مقاله سال ۲۰۱۶

Global air cargo traffic has grown by around 5% per year over the last three decades (BOEING, 2014; Kupfer et al., 2011a). According to Kupfer et al. (2011b), in 2008, the combination airlines1 accounted for around 50% of the traffic (measured in terms of RTK2 ). Similar figures were recently found by AIRBUS (2015).

The main customers of the combination airlines are service providers such as freight forwarders or GSA.3 Clancy et al (Clancy et al., 2008). estimated that freight forwarders control around 85% of the retail sales channel for general air cargo, while Hellermann (Hellermann, 2006) indicated an interval between 90% and 95%. In a movement initiated in the 1960s, most combination airlines focussed efforts and resources on the passenger business, consigning the air cargo business to a secondary role (Rhoades, 2014). In a gradual market movement, the air cargo service providers began occupying the space left by the combination airlines (Allaz, 2004). Combination airlines, generally speaking, avoid direct competition with these providers. Firstly, competition would likely damage existing commercial relationships. Secondly, it could entail substantial investments, since combination airlines often lack the means (e.g., know-how, technology, business model) to be competitive in the air cargo market (Allaz, 2004). Such investments may not be affordable (Moorman, 2007).

The cargo market is, nonetheless, a business area that combination airlines are seldom willing to forego. Wide-bodied passenger aircraft, have considerable spare hold space, which, if used to carry freight, can provide an additional source of revenue at a marginal cost. Additional sources of revenue can play a pivotal role with regard to profitability and long-term survivability. By way of example, air cargo revenues accounted (second quarter 2011) for 31% of LATAM Airlines total revenues and around of 35% of shipments were carried in the belly of wide-bodied aircrafts (Casadesus-Masanell and Tarzijan, 2012).