مشخصات مقاله | |
ترجمه عنوان مقاله | سقوط پول نقد: مقاصد مالی فراساحلی و برنامه های صندوق بین المللی پول (IMF) |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله | Crash for cash: Offshore financial destinations and IMF programs |
نشریه | الزویر |
انتشار | مقاله سال 2023 |
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی | 13 صفحه |
هزینه | دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد. |
نوع نگارش مقاله |
مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article) |
مقاله بیس | این مقاله بیس میباشد |
نمایه (index) | JCR – Master Journal List – Scopus |
نوع مقاله | ISI |
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی | |
ایمپکت فاکتور(IF) |
2.530 در سال 2021 |
شاخص H_index | 86 در سال 2023 |
شاخص SJR | 1.127 در سال 2021 |
شناسه ISSN | 0176-2680 |
شاخص Quartile (چارک) | Q1 در سال 2021 |
فرضیه | ندارد |
مدل مفهومی | دارد |
پرسشنامه | ندارد |
متغیر | دارد |
رفرنس | دارد |
رشته های مرتبط | اقتصاد – مدیریت – حسابداری |
گرایش های مرتبط | اقتصاد مالی – مدیریت مالی – حسابداری مالی – مهندسی مالی و ریسک – اقتصاد پول و بانکداری |
نوع ارائه مقاله |
ژورنال |
مجله | مجله اروپایی اقتصاد سیاسی – European Journal of Political Economy |
دانشگاه | Georgetown University, McCourt School of Public Policy, Old North Building, United States of America |
کلمات کلیدی | مقاصد مالی فراساحلی – فرار سرمایه نخبگان – صندوق بین المللی پول – برنامه های صندوق بین المللی پول |
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی | Offshore financial destinations – Elite capital flight – IMF – IMF programs |
شناسه دیجیتال – doi |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102359 |
لینک سایت مرجع | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268023000034 |
کد محصول | e17386 |
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله | ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید. |
دانلود رایگان مقاله | دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی |
سفارش ترجمه این مقاله | سفارش ترجمه این مقاله |
فهرست مطالب مقاله: |
Abstract 1 Introduction 2 Background and hypotheses 3 Research design 4 Results 5 Conclusion Declaration of Competing Interest Acknowledgements Appendix A. Supplementary data Data availability References |
بخشی از متن مقاله: |
Abstract A growing body of literature scrutinizes the harmful consequences of capital flight to offshore financial destinations. While financial integration is a well-known facilitator of capital flight, we shed light on an under-appreciated determinant—the availability of an IMF bailout. Expanding on previous literature analyzing moral hazard in the context of IMF programs, we introduce a socially even more destructive mechanism that we label the ‘crash for cash’ effect. We argue that by drawing on the IMF, elites can benefit from accumulating excessive debt to extract rents and hide these safely in offshore financial destinations while steering their countries into financial disaster. To test this mechanism, we show that elite wealth in offshore bank accounts has a first-order impact on a captured government’s willingness to draw on a lender of last resort. From a policy perspective, our analysis underscores the importance of closing financial loopholes to mitigate the devastating socio-economic effects of sophisticated financial engineering in a financially integrated global economy. Introduction Capital flight is a key obstacle to sustainable development. While policymakers often point the finger at financial investors, in many cases, well-connected local elites drive capital flight into offshore financial destinations. These elites plunder the wealth of their countries and expatriate assets into safe havens (Jayachandran and Kremer, 2006, Garcia-Bernardo et al., 2017, Andersen et al., 2020).1 Depriving a country of investible capital can lead to a loss of tax revenues and rising inequality, to the effect that elite capital flight ultimately undermines macroeconomic stability (Alesina and Tabellini, 1989, Ndikumana et al., 2014, Frantz, 2018): notwithstanding its ethical status, such behavior undermines the quality of governance, furthering endemic corruption and crony business practices that amplify financial vulnerabilities (Cerra et al., 2008, Meierrieks and Schneider, 2021). Previous literature analyzing the determinants of elite capital flight identifies dysfunctional governance frameworks that provide a fertile breeding ground for criminal activities such as embezzlement, trade misinvoicing, and tax evasion (for a review, see Cooley et al. (2018)). Weak institutions facilitate capital flight because they allow wealthy elites to move embezzled funds abroad without punishment (Collier et al., 2001, Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003, Le and Rishi, 2006). Conclusion The IMF plays a vital role in supporting countries during times of economic hardship, earning it a reputation as “a global payday loan company for countries who have got into trouble and can’t meet their financial commitments — the difference being that instead of charging sky-high interest rates, it demands radical economic reforms”.33 Researchers have analyzed the circumstances under which the IMF decides to intervene and the conditions it imposes in exchange for financial relief (e.g., Reinsberg et al., 2019). We analyze the role of international capital flight and its impact on IMF involvement and program design. We argue that the ability to draw on the IMF creates perverse economic incentives so that a country’s elites can privatize economic gains by moving funds into offshore financial destinations before the arrival of the Fund. Although the Fund possesses numerous instruments to address economic crises, it does not have any means to seize elite wealth in offshore financial destinations, so the costs of elite capital flight are passed onto the population at large. |