total accruals are moderate, earnings are a better proxy for the underlying cash flows (over the entire future horizon, not just the current period) than is cash flows. However, since total accruals are unlikely to persist in a permanent way over the years, these results indicate that the decomposition of earnings into the components of cash flows from operations and total accruals is consistent with the information set used to value equity securities. Therefore, separate disclosure of cash flows is value relevant. In addition, users of financial statements certainly need the cash flows information as an ex-post validation of the prior earnings.

Originality/value – This study’s contribution stems from its determination of the preferred level of disaggregation of earnings components (i.e. operating cash flows and total accruals). This is expected to help investors in their attempt to enhance the outcome of their informed investment and credit decisions.

Introduction

Reported numbers can be considered informative if they assist investors in making more informed decisions. When stock prices change in response to reported numbers, it can be presumed that investors’ valuation, buying, and selling decisions are influenced by reported numbers. It follows that reported numbers inform their decisions. Earnings can be divided into total accruals and cash flows from operations [1]. Earnings components (i.e. operating cash flows and total accruals) can be considered incrementally informative in relation to total earnings if they assist investors in making decisions that are more informed compared to those made when only the total is known. For example, if investors think that current cash flows are more or less informative when compared to total accruals with respect to their ability to predict future cash flows, then they are likely to be interested in learning about these earnings components and not simply total earnings. Identifying the preferred level of disaggregation regarding the elements of earnings can assist investors in making more effective investment and lending decisions. With these considerations in mind, the present study seeks to investigate the differential price of earnings components in the securities market.

Results

5.1 Stock returns and earnings components for the entire sample Table 2 presents the results regarding the relationship between stock returns and earnings components (i.e. cash flows from operations and total accruals) for the entire sample. The sum of the coefficients for the level and change in cash flows (α1þα3) is 1.218 (t 5 6.743), which is significant and positive at the 1% level. The sum of the coefficients for the level and change in total accruals (α2þα4) is 0.699 (t 5 11.311), which is significant and positive at the 1% level. These results suggest that both cash flows from operations and total accruals have incremental information content beyond each other.

Abstract

     This paper adds to the recent interest in the link between cash and firm performance, by studying how this relationship varies across boom- and bust cycles. We use data of Norwegian firms from a broad range of sectors in the period 2005–2015, and both replicate and extend previous findings on the relationship between cash and performance over the business cycle. We find that i) cash has a positive, but weakly diminishing effect on operational firm performance (ROA) throughout the entire sample period, and ii) that the curvilinear relationship between cash and firm performance is the most pronounced in the pre-recession years, while it is virtually linearly positive in recessions and post-recession periods. We conclude that cash indeed has an impact on firms’ operational performance, and especially so in recessionary times.

Introduction

     Traditionally, strategy scholars have disregarded cash as a strategic asset (e.g. Barney, 1986), while finance scholars have viewed cash holdings as a signal that a firm lacks profitable investment opportunities or have managerial issues (e.g. Jensen, 1986). Recent studies have questioned these views by documenting that cash may indeed be positively related to performance (Kim & Bettis, 2014), and that contextual factors such as state of the business cycle (Nason & Patel, 2016) and competitive dynamics (Deb et al., 2017, Jung et al., 2020, O’Brien and Folta, 2009) are important moderators for the strength of the cash-performance relationship.

     While this recent research stream has made important advancements to our understanding of the relationship between cash and firm performance, we know less about how these insights can be generalized to other contexts than large, listed (manufacturing) companies operating in relatively stable periods, and if relationships between cash and market-based measures of performance also holds for operational measures of performance. Currently, most studies on the cash-performance relationship use samples of large, listed, US, (manufacturing) firms (e.g. Deb et al., 2017; Jung et al., 2020; Kim & Bettis, 2014; O’Brien & Folta, 2009), study relatively stable periods and not more turbulent times such as economic downturns where financing constraints tends to increase (Forseth et al., 2015), and/or use market-based measures of firm performance such as Tobin’s Q as their dependent variables (e.g. Deb et al., 2017; Jung et al., 2020; Kim & Bettis, 2014; O’Brien & Folta, 2009).

