مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد حسابرسان خارجی و نظارت بانکی – الزویر ۲۰۲۰

elsevier

 

مشخصات مقاله
ترجمه عنوان مقاله حسابرسان خارجی و نظارت بانکی: تئوری و تجربی
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله Banking supervision and external auditors: Theory and empirics
انتشار مقاله سال ۲۰۲۰
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی ۱۹ صفحه
هزینه دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد.
پایگاه داده نشریه الزویر
نوع نگارش مقاله
مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
مقاله بیس این مقاله بیس میباشد
نمایه (index) Scopus – Master Journals List – JCR
نوع مقاله ISI
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی  PDF
ایمپکت فاکتور(IF)
۲٫۵۴۵ در سال ۲۰۱۹
شاخص H_index ۳۸ در سال ۲۰۲۰
شاخص SJR ۱٫۴۸۸ در سال ۲۰۱۹
شناسه ISSN ۱۵۷۲-۳۰۸۹
شاخص Quartile (چارک) Q1 در سال ۲۰۱۹
مدل مفهومی ندارد
پرسشنامه ندارد
متغیر دارد
رفرنس دارد
رشته های مرتبط حسابداری، مدیریت
گرایش های مرتبط حسابرسی، حسابداری مالی، مدیریت مالی، بانکداری، مدیریت استراتژیک
نوع ارائه مقاله
ژورنال
مجله  مجله ثبات مالی – Journal Of Financial Stability
دانشگاه Department of Economics and Baffi Carefin Centre, Bocconi University, Italy and SUERF, Italy
کلمات کلیدی نظارت بانکی، حسابرسی، نمایندگی، اقتصاد و قانون
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی Banking supervision، Auditing، Delegation، Economics and law
شناسه دیجیتال – doi
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2019.100722
کد محصول E14387
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله  ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید.
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فهرست مطالب مقاله:
Abstract

۱- Introduction

۲- Optimal design of supervisory settings

۳- Institutional Framework

۴- Empirics

۵- Conclusion

References

بخشی از متن مقاله:

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of external auditors in banking sector supervision from a theoretical, institutional and empirical perspective. We first present a simple principal-agent framework that highlights the importance of several institutional characteristics in determining the optimal involvement of external auditors in supervision. We then construct a new index that captures the degree of involvement of external auditors in the oversight of the banking sector in 115 countries. Consistent with our theoretical arguments, we find that countries that increase the role of central banks in supervision are also more likely to involve auditors, suggesting that the added complexity of a supervisory function is likely to benefit from the expertise of an external auditor. Having experienced a financial crisis is also associated with a higher use of auditors, particularly among central banks with an increasing role in supervision, which suggests some reputational concerns of the supervisor. Finally, we show that higher audit quality is associated with an increased involvement of auditors in supervision.

Introduction

In the aftermath of the 2008 Global financial crisis, researchers and policymakers alike have pointed to the weakness of banking supervisory frameworks as one of the leading causes of the crisis (see Merrouche and Nier, 2010; Kupiec et al., 2017). An effective supervision technology ought to detect, well in advance, potential threats to the safety and soudness of the banking sector. Previous research has explored various aspects of banking regulation that can achieve such objectives, including bank capital requirements, regulatory treatments of non-performing loans and provisions or disclosure requirements.1 However, little attention has been directed towards another important aspect of financial sector oversight, i.e. the use of external auditors in the implementation of specific banking supervisory tasks. The involvement of auditors, as private financial gatekeepers, can improve the credibility of the overall supervisory setting, as auditors generally have a beneficial influence on the behaviour of regulated firms, or banks in this case.2 For this reason, numerous initiatives on the global regulatory framework (such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2008, 2014) have recommended a tight relationship between banking supervisors and external auditors to enable an effective information exchange. The supervisor can request external auditors to perform different kinds of tasks, at times going beyond the standard audit report. However, the involvement of private actors in implementing public tasks can carry risks. For example,the supervisor can incur reputational costs given that auditors are private firms with potentially close ties to the regulated financial institutions.

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