Abstract

This article addresses the critical issue of violence against children, defined as a violation of their rights across interpersonal, community, societal, and global settings, encompassing both physical and psychological actions targeting them or their parents. Globally, WHO estimates that an unacceptably large number of children aged 2–17 years, experience physical, sexual, or emotional violence or neglect yearly. War stands out as a major contributor to the infringement of children’s fundamental human rights. Those in conflict zones undergo traumatic experiences, including the loss of family members, disruptions to social networks, displacement, and the denial of basic needs. The severe deprivation of essential resources and opportunities, coupled with the stress of warfare, poses a grave threat to the emotional and cognitive development of children, increasing the risk of physical and mental illnesses, disabilities, social problems, and intergenerational consequences. The article aims to draw attention to this issue and advocates for the development of appropriate academic and post-academic educational courses and training programs. This will better equip pediatricians and healthcare professionals to effectively combat violence against children in any context.

Introduction

Violence against children, is a global critical issue, which is defined worldwide as a violation of their rights across interpersonal, community, societal, and global settings, encompassing both physical and psychological actions targeting them or their parents.1,2 Globally, WHO estimates that an unacceptably large number of children aged 2–17 years, experience physical, sexual, or emotional violence or neglect yearly.1., 2. War stands out as a major contributor to the infringement of children’s fundamental human rights. Those in conflict zones undergo traumatic experiences, including the loss of family members, disruptions to social networks, displacement, and the denial of basic needs.3 The severe deprivation of essential resources and opportunities, coupled with the stress of warfare, poses a grave threat to the emotional and cognitive development of children, increasing the risk of physical and mental illnesses, disabilities, social problems, and intergenerational consequences.2., 3., 4. The article aims to draw attention to this issue and advocates for the development of appropriate academic and post-academic educational courses and training programs. This will better equip pediatricians and healthcare professionals to effectively combat violence against children in any context.

Conclusion

In the current historic moment, it is crucial for pediatricians and families to provide support to children, mitigating the potential psychological repercussions mentioned earlier. Pediatricians can significantly contribute to ensuring that the children of the future enjoy better opportunities for a normal and enriched childhood. Their role is pivotal, especially in fostering psychological well-being and contributing to the personal growth of children within a community with its own set of rules. Children must cultivate love and respect for others, understanding that “other” does not signify a limitation but rather a treasure for their personal development. Consequently, the child of today can evolve into a better individual tomorrow.

Abstract

There is a debate at the highest levels of government and civil society over whether the rise in fraud is a blip exacerbated by the pandemic or a more fundamental transformation (or flip) in the structure of crime. This paper examines this debate by exploring the social factors influencing the level of fraud. It does so by conceptualising these factors as a fraud field, offering a novel way to visualise and consider vulnerability through the broad categories of ‘threats’ and ‘safeguards’ which influence levels of fraud. In doing so it offers the first attempt to map the wide range of ‘forces’ that influence levels of fraud and produces a mathematical expression of this, which will provide a basis for further debate, refinement and research. The threats include the myriad of opportunities, the large population of fraudsters, and the range of human and technology enablers that support the fraudsters. The principal safeguards that resist the fraud threat are culture, the law and the defensive resilience of individuals and organisations. Using the fraud field and official crime statistics, the paper argues that the safeguards are so structurally weak that the fraud epidemic is not a blip, but an opportunistic flip from traditional acquisitive crimes. The forces influencing levels of fraud mean high volumes of fraud will continue at the current levels or even accelerate further, unless there is a collective national strategy to strengthen the safeguards.

