مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد شواهد تجربی از بازی های فرار مالیاتی – الزویر ۲۰۲۰

elsevier

 

مشخصات مقاله
ترجمه عنوان مقاله چه کسی متوقف میکند دروغ گویی را در زمان یاد کردن سوگند؟ شواهد تجربی از بازی های فرار مالیاتی
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games
انتشار مقاله سال ۲۰۲۰
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی ۱۴ صفحه
هزینه دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد.
پایگاه داده نشریه الزویر
نوع نگارش مقاله
مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
مقاله بیس این مقاله بیس میباشد
نمایه (index) Scopus – Master Journals List – JCR
نوع مقاله ISI
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی  PDF
ایمپکت فاکتور(IF)
۲٫۰۳۹ در سال ۲۰۱۹
شاخص H_index ۱۱۶ در سال ۲۰۲۰
شاخص SJR ۲٫۲۱۰ در سال ۲۰۱۹
شناسه ISSN ۰۰۱۴-۲۹۲۱
شاخص Quartile (چارک) Q1 در سال ۲۰۱۹
مدل مفهومی دارد
پرسشنامه ندارد
متغیر ندارد
رفرنس دارد
رشته های مرتبط حسابداری، اقتصاد
گرایش های مرتبط حسابداری مالیاتی، اقتصاد مالی
نوع ارائه مقاله
ژورنال
مجله  بررسی اقتصاد اروپایی – European Economic Review
دانشگاه Paris School of Economics and University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. CES, 106 Bd. de l’hôpital, Paris 75013, France
کلمات کلیدی دروغ گویی پاره وقت، صداقت، سوگند، تعهد، فرار مالياتي
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی Part-time Lying، Honesty، Oath، Commitment، Tax evasion
شناسه دیجیتال – doi
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103369
کد محصول E14727
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله  ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید.
دانلود رایگان مقاله دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی
سفارش ترجمه این مقاله سفارش ترجمه این مقاله

 

فهرست مطالب مقاله:
Abstract

۱- Introduction

۲- Truth-telling oath procedure

۳- Experiment 1: One-shot tax declaration

۴- Experiment 2: repeated tax declaration

۵- Conclusion

References

بخشی از متن مقاله:

Abstract

Using two earned income/tax declaration experimental designs we show that only partial liars are affected by a truth-telling oath, a non-price commitment device. Under oath, we see no change in the number of chronic liars and fewer partial liars. Rather than smoothly increasing their compliance, we also observe that partial liars who respond to the oath, respond by becoming fully honest under oath. Based on both response times data and the consistency of subjects when several compliance decisions are made in a row, we show that partial lying arises as the result of weak preferences towards profitable honesty. The oath only transforms people with weak preferences for lying into being committed to the truth.

Introduction

Dishonesty erodes opportunities for economic gains in business and society.1 Scandals like Enron and the 2008 financial crisis have prompted the promotion of truth-telling oaths–a non-price commitment device, as well as similar pledges, or codes of conduct, like the MBA oath or Dutch Bankers oath (see e.g., McCabe et al., 2002; Shu et al., 2012; Cohn et al., 2014).2 Empirical evidence confirms that when people voluntarily commit to honesty through a solemn oath, they tell the truth most of the time, holding the lie constant (see e.g., Jacquemet et al., 2018).3 The rationale is that the oath will help promote greater economic exchange by triggering a person’s intrinsic commitment to telling the truth (i) by reducing the ability to rationalize a lie (i.e., self-justification), and (ii) by coupling the desire for a positive self-image together with the desire for consistency (Mazar et al., 2008). But not all lies are the same—a small lie is easier than a big lie (Lundquist et al., 2009; Gneezy et al., 2018; Abeler et al., 2019). And not all liars are the same—some people lie all the time, some never, and some waver between lying and the truth, depending. The open question we address is who actually responds to an oath with honesty, and why. Using an earned income/tax declaration lab experiment, we find that the oath only affects partial liars, not full liars.4 What is more, partial liars do not react to the oath by smoothly increasing their level of compliance under oath (as a homogeneous change in the cost of lying would predict), but rather jump to full compliance. We argue this is consistent with partial compliance arising from weak preferences for profitable dishonesty—partial liars seem to lack clarity about how to process profitable dishonesty, which suggests they were neither committed to lying nor to being truthful 100%. Their preferences were fungible—and the oath acted as a moral anchor, so that we observe fewer partial liars and more full truth tellers under oath than without the oath.

ارسال دیدگاه

نشانی ایمیل شما منتشر نخواهد شد. بخش‌های موردنیاز علامت‌گذاری شده‌اند *