Conclusion

     The purpose of this paper was to examine the relationship between cash and firm performance over the business cycle.

     Throughout our analysis we find that cash has a positive impact on firm performance across the different phases of the business cycle. The linear term of cash is highly significant in all our models and across all time periods. The quadratic term is less consistent; in some cases, we identify a curvilinear relationship, whilst sometimes the quadratic term is low and insignificant indicating a linear relationship between cash and firm performance.

     After running our full and expanded models, we conclude that the curvilinear relationship between cash and performance is weakly curvilinear for our sample of Norwegian firms, and that this curve-linearity is the most pronounced in the pre-recession period, and more or less linear during the recession and post-recession periods.

     In closing, we believe that our results add to an important stream of research at the intersection of strategy and finance. Mainstream theories, especially in strategy discard cash and other financial assets as less important drivers for heterogeneity and performance differences. Our findings, and the findings of the studies we build on, challenge these assumptions. It is, however, important to note that cash seems more likely as an indirect source of performance differences, through enabling firms to make investments and deploy strategies that in turn create performance heterogeneity. That is, cash appears to be less of a king, but more a key member of the court that pull some important strings.

Abstract

We investigate an unexplored channel—loss given default (LGD)—through which accounting information can shape the design of debt contracts. Using a sample of defaulted bonds, we find that borrower accounting information available at contract initiation possesses significant power for predicting realized LGD at the subsequent default date. We then use this model to construct an accounting-based measure of expected LGD at the contracting date for a large sample of bond issuances. We find that this measure is positively associated with issuance date interest spread and covenant use, and document that these relations are not artifacts of an association between LGD and probability of default. We then show that accounting-based expected LGD has a stronger association with issuance date spread when the borrower’s underlying accounting is more conservative and when the accounting-based LGD predictors are more persistent. Our results increase our understanding of both the informational role and contracting role of accounting information.

Introduction

Financial reports are an important source of frm-specifc information available to lenders at the contracting date and thus may afect lenders’ behavior in the design of debt contracts. Whereas prior literature focuses on the usefulness of accounting information for probability of default assessment (e.g., Beaver 1966; Altman 1968; Shumway 2001), this study suggests that accounting information may also shape contracts by facilitating lenders’ assessment of loss given default. Loss given default, defned as the percentage loss that lenders experience from $1 of outstanding principal in a case of default, is a critical component of credit risk and debt contracting theories.1 Despite the theoretical importance of loss given default, there is little empirical evidence regarding how accounting information available to lenders at the contracting date is associated with their expectations about loss given default. This study is the frst to provide evidence that accounting information at the contracting date is a useful predictor of realized loss given default and that lenders behave as if they use accounting information about loss given default to design debt contracts.

Conclusion

A substantial body of research focuses on the informativeness of accounting information with respect to probability of default. However, there is very little research concerning the informativeness of accounting information with respect to loss given default, particularly at the contracting date. There exists some ancillary evidence in extant literature regarding the informativeness of accounting data about loss given default at the time of default. However, given the relatively long time between debt issuance and eventual default, this evidence says little about whether accounting information is useful to lenders in assessing expected loss given default at the contracting date—when lenders need information the most.

This study contributes to the literature along several dimensions. First, using a sample of defaulted bonds, we show that accounting measures available to lenders at the contracting date are informative about future loss given default. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the frst to do so. This fnding complements the literature which shows that accounting measures are informative about probability of default and therefore enhances our understanding of the informational role of accounting. Second, we construct an intuitive measure of accounting-based expected loss given default at the time of bond contract initiation, which could be of use in future research. Third, we show that lenders behave as if their accounting-based expectations about loss given default signifcantly afect price and non-price terms of bond contracts. We provide evidence that the association is stronger when the accounting-based predictors are more persistent, consistent with the intuition that accounting information with higher persistence is more reliable for predicting future outcomes. This fnding contributes to the literature on the role of accounting information in debt contracting by showing a specifc channel through which accounting information may be useful in lending decisions. Finally, our results provide important evidence that establishes a direct link between accounting-based LGD estimation and lenders’ demand for fnancial reporting conservatism.