Introduction

A recent report by the prestigious international relations think tank, the Royal United Services Institute, described fraud as an epidemic that threatens national security (Wood et al., 2021). In stark contrast, a senior official responsible for the counter-fraud policy in a large government agency expressed to one of this paper’s authors their frustration in failing to secure greater interest and resources from colleagues and politicians because of the prevailing perception that the recent rise in fraud in the UK is a ‘blip’, exacerbated by the COVID pandemic. In another illustration of the sanguine view regarding fraud, one of the authors of this paper was contacted by an undergraduate student from another university, who asked what they thought of their lecturer’s view that fraud was just another moral panic. These views attenuating the fraud problem might not be representative, but the fact of such views in ‘informed’ opinion in the face of the overwhelming evidence of the substantial fraud problem illustrated by the Crime Survey of England and Wales, illustrates the need for further exploration and exposure of the problem. Differential rationalisation theory suggests this sanguine view is dangerous because it justifies inaction (Shepherd and Button, 2018). The political perception is partly informed by a marked fall in traditional crimes since the early 1990 s in the UK and other Western nations (Tonry, 2014). It is also subject to the manipulative politicalisation of statistics. For example, former Prime Minister, Boris Johnson announced to the House of Commons in January 2022 that “we have been cutting crime by 14 %” (HC Deb, 2022). He was subsequently admonished by the head of the UK Statistics Authority for failing to explain that the fall excluded fraud and computer misuse (Norgrove, 2022). Had Johnson included fraud and computer misuse, he would have had to announce a 14 % increase in total crime. These political machinations do, nevertheless, point to a very important question. Can the fraud epidemic be ignored as just another cyclical change in crime that will eventually decline or is it a permanent feature of 21st century British society?

Conclusion

Galvanised by the dismissive attitudes of some senior leaders in the UK, this paper challenges the notion that the fraud epidemic in the UK could be described as blip. The examination of the official crime statistics shows that acquisitive crime has switched from theft to fraud because fraud has become a more accessible offence and, from the offender’s perspective, it is lower risk. Using the novel fraud field concept to visualise fraud threats and safeguards, the paper has noted the significant forces influencing fraud levels and developed a novel mathematical expression of this. From this assessment the paper argues that the threat forces in favour of fraud currently overwhelm the safeguard forces. The array of threat forces has been hugely amplified by the disruptive impact of new technologies. In particular, because the essence of fraud is a false communication, the digital communication and transaction technologies are powerful enablers that provide a whole generation of fraudsters across the world with access to victims anywhere in the world. Indifference is the essential cause of the weakness of the safeguard forces: an indifferent public, marginal interests within law enforcement, irresponsible organisations, and dismissive politicians. Consequently, it is naïve and reckless to regard the current level of fraud in the UK as a blip, and it will continue at the current levels or accelerate without strategic intervention. The fraud field analysis suggests that the threat field can be tackled by collective action: strengthening law enforcement, obliging large organisations to transition from enablers to disablers by investing in resilience that protects both themselves and the public, and by greater international efforts to tackle the international dimension of fraud.

Abstract

1 Introduction

2 FIL Background

3 Highlights of the FIL

4 The Road Ahead: Implementation of the FIL

5 Conclusion: Towards a New Era of the Foreign Investment Law Regime

References

Abstract

     China’s foreign investment law regime has experienced significant changes in recent years. A milestone came with the passing of the Foreign Investment Law (FIL) in 2019, replacing the laws and regulations that had governed foreign investment in China for four decades. This article first undertakes a political economic analysis to determine the relevance of internal and external factors contributing to the changes. It then discusses the key characteristics of the FIL and reveals how it is designed to create a liberal, stable, fair, transparent and accountable regime to promote and protect foreign investment. Although the passage of the FIL ushered in a new era of foreign investment in China, many important issues remain unresolved and further actions must be taken to ensure its smooth implementation. To support the sustained development of its foreign investment regime, China must address existing laws and regulations that are incompatible with the new regime, clarify key issues that the new law fails to address, issue clearer guidance on national security, shorten its ‘negative list’, promote opening up and enhance regulatory transparency.

Introduction

     On 15 March 2019, China passed the Foreign Investment Law (FIL)Footnote1 that demonstrated its commitment to providing a level playing field for foreign investors. Entering into force on 1 January 2020, together with its corresponding Implementation Regulation, the FIL put an end to the three primary laws that had governed foreign investment in China for four decades, namely the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law, the Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law and the Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises Law (together, the Three Laws). With unified provisions on market access, investment promotion, investment protection and foreign investment management, the FIL represented a milestone in China’s endeavour to open up to foreign investment through the rule of law. The law was promulgated to address international concerns, to summarise the domestic experience and to improve the business environment. In the face of unprecedented uncertainties and rising protectionism in the global economy, the law was intended to create a ‘golden age’ for foreign investors in China.Footnote2 Against this backdrop, this article first presents an overview of the development of China’s foreign investment law regime, delving into the economic, political and external factors that led to the enactment of the FIL. It then highlights the main features of the FIL. The third part of the article summarises the problems with the law that remain to be resolved and the measures required for its smooth implementation. Specifically, to support the sustained development of its new foreign investment regime, China must revise existing laws and regulations that are incompatible with the FIL, clarify key issues that the FIL fails to address, issue detailed guidance on national security, shorten the ‘negative list’ to promote opening up and enhance the transparency of the regulatory system.

