| مشخصات مقاله | |
| ترجمه عنوان مقاله | تاثیر تخصص صنعتی حسابرس بر بهای وام بانکی |
| عنوان انگلیسی مقاله | Does Auditor Industry Expertise Affect Bank Loan Costs? |
| انتشار | مقاله سال ۲۰۱۷ |
| تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی | ۵۵ صفحه |
| هزینه | دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد. |
| پایگاه داده | نشریه امرالد |
| نوع نگارش مقاله |
مقاله پژوهشی (Research article) |
| مقاله بیس | این مقاله بیس میباشد |
| نمایه (index) | scopus – master journals – JCR |
| نوع مقاله | ISI |
| فرمت مقاله انگلیسی | |
| ایمپکت فاکتور(IF) |
۰٫۶۹۳ در سال ۲۰۱۷ |
| شاخص H_index | ۴۳ در سال ۲۰۱۷ |
| شاخص SJR | ۰٫۳۴ در سال ۲۰۱۷ |
| رشته های مرتبط | حسابداری |
| گرایش های مرتبط | حسابرسی، حسابداری صنعتی |
| نوع ارائه مقاله |
ژورنال |
| مجله | مجله حسابرسی مديريت – Managerial Auditing Journal |
| دانشگاه | Accounting – University of Central Oklahoma – Edmond – Oklahoma – USA |
| کلمات کلیدی | تخصص صنعت حسابرس، تخصص صنعت حسابرس، قرارداد وام بانکی، گسترش وام، عهدنامه |
| کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی | Auditor industry expertise،Auditor industry specialization،Bank loan contracting،Loan spreads،Collateral،Covenant |
| شناسه دیجیتال – doi |
https://doi.org/10.1108/MAJ-07-2015-1230 |
| کد محصول | E10514 |
| وضعیت ترجمه مقاله | ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید. |
| دانلود رایگان مقاله | دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی |
| سفارش ترجمه این مقاله | سفارش ترجمه این مقاله |
| فهرست مطالب مقاله: |
| Introduction
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development Research Design Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics Empirical Results Conclusion Reference |
| بخشی از متن مقاله: |
| We examine the association between auditor industry specialization and features of loan contracts including interest rates, the number of covenants and the likelihood of collateral. Over the past two decades, US firms have come to rely on bank loans as a key source of external financing. At times, the amount of bank loan financing was larger than the total amount of equity and bond financing 1 . But since firms may be hesitant to provide complete and accurate information when applying for financing, banks face an adverse selection problem when making loans. Reducing information asymmetry between banks and borrowers can mitigate adverse selection. Previous literature points out that accounting information can resolve information asymmetry and thus alleviate the adverse selection problem in loan contracting (Smith and Warner 1979;Watts and Zimmerman 1978, 1986, 1990; Armstrong, Guay and Weber 2010, etc). For instance, covenants associated with loan contracts are often based on accounting information about working capital or debt-to-equity ratios. In fact, banks are likely to strengthen price and non-price loan terms if borrowers provide poor quality accounting information (Bharath, Sunder and Sunder 2008). As public watchdogs, in a sense, auditors help to ensure that firms provide accounting information that conforms with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Firms hiring good auditors can improve the quality of their accounting information and obtain bank loans with favorable loan terms. Previous studies examine the role of auditing in bank loan contracting with respect to hiring auditors (Blackwell, Noland and Winters 1998; Minnis2011), the size of audit firms (Kim and Song 2011), and audit opinions (Chen, He, Ma and Stice 2015). |