This study analyzes how accounting participates in the business of extortion. Using a combination of archival, interview and participant observation data, we consider the extortion activities of two criminal organizationsdthe Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18dthat operate in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Starting from the assumption that the repetitive extortion activities of street gangs require organizational devices that coordinate activities and facilitate decisionmaking, we examine how street gangs use accounting. We also analyze how business targets react to receiving extortion demands. The analysis illustrates that both street gangsters and their extortion targets have a pre-existing existential relationship to accounting that influences how street gangsters use accounting as well as how business targets respond.

Introduction

This study analyzes how accounting participates in the business of extortion. Using a combination of archival, interview and participant observation data, we consider the extortion activities of two criminal organizationsdthe Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18dthat operate in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Starting from the assumption that the repetitive extortion activities of street gangs require organizational devices that coordinate activities and facilitate decision-making, we examine how street gangs use accounting. We also analyze how business targets react to receiving extortion demands. The analysis illustrates that both street gangsters and their extortion targets have a pre-existing existential relationship to accounting (Vollmer, 2007) that influences how street gangsters use accounting as well as how business targets respond. The study has three purposes. First, we are motivated to better understand the role(s) of accounting in extortion processes. In many parts of the world, extortion is an organized and routine economic activity that enlists a variety of social actors and which has negative consequences for the individuals, businesses and communities who bear both direct and indirect costs. A recent TransCrime Report (2015), for example, documents the prevalence of different forms of extortion in Eastern and Western Europe and suggests that extortion proceeds are a multi-million if not billion Euro business in many countries (2015, p. 78; see also Lisciandra, 2014, p. 102). In the Northern Triangle country of El Salvador that we study, the combination of extortion proceeds plus the indirect costs of extortion are estimated to amount to more than $4B annually which is approximately 16% of GDP (Penate, De Escobar, ~ Quintanilla, & Alvarado, 2016, p. 31).