Conclusion: Towards a New Era of the Foreign Investment Law Regime

     With the adoption and implementation of the FIL, the laws and regulations that have governed China over the last four decades fall away. The FIL establishes the basic framework for a new type of foreign investment legal regime and unifies provisions on market access, investment promotion, investment protection and investment management. As a landmark piece of legislation in China’s foreign investment law regime, the FIL is underpinned by a combination of internal experience and international practice. It provides a stronger legal guarantee of further opening up and the active and effective utilisation of foreign investment. With the adoption of the FIL, China is entering a new era of foreign investment wherein a level playing field will be created and a more stable, fair and transparent regime will be established.

Abstract

1 Introduction

2 Data and Methods

3 Results and discussion

4 Conclusion

Appendix A

References

Declaration of interests

Abstract

     The COVID-19 pandemic is strongly affecting many aspects of human life and society around the world. To investigate whether this pandemic also influences crime, the differences of crime incidents numbers before and during the pandemic in four large cities (namely Washington DC, Chicago, New York City and Los Angeles) are investigated. Moreover, the Granger causal relationships between crime incidents numbers and new cases of COVID-19 are also examined. Based on that, new cases of COVID-19 with significant Granger causal correlations are used to improve the crime prediction performance. The results show that crime is generally impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, but it varies in different cities and with different crime types. Most types of crimes have seen fewer incidents numbers during the pandemic than before. Several Granger causal correlations are found between the COVID-19 cases and crime incidents in these cities. More specifically, crime incidents numbers of theft in DC, Chicago and New York City, fraud in DC and Los Angeles, assault in Chicago and New York City, and robbery in Los Angeles and New York City, are significantly Granger caused by the new case of COVID-19.

Introduction

     The COVID-19 pandemic is one of the most serious global public health events in recent years. The onset and spread of COVID-19 have affected nearly every continent. People’s daily lives and the whole society have been drastically influenced around the world [1], [2], [3]. For example, in many cities, traffic is completely restricted [4, 5]; non-essential businesses have closed for a very long time; travel became more and more difficult; and social gatherings are limited [6, 7]. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic is a huge challenge to education activities [8, 9], many courses are moved online. At the same time, unemployment among many groups of workers increased sharply [10, 11]. What’s more serious is that the pandemic has led to a dramatic loss of human life, economic losses and social disruption worldwide, presenting an unprecedented challenge to public health, food systems, and public safety [12]. This also raises attention to other questions related to our lives and security. Does the COVID-19 pandemic have an impact on crime? If so, is this impact strong or weak? If the COVID-19 pandemic has a strong impact on crime, will the pandemic be a factor for analyzing

Conclusion

     This study investigates the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on crimes in four large cities (namely Washington DC, Chicago, New York City and Los Angeles). The differences of crime incidents numbers before and during the pandemic are investigated, and the Granger causal relationships between crime incidents numbers and new cases of COVID-19 are examined. Then, significant correlations between COVID-19 and crimes are used to improve the crime prediction performance.

     Overall, the result shows that crime is indeed impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, but it varies in different cities and also with different crime types. Most types of crimes have seen fewer incidents numbers during the pandemic than before. For example, theft numbers decrease significantly in these cities. Moreover, in three of the US cities, theft numbers are proved Granger caused by the new cases of COVID-19. For some other crime types and cities, similar results are reported. This may be partially explained by the Routine Activity theory and opportunity theory that people may prefer to stay at home to avoid being infected with COVID-19 during the pandemic, giving fewer chances for crimes.

