مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد نابرابری پرداختی مدیر عامل اجرایی – الزویر ۲۰۱۹

This study extends previous research on the influence of CEO pay inequity on CEOs’ decision-making by examining the relationship in the acquisition context. Focusing on CEOs’ compensation vis-à-vis external and internal referents, we find that underpaid CEOs pay higher acquisition premiums and that overpaid CEOs pay lower premiums, although this tendency is reduced as the level of overpayment increases, creating a U-shaped relationship. We further find that the CEO-TMT pay gap moderates the relationship between CEO under-/ overpayment and acquisition premiums by adjusting CEOs’ perceptions of pay inequity and motivation to restore inequity through their higher or lower sense of self-importance. The findings of this study suggest that CEOs’ decision-making is strongly influenced by their framing of gains and losses and the perception of pay inequity vis-à-vis external and internal referents.

Introduction

Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation has received considerable attention over the last four decades. This body of literature has been influenced greatly by agency theory, and scholars often have examined how specific compensation packages affect behaviors and organizational outcomes (Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008; Sanders, 2001). More recently, behavioral agency theory has been used to expand and modify many of the assumptions in agency theory (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). These modifications reveal important new insights into CEO compensation which have been summarized by Pepper and Gore (2015). Foremost among these new insights (for our paper) is an understanding from equity theory that agents maintain perceptions concerning equitable compensation. Agents implicitly make judgments concerning their compensation vis-à-vis market norms and personal referents (Pepper & Gore, 2015). The second insight is an understanding regarding agents’ risk preference drawing upon prospect theory.