Abstract

     Previous studies on the impact of firm growth on survival have paid little attention to agglomeration externalities. This study theoretically analyses how different agglomeration externalities affect the relationship between growth and survival. Using data from China’s manufacturing start-ups, we confirm a U-shaped relationship between the growth and survival risks of start-ups. Moreover, we find that different agglomeration externalities have heterogeneous moderating effects on this U-shaped relationship. Specifically, specialization and diversification externalities have significantly negative and positive moderating effects, respectively. The positive moderating effect of diversification externalities comes from the moderating effect of related variety externalities, whereas unrelated variety externalities have no significant moderating effect. The robustness test results support the above conclusions and suggest that the moderating effect of specialization externalities is heterogeneous in terms of firms’ resources.

Introduction

     In strategic management, growth is believed to affect not only the success of a firm at a certain stage but also its survival. Regarding growth as a strategic choice and process facilitates a deep understanding of a firm’s early survival process (Gjerløv-Juel and Guenther, 2019, Pe’Er et al., 2016). Many studies have discussed the relationship between growth and firm survival. The literature enriches our understanding of the survival outcomes of growth, but a consistent conclusion has not yet been reached.1 Moreover, existing research on the relationship between growth and survival rarely considers the interactions between growth and external factors.

     Recent studies have emphasized that exploring the underlying mechanism of business failure requires consideration of internal and external factors (Karabag, 2019, Zhang et al., 2019). They argued that, although few studies have explained how the interaction of firms’ external environment and managerial decisions (or strategic actions) contributes to business failure, interaction is not unimportant. Thus, when exploring the drivers of firm failure, we need an integrated framework that includes internal and external factors and considers the interaction of internal and external factors. Therefore, research on the survival outcomes of growth may need to be systematically reexamined to explore the role of the external environment.

Conclusions

     In strategic management, scholars emphasize that firm survival results from the external environment and internal decision-making. In this study, we use China’s manufacturing start-ups from 1999 to 2007 as a research sample to investigate the impact of growth on survival and analyze the moderating effect of different agglomeration externalities on the relationship between growth and survival. A U-shaped relationship exists between growth and survival risk for Chinese manufacturing startups. Given that most observations fall on the left side of the U-shaped curve, the positive effects of growth dominate.

     Different agglomeration externalities have different moderating roles in the relationship between growth and survival. Specialization externalities play a negative moderating role because they provide benefits that are substitutes for growth benefits and reduce the costs of growth. Meanwhile, diversification externalities play a positive moderating role because they push firms to rely on their internal growth benefits to survive and increase growth costs. After decomposing diversification, we find that the moderating effect of related variety externalities follows the same direction as that of diversification externalities, whereas unrelated variety externalities have no significant moderating effects. Therefore, the positive moderating effect of diversification externalities arises from related variety.

Abstract

     Our investigation of 46 conventional and 22 Islamic banks from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries during 2008–2021 reveals that sectoral diversification effects on stability are nonlinear and different for the two bank types. While Islamic banks’ stability is worsened only by moderate levels of diversification, conventional banks’ stability is enhanced by high levels and impaired by low levels of diversification. Furthermore, diversification acted as a stabilizer during the global financial crisis but exacerbated the adverse effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Although regulators usually call for bank diversification, our results imply that it can be a double-edged sword.