Abstract

     Globally life imprisonment has been considered as the terminal and conclusive penalty, in most of the countries for the extreme violations and serious crimes. Thus since the last few decades this long-term conviction has been increasing throughout the world, it has attracted much of the attention towards a principal debate from human rights point of view that whether as an ultimate penalty is life imprisonment acceptable or is merely an act of violation towards human rights. In this article, the aim is to evaluate the life imprisonment complexity against the human rights standards and how it has been considered as a substitute for death penalty. Apart from this it also talks about Article 3 (universal Declaration of Human Rights) and if life imprisonment without possibility of parole violates convention or not. Further analyzing human rights perspective, the article revisits the debate to conclude if life imprisonment is justifiableretribution by severely examining it under Internationalcriminal law.

Introduction

     Life imprisonment as the only deterrent for violent offences has been a long-standing tradition which dates back to 1970s and 1980s when harsh and long-term penalties were seen as an appropriate retributive solution to rising crime rates in the US [1]. Eventually within a few years this toughon-crime movement spread across the Anglo-Saxon world, finally finding hold in Europe. In criminological research and national crime figures, there is little agreement about what constitutes a long-term jail sentence [2]; meanings vary from five years to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the latter clearly indicating circumstances where inmates are held in prison until they die. While offences and punishments were originally regarded as inherently state prerogatives, implying that it was up to states to decide what were the worst crimes and how to prosecute their criminals, constituting the essence of their “right to punish”; International human rights law (IHRL) saw that as an unacceptable statement that needed to be revised, and it stood up to determine that states are not able to prosecute criminals in whatever manner they see fit, and that there would be certain restrictions. The current contribution builds on this foundation by addressing the punishment of life imprisonment, with a particular emphasis on forms of life imprisonment in which the possibility of parole is missing or, if available, is not materially open to inmates, again describing this as a sentence without the hope of any escape, even fairly – let alone completely [3].

Conclusion

     Providing life a prisoner with a possibility of parole is not only fair, but also compatible with their intrinsic humanity, which is unaffected even by the most egregious offences. The suggested theoretical framework to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under International human rights legislation provides for the recognition of certain similar characteristics and discrepancies within the major International instruments aimed at the defence of human rights. The aforementioned arguments for life sentences under International humanitarian law seem to be critical for International criminal tribunals and courts to take a more oriented and careful human rights policy. This is because, aside from the tradition of infuriating and mitigating circumstances, these courts and tribunals have rendered no heed to the human rights-based arguments for life imprisonment. Recent judicial precedent suggests that the present state of affairs jeopardizes human-rights negotiations, and that the lack of annual evaluations results in unnecessarily lengthy sentences. Also, there has been a lengthy discussion on whether life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is the most serious kind of punishment that can be enforced on anyone under the age of 18. The sole solution to this debate is that the punishment should be equal to the severity of the offence and the risk that the criminal poses. Aside from that it has been concluded that life imprisonment can breach Article 3 if it possesses certain attributes or ignores certain vital legal authority conducts. However, since the European Court of Human Rights has not established any official uniform standards, the specifications for specified follow can be difficult. It is clear that a concrete and formal life sentence with no chance of parole is deemed a violation of Article 3. As a result, the only criterion for incarceration is that it does not violate Article 3 which prohibits cruel or degrading treatment. Overall, it is past time for us to reconsider our attitudes about long-term incarceration. This is critical, since long-term prisoners make up a vast and increasing percentage of prisons around the world, and protecting their basic human rights with a correctional facility that offers them a chance to be released is paramount.

Abstract

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Abstract:

This article explores ‘bad’ sex in an age of same-sex marriage, through an analysis of the ‘homoradical’ as a rejection of both hetero and homo-normativities. Drawing on qualitative data from 29 LGBTQ interviewees, the article considers resistance to the discursive privileging of same-sex marriage in the context of Gayle Rubin’s theories of respectability and sexual hierarchies. These hierarchies constitute a ‘charmed circle’ of accepted sexual practices which are traditionally justified by marriage, procreation and/or love. It examines non-normative sexuality through the example of the lived experiences of non-normative, anti-assimilationist identities, particularly non-monogamy, public sex, and kink sex, showing how the ‘homoradical’ deviates from the normative practices that same-sex marriage reinforces.

