| مشخصات مقاله | |
| ترجمه عنوان مقاله | مدیریت سود و مکانیسم های حاکمیت داخلی: نقش دینداری |
| عنوان انگلیسی مقاله | Earnings management and internal governance mechanisms: The role of religiosity |
| انتشار | مقاله سال 2022 |
| تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی | 27 صفحه |
| هزینه | دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد. |
| پایگاه داده | نشریه الزویر |
| نوع نگارش مقاله |
مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article) |
| مقاله بیس | این مقاله بیس میباشد |
| نمایه (index) | Scopus – Master Journals List – JCR |
| نوع مقاله | ISI |
| فرمت مقاله انگلیسی | |
| ایمپکت فاکتور(IF) |
4.091 در سال 2020 |
| شاخص H_index | 42 در سال 2020 |
| شاخص SJR | 0.767 در سال 2020 |
| شناسه ISSN | 0275-5319 |
| شاخص Quartile (چارک) | Q1 در سال 2020 |
| فرضیه | دارد، بخش 3. Hypotheses development صفحه 6 |
| مدل مفهومی | دارد، بخش 2.1. Theoretical framework صفحه 4 |
| پرسشنامه | ندارد |
| متغیر | دارد، ضمیمه A صفحه 24 |
| رفرنس | دارد |
| رشته های مرتبط | حسابداری، مدیریت |
| گرایش های مرتبط | حسابداری مالی، حسابداری مدیریت، مدیریت مالی |
| نوع ارائه مقاله |
ژورنال |
| مجله | پژوهش در کسب و کار بین المللی و مالی – Research in International Business and Finance |
| دانشگاه | Newcastle University, United Kingdom |
| کلمات کلیدی | مدیریت سود، حاکمیت شرکتی، دینداری، نوع بانک |
| کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی | Earnings management, Corporate governance, Religiosity, Bank type |
| شناسه دیجیتال – doi |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2021.101565 |
| کد محصول | E16091 |
| وضعیت ترجمه مقاله | ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید. |
| دانلود رایگان مقاله | دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی |
| سفارش ترجمه این مقاله | سفارش ترجمه این مقاله |
| فهرست مطالب مقاله: |
| Abstract Abbreviations JEL classification Keywords Introduction Theory and literature review Hypotheses development Sample selection and data Methodology Results Conclusion Declaration of Competing Interest Acknowledgement Appendix A. Variable Definitions and Descriptions References |
| بخشی از متن مقاله: |
| ABSTRACT Motivated by the managers’ social norms and religious orientations, this study offers new avenues for investigating the effect of internal governance in curbing earnings management. We comparatively assess whether internal governance mechanisms (i.e., boards of directors and audit committees) employed by Islamic and conventional banks could differentially mitigate earnings management. We take a step further to assess this association under the extended governance mechanism (i.e. Shari’ah supervisory board) employed by Islamic banks. For a global sample of 14 countries operating on a dual banking system between the years 2007− 2015, we find that, on average, having effective boards and audit committees enhance the quality of financial reporting in banking industry. Conditional on bank type, we find that large and independent board of directors (and audit committees) are negatively associated with earnings management for Islamic and conventional banks. There are no structural differences across the two bank types for the effectiveness of these traditional governance mechanisms. We also find that Shari’ah supervisory board (i.e., non-traditional governance) can significantly reduce earnings management. This finding is more evident when this board is large; its members have financial expertise and serve on multiple banks’ boards. Our results provide important implications for regulators governing dual banking systems by highlighting the explicit role of religiosity on managerial opportunism and the impact of double governance in promoting high financial reporting quality for global banking. Introduction The quality of financial reporting has long been discussed as having broader moral and ethical implications on various stakeholders (Du et al. 2015; Kanagaretnam et al., 2015; Lai et al., 2016; Vladu et al., 2017). Corporate scandals (e.g., Enron and WorldCom) have raised serious concerns about the credibility of financial statements over the last decade. Organisations enjoy legitimacy as they show that their activities are congruent with wide societal acceptations. Managers might be motivated in some situations to show that their firms adhere to the prevailing systems of acceptable norms, beliefs and cultural values to confer legitimacy upon their organisations (Wijayana and Gray, 2018). A weak system of governance is likely to offer managerial incentives to opportunistically manipulate reported earnings. Earnings management1 has been documented as one of the most critical questionable practices, which have substantial detrimental societal and economic consequences (Dechow et al., 1996; Klein, 2002; Leuz et al., 2003). Earnings management emerge within the presence of several motives (e.g. stock market incentives, compensation contracts incentives, debt contracts incentives, political incentives). Consequently, financial reporting quality is substantially lower as investors receive inaccurate information about the actual financial performance of the entities. This could cause adverse selection problems and moral hazards (Jiraporn et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010). |