Introduction

     Due to dependence on oil and gas revenue and their price plunge caused by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, the governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries started introducing various policies aiming at developing diversified real and financial sectors.1 While oil and gas production still represents over 40% of the GDP in GCC countries, with the exception of Bahrain and UAE, (Esam, 2021) shows that there has been significant diversification away from hydrocarbon revenue since 2010 in all GCC countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain. Given the low development of capital markets and non-bank financial institutions in these countries, banks play a pivotal role in assisting the execution of these national diversification policies by providing financing to support investments in the existing and ‘new’ sectors. The proponents of diversification in banking would see this as an opportunity for banks to spread their loans and financing2 across different sectors and thus reduce bank default, liquidity, and bankruptcy risks (Diamond, 1984; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Rose and Hudgins, 2006), vulnerability to economic downturns and financial crises (Tabak et al., 2011; Doumpos et al., 2016), and become safer and more stable (Saunders and Walter, 2012). On the contrary, the opponents of diversification would argue that banks are better off by focusing on a single sector or a few sectors as that allows them to leverage their screening and monitoring knowledge and expertise in these sectors and thus reduce the unnecessary complexity, agency problems, overhead expenses (Klein and Saidenberg, 2010), earnings volatility (DeYoung and Roland, 2001), and write-downs and write-offs (Jahn et al., 2013) that usually come with diversification.

Discussion and conclusion

     Against the backdrop of the GCC countries’ ongoing economic diversification policies and banks being the primary financiers of the projects brought about by these policies, we investigate (i) if and how diversification of loans and financing across economic sectors impacts the stability of GCC banks, (ii) if the effects are the same on conventional and Islamic banks, and (iii) if diversification helps banks navigate smoothly through economic downturns such as the 2008 global financial crisis and the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic.

     anks navigate smoothly through economic downturns such as the 2008 global financial crisis and the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. Analyzing a unique panel dataset of 46 conventional and 22 Islamic banks, we find that there is no one-strategy-fits-all even within these seemingly similar countries. Diversification effects on bank stability are nonlinear and different for Islamic and conventional banks. While Islamic banks’ stability worsens at moderate levels of diversification, conventional banks’ stability thrives at high levels and erodes at low levels of diversification. Given that the diversification measure is an inverse measure of concentration, this means that a high concentration of loans on one or a few economic sectors also benefits conventional banks. Lastly, we observe a temporal dimension of our results which suggests that diversification supported bank stability against the destabilizing effects of the global financial crisis but amplified the adverse effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Abstract

In the current complex global economic background, international capital flows are becoming more frequent. Based on this, this paper takes international portfolio investment as the research object and empirically tests the causal relationship and control channel between international portfolio flows and macrofinancial risk in emerging economies. It selects the panel data of emerging economies from 2001 to 2020, constructs macrofinancial risk indicators by using contingent claim analysis and the entropy-based TOPSIS method, tests the effect of international portfolio flows on macrofinancial risk by using the panel distributed lag regression model, and explores the management effect of foreign exchange reserves and capital controls on the risk effect by using the panel threshold regression model. The results show that long-term international portfolio flows help reduce macrofinancial risk, but short-term capital flows appear to increase macrofinancial risk. In addition, both foreign exchange reserves and capital controls effectively reduce the risk effect of portfolio flows. However, when considering different types of portfolios, we find that foreign exchange reserves do not effectively control the risk effect of equity securities flows, while stricter capital controls do. This paper argues that emerging economies should be more open to international long-term portfolio flows, focus on the monitoring of short-term portfolio capital flows and equity securities flows, and coordinate the use of foreign exchange reserves and capital control instruments to manage the risk effects of portfolio flows. This paper verifies the risk effect of international portfolio investment flows through empirical analysis, tests the effectiveness of foreign exchange reserves and capital controls, and provides a decision-making reference for emerging economies to timely identify, effectively manage, and prevent the risk effect of international capital flows.