1. Introduction

The Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 (hereafter, the 2013 Act) allowed same-sex couples to enter into a marriage for the first time in England and Wales.1 This change in the law is a significant development in the relationship of law and sexuality, and is of particular significance for LGBTQ people who are now be seen as ‘equal’, ‘normal’, or ‘the same as’ different-sex couples when formally recognizing their relationship. LGBTQ people’s sexuality was seen, traditionally, as antithetical to marriage; abject, immoral, and dangerous. In the 1980s, LGBTQ couples were described by Parliament as ‘a pretended family relationship’ in s28 of the Local Government Act, while the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 explicitly removes the sex from same-sex marriage by omitting adultery and consummation provisions (see Maine 2021). Marriage is representative of notions of ‘good sex’, as the legitimate and appropriate location for sex and procreation to take place: marriage’s introduction occupied a large swathe of LGBTQ rights campaigns for the best part of the last decade, and reaffirms the normative centrality of marriage and promotions of good gay, bad queer narratives (Ashford et al. 2020). This article seeks to highlight the queer challenge to the normative ideals of marriage and, particularly, the homonormative ideals of same-sex marriage.

Heteronormativity describes the social norm in which heterosexuality is seen as a ‘default’ position. Heteronormativity sustains and fosters a sexual hierarchy (Rubin 1984) in creating an expectation of heterosexuality, monogamy, and procreativity. Comparatively, homonormativity may be viewed as a conduit of heteronormativity, a form of identity and relationship that closely mirrors and reinforces heteronormativity and that ‘straightens’ queer politics. Homonormativity describes a dominant politics of liberal equality that upholds and sustains desexualised and depoliticised perspectives of same-sex couples, defined by Duggan (2003) as a ‘politic of assimilation’.

The Roots: Individual Mastery versus Anti-hegemonic Sovereignty

The Core: Civil and Political Rights or Socioeconomic Well-Being

The Fruits: Identity Politics or the Flowering of Civil, Political, Cultural, and Environmental Rights

Conclusion: Concrete Universals

Notes

Disclosure Statement

Notes on Contributor

References

Abstract

     Based on the principle that universals are valid if they are concrete universals, this article provides a comparison between Western liberal and Chinese Marxist approaches to human rights. It does so in three steps. First is the analysis of the foundations, or roots, of the Western liberal emphasis on an individual’s mastery over a “right” understood in terms of private property, and the Marxist tradition’s emphasis on anti-hegemonic sovereignty in light of anti-colonial struggles for national liberation. Second is the contrast between the development of the Western approach to the core human rights in terms of freedom of expression, movement, and assembly, and the Marxist emphasis on the right to socioeconomic well-being, or common prosperity. Third is the comparison between the fruits of either tradition, one in terms of identity politics, and the other in the emphasis on civil, political, cultural, and environmental rights. The article concludes by asking whether the two approaches are able to come to an understanding of each other, and proposes that such an understanding may need to take place in light of the concept and reality of concrete universals.

The Western Emphasis on Individual Mastery over Private Property

     To begin with the roots: the Western tradition begins in Western Europe of the eleventh century. During this period, the fabled “lawyer popes” began the process of a thorough transformation of the European legal and political framework. These lawyer popes and their advisers made a crucial rediscovery: the ancient Roman concept of absolute private property. In Rome of the second century BCE, they were faced with a legal conundrum that concerned slaves. Was a slave a human being or a “thing” (res)? If the former, then the relation between a master and a slave would be one between human beings; if the latter, then the relation would be one between a human owner and an object or a “thing.” Given that slaves had gradually been reduced to the same level as cattle and material objects, it was the relation between a master and a “thing” that constituted the legal problem to be solved.

