مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد بی سوادی مالی و تصمیمات بازپرداخت وام – الزویر 2018

 

مشخصات مقاله
ترجمه عنوان مقاله بی سوادی مالی و تصمیمات بازپرداخت وام
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله Financial Illiteracy and Mortgage Refinancing Decisions
انتشار مقاله سال 2018
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی 50 صفحه
هزینه دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد.
پایگاه داده نشریه الزویر
نوع نگارش مقاله مقاله پژوهشی (Research article)
مقاله بیس این مقاله بیس نمیباشد
نمایه (index) scopus – master journals – JCR
نوع مقاله ISI
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی  PDF
ایمپکت فاکتور(IF) 1.931 در سال 2017
شاخص H_index 126 در سال 2018
شاخص SJR 1.503 در سال 2018
رشته های مرتبط اقتصاد
گرایش های مرتبط اقتصاد مالی، اقتصاد پولی
نوع ارائه مقاله ژورنال
مجله / کنفرانس مجله بانکداری و امور مالی – Journal of Banking and Finance
دانشگاه University of Bologna – Department of Economics – piazza Scaravilli – Italy
کلمات کلیدی تامین مالی مجدد رهن؛ سواد مالی؛ امور مالی خانوار
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی Mortgage refinancing; Financial literacy; Household finance
شناسه دیجیتال – doi
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.08.001
کد محصول E9559
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله  ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید.
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فهرست مطالب مقاله:
Highlights
1 Introduction
2 Legal framework on mortgage refinancing
3 Data and preliminary evidence
4 The refinancing decision
5 Robustness
6 Conclusion
References

بخشی از متن مقاله:
We analyze the effect of an exogenous shock to the Italian mortgage market, where a reform has abolished prepayment fees and simplified mortgage refinancing, making it a virtually cost-free decision for households. This law, along with the considerable drop in market interest rates, has generated important gains for fixed-rate borrowers, which we quantify at up to 15 percent of the principal balance. Nevertheless, only about 13 percent of borrowers have locked in this opportunity. We study the relationship between this.

Introduction

In 2007 the Italian government passed new legislation, granting households the right to refinance their mortgage at no cost, regardless of the contractual prepayment fee that had been agreed upon at the time of mortgage origination. Other than prepayment fees, all other costs associated with mortgage refinancing (e.g., notary fees, registration fees, etc.) were also eliminated. This intervention has produced a break in the previously rigid Italian mortgage market, where the overall cost of refinancing was extremely high (from 5 to 8 percent of the principal). Consequently, fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) borrowers have experienced the opportunity to cash in a sizeable gain from the sharp interest rate drop which has since occurred. In this paper, we employ a large proprietary dataset of approximately 147 thousand FRMs issued by a primary Italian bank, and we estimate that the cross-section average refinancing gain for fixed-rate borrowers has reached 15 percent of the average principal balance. This figure corresponds to a €112 reduction of the monthly instalment and an annual saving slightly lower than the average monthly income in our sample (about €1.5k). Despite this important gain, we document that only a scant minority of FRM borrowers (about 13 percent) has taken advantage of this opportunity in the 8 and a half years following the introduction of the new legislation. Two main possible financial motivations may explain this sluggish behavior. First, the economic convenience of refinancing an FRM only arises if the new prevailing market conditions are more favorable than those at the loan’s inception. This gap depends on both the evolution of base interest rates and credit spreads, and the point in time at which the mortgage originated. For approximately one-tenth of households in our sample this difference is on average negative. Second, since both the subprime and the European sovereign debt crises fall in our investigation period, we capture the effects of the credit crunch, when banks generally tightened credit supply. A stricter lending policy might have excluded some borrowers who would otherwise have been willing to capture the gain offered by the new law.

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