Introduction

In the context of the current COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, recessionary expectations of “high inflation” and “weak growth” in the United States, Europe, and other advanced economies have continued to rise, and global economic activities have been severely impacted [1]. Advanced economies, represented by the United States, implemented quantitative easing and fiscal stimulus policies to stabilize financial markets and protect economic development in response to the resulting economic recession. As high inflation continued to rise under the policy mix, the Federal Reserve began to reduce inflation by significantly increasing interest rates and tightening liquidity. Emerging economies have historically risen with the wave of industrialization through industrial transfer, aided by ample international capital liquidity. However, the Fed’s persistent policy of increasing interest rates has resulted in a stronger US dollar and depreciating currencies in emerging economies [2]. When expectations of a decline in the short-term exchange rate rise, the willingness of cross-border capital to invest weakens further, and there is a sudden halt in capital inflows or even capital flight, resulting in a cascade of asset price declines. Under the negative feedback spiral, the wealth of the household sector decreases significantly, corporate solvency declines, and the bank nonperforming loan ratio rises, resulting in heightened instability in the real economy and financial markets. The current complex and volatile international economic environment increases the frequency and unpredictability of cross-border capital flows, which will cause significant volatility on the financial markets of emerging economies [3].

International capital contributes significantly to the growth of emerging economies, but it is also extremely vulnerable to macrofinancial instability. In every financial crisis, we can see unusual global capital fluctuations. Emerging economies’ financial systems are flawed and have insufficient defenses against shocks from global capital flows. Emerging economies are additionally more susceptible to external capital shocks due to internal factors like a high external debt ratio and a mismatch in debt maturities [4]. Considering the current complex global economic context, to investigate how cross-border capital flows affect macroeconomic stability in emerging economies, this paper selects highly speculative international portfolio investment flows as the research object, discusses the effect of international portfolio flows on macrofinancial risk in emerging economies, and further explores how to effectively manage such risk. By revealing the evolution of macrofinancial risks under external shocks and the efficient control tools for identifying the risks of capital flows, it is of great theoretical significance and practical value for emerging economies to identify, manage, and prevent the impact of global capital shocks.

Conclusion

Since the 1990s, the process of economic globalisation has accelerated. Emerging economies have gradually assimilated into the global financial market, growing in popularity with foreign capital that prefers the better growth prospects of emerging economies to advanced economies that have finished industrializing. Although international portfolio capital inflows have helped fuel the market boom, they have also caused some worry about the emerging economies’ financial stability. Emerging economies’ growth is significantly influenced by foreign capital. Open capital accounts in emerging economies make them particularly susceptible to significant shifts in international capital flows, which can either precipitate financial crises there or have a more muted resolution [58]. To explore how international portfolio investment flows affect macrofinancial risk in emerging economies and how to manage this risk effect, this paper develops macrofinancial risk indicators by using contingent claims analysis and the entropy-based TOPSIS method to conduct this study, empirically investigates the short- and long-term effects of international portfolio investment and macrofinancial risk by using a panel distribution lag model, and investigates how capital flow affects the management of macrofinancial risk under capital flow from the standpoint of foreign exchange reserves and capital control by using a panel threshold model.

This paper demonstrates, through an examination of the relationship between macrofinancial risk and international portfolio investment flows, that international portfolio investment flows will increase the macrofinancial risk of emerging economies in the short term but reduce it in the long term. From the perspective of the components of international portfolio investment, high-risk and speculative international speculative capital will have a negative effect on the real economy [51]. Furthermore, this paper examines the management effects of foreign exchange reserves and capital control to mitigate the damage that the risk may cause. This paper argues that foreign exchange reserves can play a positive moderating role in international portfolio flow and macrofinancial risk, but only to a limited extent. Capital controls are tougher, but risk controls work well. Both foreign exchange reserves and capital control have effective risk management capabilities. When equity capital flows frequently, capital control works better at managing macrofinancial risk.

