Downstream members of a supply chain frequently purchase substitutable products from multiple vendors, and the management of the vertical relationships with upstream suppliers is a central concern in supply chain management. In particular, numerous previous studies demonstrate the significant impact of the price leadership structure in supply chains on firm performance and overall supply chain efficiency (Choi 1991 & 1996; Lee and Staelin 1997; Trivedi 1998; Edirisinghe et al. 2011). Choi and Fredj (2013) also analyzed the impact of supply chain price leadership structures in the context of a retailer managing its own store band, and show the difference that they make to the profitability of the retailer and the manufacturer. This stream of research extends to more recent studies, in which the strategic implications of supply chain price leadership are investigated for revenue sharing and wholesale pricing mechanisms (Pan et al. 2010), the performance of closedloop supply chains (Choi et al. 2013), and a manufacturer’s incentive for the utilization of the dual channel strategy (Xiao et al. 2014). The above-mentioned studies reflect practitioners’ increasing concern about establishing and maintaining the ―right‖ relationships with suppliers in today’s business environment. Empirical evidence indicates that the price leadership situations between a retailer and multiple suppliers can vary substantially in many product categories (Cotterill and Putsis 2001), and, therefore, it should be a major consideration in a firm’s supplier selection decision, which is a crucial issue in managerial and operational aspects of supply chain management (Chai and Ngai 2015). For instance, retailers have the strategic options of entrusting the private label production either to leading national brand manufacturers (e.g., Kraft Heinz, Pillsbury, Ralston Foods, Coca-cola, Ralcorp, etc.) that use their excess production capacity or to medium and small sized firms that cover specific markets (Dunne and Narasimhan 1999; Bergès-Sennou 2006; PLMA 2015). Choosing a leading national brand manufacturer as the vendor is likely to have the advantage of a more efficient production process but the disadvantage of a lower bargaining position (Bergès-Sennou 2006). In contrast, the retailer can take supply chain leadership through a better bargaining position by selecting medium and small sized local companies. A retailer’s decision on whether to carry a store brand also depends on its implications for the price leadership structure with the supply chain. Cotterill and Putsis’s (2001) empirical study shows that, in the consumer packaged goods categories, national brand manufacturers are often price leaders over the retailer, but no such leadership is exercised by store brand suppliers. Furthermore, the introduction of store brands can modify the pattern of national brand suppliers’ exercise of their price leadership (Chintagunta et al. 2002).