     Roman jurists—legal theorists—came up with an ingenious solution that would come to have repercussions they could never have imagined. This was the category of absolute private property,1 in which the primary relation of the owner of private property was to the “thing” that he—and it was invariably a “he”—owned.2 This may seem like a somewhat strange way to formulate the solution, since those who are immersed in the Western tradition tend to think of private property in terms of the relations with other owners: I own this object, which means that you do not own it. Not so for the Romans. Instead, absolute private property was constituted as the relation between the owner and the object owned. Why? Because the object owned was a slave. The various ways in which this relation was expressed are telling: the slave was seen as simply an extension of the master, an automaton that acted as though it were a part of the master, as the hand of the master.3

Conclusion: Concrete Universals

     In conclusion, two points need to be made. To begin with, I have emphasised two approaches and indeed traditions concerning human rights. One begins from individual mastery over private property, grows into civil and political rights, and flowers in terms of identity politics. The other begins from anti-hegemonic sovereignty, upon which grows socioeconomic well-being, and flourishes in term of civil, political, cultural, and economic rights in a socialist system. But a question remains as to whether they have any common ground. By way of an answer, let us consider two documents from the United Nations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UNGA 1966a) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (UNGA 1966b). In many ways, these two documents embody the two traditions I have analysed in this study, INTERNATIONAL CRITICAL THOUGHT 247 although it is notable that the Marxist tradition’s emphases are also to be found in most developing—and formerly colonised—countries, who also are signatories to the right to development (UNGA 1986). The history of the writing of these documents is instructive: the two main declarations were initially planned to be one document. However, due to disagreement in emphasis between countries that espouse the Western liberal tradition and the majority of countries that were formerly colonised by such countries and strongly advocate anti-hegemonic sovereignty, the declaration was divided into the two we have now. They were initially published in 1966, and they both came into effect in 1976. If one considers the countries that have signed and ratified the declarations (not difficult to determine), it is clear that a divide still exists and mutual recognition of distinct traditions and emphases on human rights still requires considerable work (Sun 2014; Li et al. 2015, 68–69; Zwart 2020).

Abstract

     Since the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) were adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011, they have diffused into policy frameworks, laws, and regulations across the globe. This special issue seeks to advance the interdisciplinary field of human rights research by examining key elements of the emerging transnational regime for the regulation of business and human rights. In seven original contributions, scholars from political science, law, accounting, and philosophy critically reflect on the theoretical foundations of the UNGPs, they analyze the effectiveness of implementation mechanisms and current regulatory practice, and they advance proposals for the future development of the business and human rights regime. In this introduction, we prepare the ground for these analyses, proceeding in three steps. Firstly, we argue that the adoption of the UNGPs has triggered a norm cascade which requires a distinctive, empirically oriented research agenda focusing on the scope, governance, and effectiveness of corporate human rights accountability norms and instruments. Secondly, we explain how the articles in this special issue contribute to that research agenda by addressing these themes. Thirdly, we provide an overview of the individual contributions and point out avenues for future research.

Introduction

     Following the endorsement of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in 2011, they have become widely regarded as “the most authoritative statement of the human rights duties or responsibilities of states and corporations adopted at the UN level” (De Schutter 2013: xvii).Footnote1 Developed in a worldwide consultation process by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), John Ruggie, the UNGPs were aimed at tackling and preventing business-related human rights abuses by closing governance gaps in the largely unrestrained global market economy (Ruggie 2013: xxiii).

     Although many corporations contribute positively to realizing human rights, e.g., through job creation, the production and distribution of goods, services, and infrastructure, business activities also impact negatively on human rights. Some of the most severe and widespread forms of corporate human rights abuse include the dislocation of indigenous communities without compensation or consultation, the impairment of people’s health and safety due to unfit working conditions and destruction of the environment, the leaking of individuals’ data to government agents, the denial of freedom of expression and of association, discrimination and sexual harassment at the workplace, and sweatshops, bonded labor, and child labor in the transnational supply chains of global brands (see Bernaz 2017: 1–2; Ruggie 2013: xv-xvi; ILO 2017). However, it is rather difficult to hold business enterprises to account for human rights abuses, for various reasons.

Conclusion and Avenues for Future Research

     Taken together, the contributions to this special issue offer a rich multi-dimensional and transdisciplinary analysis of key elements of the business and human rights regime. On the one hand, they enhance our understanding of different conceptions of corporate human rights accountability, of the role and functions, the impact but also the limitations of important actors and governance instruments of that regime. On the other hand, the articles engage with these limitations in a critical yet constructive fashion, making proposals for resolving misalignments in the governance architecture and improving the effectiveness of specific instruments. In so doing, all contributions are driven by a normative commitment to strengthen corporate human rights accountability, help prevent business-related human rights abuses, and improve access to effective remedies for victims.