Abstract

We analyze stock market participation in 19 European countries, providing a composite view of the interplay and relative importance of established participation drivers. We jointly control for nearly all relevant drivers found in prior studies, which tend to introduce one novel variable at a time and often omit risk-aversion. Excellent full model predictive power decomposes into institutional (country) fixed effects (about 30% of total), traditional individual-level variables (50%), and more recently identified behavioral variables (20%). We sketch a hierarchical framework where factors’ effects vary by agents’ proneness to participate. We also challenge and complement existing interpretations given to sociability, IQ, trust, and life experiences.

Introduction

Limited stock market participation has been the quintessential topic in the emerging field of household finance.1 Differences in stockholding propensity across countries, and between people of comparable wealth, show that country factors related to economic or cultural institutions are important. On the individual level, wealth, income, and education are highly influential. Besides these traditional factors, more recent studies have uncovered an interesting set of behavioral factors that explain stock market participation. What is missing, however, is a composite view of the interplay and relative importance of the various drivers of participation.

In this paper, we take a novel, big-picture approach. Whereas the literature has tended to focus on testing the effect of a single new factor after controlling for traditional ones, we combine an extensive set of these variables in one model and explore the relative contribution of three types of factors – institutional, traditional, and new behavioral ones. We jointly estimate the effects of all variables while including a directly queried financial risk aversion measure known to predict actual financial risk-taking well (Dohmen et al., 2011; Halko et al., 2012; Guiso et al., 2018; Laudenbach et al., 2020). Then, based on the contribution of individual explanatory variables in various regulatory environments and subsamples of varying sophistication, we sketch a hierarchical model that describes the likely importance of each factor in different contexts.

Conclusion

The stock market participation literature has progressed steadily over the past few decades, but in step-by-step fashion, usually by adding one novel explanatory variable at a time. We take a consolidating approach by examining the roles of institutional, traditional, and behavioral factors, independently and jointly. We use data from SHARE, which comprehensively cover traditional drivers of participation, including risk aversion, and nearly all of the behavioral drivers from the recent stock market participation literature. We take full advantage of the data, exploiting cross-country variation in regulatory quality and varying levels of wealth and education across individuals.

Institutions clearly matter. Of the explanatory power, institutional factors captured by country fixed effects account for about a third. The traditional individual-level variables capture about 50%, and less than a fifth of the variation is explained by the new behavioral variables. We show that the effects of traditional variables and new behavioral variables change across levels of regulatory quality and across levels of wealth and education. In environments where participation rates are higher, such as high regulatory quality countries and among the wealthy and highly educated, variables reflecting values and attitudes have larger effects. In environments with lower levels of participation these variables have smaller or even non-significant effects. To complete our comprehensive approach, we also take a look at individual behavioral drivers and document complementing and contrasting results with previous literature.

Based partly on our results, and partly on prior research, we suggest a hierarchical model of participation drivers. In this model, similar in spirit to Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs, the low-level factors, such as wealth, have to be on a sufficient level before high-level, e.g., psychological, factors can come into play. Further progress in explaining non-participation, particularly among the well-off, would likely benefit from a focus in the high end of the model.

Abstract

This study examined whether foreign investment flow and overconfidence can influence stock price movement among the publicly listed companies in Indonesia. Subsequently, this study determined whether there was any significant difference in the influence of foreign investment flow and overconfidence on stock price movement before and after the COVID-19 lockdown in Indonesia. This study focused on the manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the 2020 period of which the data were taken in a period of 10 days before and 10 days after the implementation of the COVID-19 lockdown in Indonesia. Using content analysis on secondary data, this study showed that there was a significant difference between the stock prices before and after the COVID-19 lockdown. However, this study showed that foreign investment flow and overconfidence were not the main factors influencing stock price movement before and after the lockdown. The findings indicate that there are other factors that contribute to stock price movement in Indonesia. This study contributes to the existing literature on whether foreign investment flow and overconfidence influence stock price movement in a pandemic world.

