This study extends the literature on audit quality (e.g., Guedhami, Pittman and Saffar (2009), and Wang, Wong and Xia (2008)) by examining the link between firms’ internal corporate governance mechanisms and their auditor choice decisions particularly in the context of privatized firms. More specifically, we exploit the changes that privatization trigger within internal corporate governance mechanisms to examine whether their assessments of financial reporting credibility have changed for a sample of newly privatized firms (NPFs) from the MENA region. Furthermore, the switch from state to private ownership, which is accompanied by severe information asymmetry problems (Denis and McConnell (2003) and Dyck (2001)), also constitutes a unique setting for investigating how the auditor choice is related to internal corporate governance. Most audit quality research focuses on one aspect of internal corporate governance, typically either ownership structure or board structure (Guedhami et al, 2009). We posit that it is opportune to examine the effect of several corporate governance mechanisms on the demand of audit quality and the relation between these mechanisms, rather than focusing on one particular aspect of corporate governance, since they could either substitute or complement each other. Accordingly, we attempt to examine whether board structure and ownership structure act in a complementary or substitutable fashion in determining auditor choice. Although a few studies have provided some evidence for other developing countries (e.g., Bliss et al. (2007), Fan et al. (2005)), in this paper we are particularly interested in drawing some implications from the privatization experience of MENA region, which remains an under researched area. This region is unique for the specificity of its privatization process. First, privatization in MENA region is usually prescribed by the donor agencies and international financial institutions such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. Second, the process is characterized by a slow progression compared to other developing countries such as Latin America or Asia (Ben Naceur et al., 2007). This may be explained by the fact that stock markets of the region are in an embryonic stage of development and generally lag behind other developing countries in terms of level of development indicators (Ben Naceur et al., 2009). Finally, most governments divest only partially over time and are reluctant to relinquish ownership completely (e.g., Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) and Boubakri et al. (2011)).2 Unlike typical shareholders, governments tend to pursue political objectives that rarely coincide with profit maximization.3 Moreover, part of the relinquished stake by the state is transferred to foreign owners (e.g., Boubakri et al. (2013)). Foreign owners have the financial resources, managerial know-how, and corporate governance expertise, which give them advantage over other owners in monitoring managers’ actions (Frydman et al. (1999)). Furthermore, foreign owners maintain, for reputational reasons, strict control of managers’ actions (Dyck (2001)). Within this structure, the roles and relationship between shareholders, board and audit quality tend to be overlapping and unclear. The MENA countries hence constitute a unique setting in which we examine the link between internal corporate governance mechanisms and auditor choice. We attempt to answer the following questions: Does internal corporate governance mechanism associated with privatization affect firms’ auditor choice decisions? Does the effectiveness of board structure and ownership structure act as complements or substitutes on auditor choice decision?