     Building on the insights provided by the analyses in this special issue, as well as on the research agenda set out above, we identify three main tasks for future research in the business and human rights field. Firstly, scholarship needs to further investigate the scope and substance of changes in corporate human rights conduct in response to regulatory initiatives. This is not only to differentiate good corporate practice from rhetorical adaptation or strategic attempts to co-opt the human rights discourse but also to identify the underlying conditions for the effective socialization of business actors into norm acceptance and compliant behavior. Secondly, researchers need to keep pace with the evolution of, and changing trends in, the business and human rights regime. This implies the close monitoring and critical assessment of the construction, contestation, and transformation of human rights and accountability norms, as well as of the emergence and performance of actors and governance instruments, such as National Contact Points, National Action Plans, corporate reporting standards, and due diligence laws. Here, it is important to move beyond dominant perspectives on the Global North and extend the research focus to regulatory frameworks and corporate conduct at the starting point of transnational supply chains, especially in countries of the Global South. Finally, business and human rights scholars should continue to feed their academic expertise into the policy process and public debate at the local, national, and transnational levels. With their privileged access to the insights of multidisciplinary human rights scholarship, business and human rights scholars are in an ideal position to create awareness for the complexity of the issues at stake, help building bridges between opposing actors, and contribute to the enhancement of corporate human rights accountability.

Abstract

     Although the extractive industry has contributed to the socio-economic development of many African countries, it has also led to incidences of human rights violations in many rural communities. However, the use of an evidence-based approach to search, locate, explore and synthesize the literature systematically in order to understand the nature and pattern of human rights violations within the extractive industry remains limited. Consequently, this study employs the systematic review method to determine the nature and drivers of human rights abuses within the extractive industry in Africa. Of the 791 articles retrieved from the search of the databases, 58 articles met the inclusion criteria and were included in evidence synthesis. Based on the thematic analysis conducted on the articles that met the inclusion criteria, we find that human rights abuses tend to be associated with the violation of economic, social, and cultural rights, tensions over land ownership, the loss of livelihood, and community marginalization. We conclude the study with some policy implications and suggest avenues for future research.

Introduction

     The relationship between resource extraction and sustainable development in Africa has largely remained contested. Indeed, while the World Bank and African governments/elites are often quick to point out that resource extraction contributes to the economic development of African countries, others have emphasized the negative socio-economic impacts of the extractive industry on the poor and marginalized communities (Akabzaa and Darimani, 2001; 1demudia, 2007; Tuokuu et al., 2018). As primarily an exporter of primary commodities, African governments pursuit of economic development through resource extraction with the adoption of neoliberal economic policies like the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in the 1980s resulted in the liberalization of codes and laws that also allowed for the influx of foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) into rural communities where resource extraction tends to take place (Campbell, 2003, 2010; Tuokuu et al., 2019). As a result, in contrast to the 1960s that was dominated by African governments’ pursuit of nationalization of economic policies, the domain of opposition to MNC activities in the 1990s invariably shifted from host governments to local communities (Harvey, 2006). These contestations over the activities of MNCs in rural communities often resulted in a widespread incidence of corporate-community conflict and associated human rights violations. For example, local protests over incidences of environmental degradation associated with the operation of Shell in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria led to the displacement of the Ogoni people and the violations of their human rights (Obi, 2009). These kinds of incidences resulted in reputational damage, increased social risks, and associated costs for MNCs.