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has had an effect not only on the health sector but also on the economic sector all over the world (Ghani et al. 2022). Indonesia is not an exception to this situation. The Central Statistics Agency (BPS) revealed that Indonesia’s economic development in the first quarter of 2020 witnessed a growth of 2.97%, which is a significant change from the 5.02% growth that was recorded in 2019. In Indonesia, the pandemic had a negative impact on the capital market including a change in trading hours on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (BEI) (Kusnandar and Bintari 2020) which, consequently, affected stock price movement. On 8 April 2020, the Combined Stock Price Index (IHSG), which shows the aggregate change in the share price of companies listed on the BEI, showed a decrease in stock prices by around 1.34% at 4704.58. However, upon the government’s announcement of imposing the COVID-19 lockdown, trading hours resumed, causing a steady movement in the stock prices. The existence of unstable stock price movement results exposed investors to increasing risk and uncertainty (Kartika 2008).

Results

5.1. Analyses before COVID-19 Lockdown

Table 3 presents the results of the normality test before the COVID-19 lockdown. The Asymp. Sig. (two-tailed) result was 0.346, which is greater than 0.05. Therefore, it can be concluded that the data were normally distributed, or, in other words, the data passed the normality test.

Table 4 presents the results of the normality test after the COVID-19 lockdown. The table shows the value of Asymp. Sig (two-tailed) to be 0.349, which is greater than 0.05. Therefore, it can be concluded that the data were normally distributed, or, in other words, the data passed the normality test.

Abstract

This paper builds a network econometric model capable of analysing the impact of inflation on systemic risk. Its main contribution is the identification of a robust inverse relationship which reverses when controlling monetary policy. This reveals that the former effect is due to monetary policy reactions to inflation. It is further analysed whether this effect comes from overindebtness as in a Minsky moment. There is no evidence supporting it, which suggests that mechanisms other than excess credit underlie such a relationship. The results presented in this paper are of particular importance for understanding monetary policy reactions to current inflationary cycles.

Introduction

Analogously to many other macro-financial linkages, the effects of inflation on systemic risk are, to a large extent, still unknown. This is the result of a disconnection between the interplay of the economy and financial markets which has dominated macroeconomic research in recent decades. However, the financial crisis of 2007–2009 made clear that there is a constant interaction between the economic system and financial markets (Diebold and Yılmaz, 2015, Abbas et al., 2019, Balcilar and Bekun, 2020, Cotter et al., 2020, Silva et al., 2017, Festić et al., 2011, Aliyu, 2012), highlighting the need to consider additional contagion channels rather than the traditional interbank market (Silva et al., 2018). Thus, many of the macro-financial variables depend the other dimension, potentially in a non-linear way, as it has been theoretically argued (Bernanke et al., 1999, Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010, Mendoza, 2010, Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014) and empirically estimated (Giglio et al., 2016).

In particular, the effects of inflation on systemic risk are of special importance nowadays. After more than 20 years of relatively low inflation (see red line Fig. 1, quantified on the right axis), the study of the inflation-financial stability binomial have not been of upmost importance. Thus, some studies have analysed the impact of inflation on the performance of the financial sector (Boyd et al., 2001), financial development (Festić et al., 2011), and many have analysed the relationship between inflation and public debt (Bhattarai et al., 2014, Krause and Moyen, 2016, Cherif and Hasanov, 2018). However, the recent inflationary shock has caused “seismic waves” for the stability of the financial system, as contractive monetary policy stances have revealed, among other concerns, overexposures to interest rate risks by financial institutions. Therefore, discounting monetary policy, there may exist a relationship between inflation and systemic risk which could make controlling inflation a major concern not only for the correct functioning of the economy, but also for ensuring the stability of the financial system. As shown in Fig. 1, this correlation between inflation and systemic risk connectedness may exist a priori.

