مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد هزینه های آژانس از جریان نقدی آزاد و محافظه کاری مشروط – الزویر ۲۰۱۹

۱- Introduction

۲- Previous literature and hypothesis development

۳- Research design and sample selection

۴- Empirical results

۵- Conclusion

References

Abstract

This study investigates whether agency costs of free cash flow (FCF) are associated with conditional conservatism. Prior research documents that conditional conservatism improves ex ante efficient investment decisions and facilitates ex post monitoring of managers’ investment decisions. As conditional conservatism can provide protection from possible managerial expropriation, the demand for conditional conservatism should increase with the agency costs of FCF. Using excess cash as a proxy for the agency costs of FCF, I provide evidence that firms with higher agency costs of FCF incorporate losses in a timelier manner relative to gains compared to their counterparts. Additionally, the association between excess cash and conditional conservatism predictably varies with the presence of alternative monitoring mechanisms that mitigate FCF problems, such as debt or dividend payouts or repurchases. Further investigation suggests that greater conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of overinvestment among firms bearing high agency costs of FCF, demonstrating the ability of conservatism to reduce agency costs of FCF.

Introduction

This study investigates whether potential agency costs of free cash flow (FCF) affect a firm’s level of conditional conservatism.1 Previous studies document that when companies are prone to overinvest, investors discount the value of cash and, consequently, the corporate value. Jensen (1986) refers to this type of loss of firm value as the agency costs of FCF, a type of agency costs between a manager and shareholders. Most prior studies focus on corporate governance as a monitoring mechanism for manager–shareholder agency conflict (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003; Pinkowitz & Williamson, 2007). However, governance structures are not designed ex ante to optimally mitigate agency problems and are not very responsive to demands arising from stakeholders (Richardson, 2006). Other than shareholder litigation, which is ex post in nature and very costly, there is no specific action that shareholders can take against possible managerial expropriation.2 Prior research provides ample evidence that asymmetrically timely loss recognition, otherwise known as conditional conservatism, serves as an ex ante safeguard against ex post managerial opportunism while at the same time being demand driven (e.g., Beatty, Weber, & Yu, 2008; Gao, 2013; Holthausen & Watts, 2001; LaFond & Roychowdhury, 2008; LaFond & Watts, 2008; Ramalingegowda & Yu, 2012; Watts, 2003a). Conditional conservatism imposes stricter verification standards for recognizing gains than for losses, which results in recognition of losses ahead of realization and a delay in the recognition of gains until realization. The requirement of conservative reporting makes the recognition of losses from overinvestments less likely to be deferred to the future, and ex ante knowledge that future losses in cash flows will be recognized in income in a timelier manner provides disincentives for managers who might otherwise undertake negative net present value (NPV) projects (Ball & Shivakumar, 2006). As conditional conservatism can provide protection from possible managerial expropriation, the demand for conditional conservatism should increase with the agency costs of FCF.