Conclusion and future directions

     The aim of this systematic review was to synthesize available evidence in the literature on the drivers and patterns of human rights abuses in the extractive industry as well as identify the common suggestions on how to address these abuses. Our analysis showed that the pattern of abuse is often in terms of the violation of economic, social, and cultural rights and the core drivers of human rights abuses are contestations over land ownership, the associated loss of livelihood, and the marginalization of communities in decision-making. Much of the suggestions on efforts to address human rights abuses in the sector focused on CSR programs, formalization of ASM, and active community engagement. The implication is that the literature on business and human rights within the extractive industry in Africa tend to focus on document incidence of human rights abuses as opposed to analyzing how MNCs seek to address their human rights obligations. Indeed, while the extant works are critical for better understanding of the nature of the human rights problems in the sector, there is a need to move towards examining the effectiveness of the different processes and practices that MNCs are putting in place to address their human rights obligations. This is particularly important given that several MNCs are increasingly signing up to global initiatives such as the UN global compact and the voluntary principles of security and human rights as means to demonstrate their commitments to become corporate human rights defenders. Put differently, future research can usefully examine the extent to which corporate commitment to such global initiatives have necessarily yielded positive human rights dividend for local communities on the ground. There is the need for future research to probe how corporate commitments to global initiatives have yielded human rights outcomes within the extractive industry in Africa. Similarly, a crucial assumption underpins the idea that it is in the best interest of MNCs to respect human rights and rely on the notion that they require social licenses to operate. While the concept of social licenses to operate has been a subject of various critiques (see Owen and Kemp, 2013), we still do not know whether and how poor communities can enforce social license to operate or what other effective alternative corporate accountability strategies that local communities might be deploying to ensure MNCs respect their human rights.

Abstract

     The digitalisation of production driven by new paradigms such as Industry 4.0, factories of the future and smart manufacturing, create new challenges as to how manufacturers and other supply chain actors would discharge their corporate responsibility to respect human rights. These new paradigms enable novel approaches like distributed and collaborative manufacturing. Manufacturers increasingly leverage digital technologies, such as 3D printing, cloud manufacturing and artificial intelligence, to provide customised products. Digital technologies also improve predictive and preventive maintenance on the shop floor and across the supply chain, increasing the overall resilience of manufacturing industries in times of crisis. This article proposes a blueprint of a collaborative, decentralised approach to human rights due diligence in digital supply chains. It argues that the pooling of human rights due diligence efforts in manufacturing industries could have network-wide effects of incentivising value chain actors to also collaborate on providing collective remedy.

Introduction

     The manufacturing of a modern aircraft, like an Airbus A321, is the result of highly efficient cooperation across complex, tightly integrated global supply and manufacturing chains. The process starts with the design and engineering, through production and transport of aircraft sections, to final assembly and tests, certification and delivery to the customer. Growing demand in air travel in the past few decades has naturally increased the production needs. At the same time, fast-paced developments in the information and communications technology (ICT) industry have offered new ways of optimising manufacturing. As a result, the supply chain of modern aircraft production no longer consists of just raw materials, such as steel, aluminium, titanium and their alloys. The deployment of smart sensors on the shop floor and the utilization of automated systems means that supply chains now include also digital assets, such as datasets, computer simulations, digital twins and pre-trained machine learning models.

     New models of manufacturing are enabled by concepts like distributed, collaborative and additive manufacturing. At the same time, they also create distinct challenges as to how manufacturers and the various actors in their supply chains could discharge their corporate responsibility to respect human rights. It has become widely accepted that businesses do have a corporate responsibility to respect human rights. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (‘Guiding Principles’) promote this responsibility as a global standard of expected conduct from business enterprises, regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership or structure.1 Thus, from manufacturers to service-providing enterprises, all actors in the value chain are subject to the same responsibility.2 In this sense, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights applies equally to enterprises engaged in traditional manufacturing as well as those in smart manufacturing driven by the developments in so-called Industry 4.0.

Conclusion

     Collaborative smart manufacturing in Industry 4.0 represents a significant shift in the convention manufacturing paradigm. The vertical and horizontal integration of actors in the supply chain leads to the emergence of new business relationships entailing new potential adverse human rights impacts. It is beyond doubt that business entities have a corporate responsibility to respect human rights. A main tool to discharge this responsibility, human rights due diligence is premised on the idea that it is within the business enterprise’s control to prevent or mitigate human rights impacts at the beginning of a new business relationship or activity. This assumption, however, is challenged by technological and organisational processes within Industry 4.0 which are based on complex real-time network interactions and data-driven autonomous decision-making. In this new collaborative environment, the manufacturer becomes one of many actors in a network, along with the customer. This gives rise to new potential aggregate adverse human rights impacts at the level of the ecosystem which cannot be sufficiently addressed by any single actor alone.