Conclusions

This paper has provided some inferences about the effects of inflation on systemic risk in a financial network of twelve countries. It has been found that, after controlling the monetary policy reactions to inflation, inflation increases systemic risk. Furthermore, in the time span considered (2000–2022), inflation increases more systemic risk than interest rates. This provides partial equilibrium evidence in favour of aggressive monetary policy interventions to preserve financial stability and not only to ensure the correct functioning of the economy during inflationary shocks. Indeed, if inflation increases more systemic risk than interest rates, there exists an incentive for the central bank to increase interest rates in presence of rising inflation, since the effect of the latter outweights the negative effect of the bank rate hike for financial stability.

It has been further tested whether the channel through which inflation increases systemic risk is excessive lending during economic booms as in a Minsky moment. However, evidence has not been found which reveals that mechanisms other than excess credit are behind the relationship. All the results presented in this paper are robust to several variable selections and econometric specifications, and extend to inflation expectations as well. Further research can be directed towards increasing the understanding of the relationship between inflation and systemic risk with monetary policy, since a substantial part of it appears to be happening through interest rates.

Abstract

A growing body of literature scrutinizes the harmful consequences of capital flight to offshore financial destinations. While financial integration is a well-known facilitator of capital flight, we shed light on an under-appreciated determinant—the availability of an IMF bailout. Expanding on previous literature analyzing moral hazard in the context of IMF programs, we introduce a socially even more destructive mechanism that we label the ‘crash for cash’ effect. We argue that by drawing on the IMF, elites can benefit from accumulating excessive debt to extract rents and hide these safely in offshore financial destinations while steering their countries into financial disaster. To test this mechanism, we show that elite wealth in offshore bank accounts has a first-order impact on a captured government’s willingness to draw on a lender of last resort. From a policy perspective, our analysis underscores the importance of closing financial loopholes to mitigate the devastating socio-economic effects of sophisticated financial engineering in a financially integrated global economy.

Introduction

Capital flight is a key obstacle to sustainable development. While policymakers often point the finger at financial investors, in many cases, well-connected local elites drive capital flight into offshore financial destinations. These elites plunder the wealth of their countries and expatriate assets into safe havens (Jayachandran and Kremer, 2006, Garcia-Bernardo et al., 2017, Andersen et al., 2020).1 Depriving a country of investible capital can lead to a loss of tax revenues and rising inequality, to the effect that elite capital flight ultimately undermines macroeconomic stability (Alesina and Tabellini, 1989, Ndikumana et al., 2014, Frantz, 2018): notwithstanding its ethical status, such behavior undermines the quality of governance, furthering endemic corruption and crony business practices that amplify financial vulnerabilities (Cerra et al., 2008, Meierrieks and Schneider, 2021).

Previous literature analyzing the determinants of elite capital flight identifies dysfunctional governance frameworks that provide a fertile breeding ground for criminal activities such as embezzlement, trade misinvoicing, and tax evasion (for a review, see Cooley et al. (2018)). Weak institutions facilitate capital flight because they allow wealthy elites to move embezzled funds abroad without punishment (Collier et al., 2001, Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003, Le and Rishi, 2006).

Conclusion

The IMF plays a vital role in supporting countries during times of economic hardship, earning it a reputation as “a global payday loan company for countries who have got into trouble and can’t meet their financial commitments — the difference being that instead of charging sky-high interest rates, it demands radical economic reforms”.33

Researchers have analyzed the circumstances under which the IMF decides to intervene and the conditions it imposes in exchange for financial relief (e.g., Reinsberg et al., 2019). We analyze the role of international capital flight and its impact on IMF involvement and program design. We argue that the ability to draw on the IMF creates perverse economic incentives so that a country’s elites can privatize economic gains by moving funds into offshore financial destinations before the arrival of the Fund. Although the Fund possesses numerous instruments to address economic crises, it does not have any means to seize elite wealth in offshore financial destinations, so the costs of elite capital flight are passed onto the population at large.