مقاله سال ۲۰۱۷

Functional buyer-supplier relationships can have many benefits. Supplier firms can expect greater profitability and better buyer insights while buyers can experience tailored solutions and exchange efficiencies (Palmatier, 2008; Palmatier, Houston, Dant, & Grewal, 2013). However, buyer-supplier relationships are diverse. Rather than a cure-all, relationships can also be sources of frustration and resentment for one or both parties (Hibbard, Kumar, & Stern, 2001). Relationships can be very costly for the supplier and pose excessive risks to buyers (Musalem & Joshi, 2009; Ryals & Holt, 2007). Therefore, relationships are often finite. They tend to pass through a lifecycle that begins with initial investments by both parties fueled by positive expectations, a middle stage where both parties engage in repeated interactions and are generally satisfied with the existing arrangements, and, then, a final stage where the relationship ends (Terawatanavong, 2007).

Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1979, 1988, 1991) has become an important theoretical lens to study buyer-supplier relationships. A central tenet of TCE is that partner behaviors are governed by norms, which differ from formal contracts as means to affect relational outcomes (Cannon, Achrol, & Gundlach, 2000; Heide & John, 1992; Macneil, 1980). Indeed, norms explain the majority of partner behaviors by conveying what behaviors are acceptable and by associating non-compliant behavior with various penalties (Kaufmann & Stern, 1988; Wan, Hui, & Wyer, 2011). The absence of supportive norms has been shown to reduce the economic efficiency of relational exchange (Heide & John, 1992). Norms have been conceptualized as context-dependent, multi-level and dynamic and, as a consequence, it is unclear what norms are relevant and to what extent (Blois & Ivens, 2006; Ivens & Blois, 2004; Macneil, 1980). This issue is particularly acute when considering relationship decline. While most studies in this area focus on resource or systemic misalignment and opportunistic behaviors, few consider the influences of norms (Jean, Sinkovics, & Cavusgil, 2010; Mishra, Chandrasekaran, & Maccormack, 2015). By considering the role of norms, there is scope to identify and explain subtle yet profound social rules that current studies do not yet capture fully.

Moreover, the cognitive and behavioral constraints facing key individuals are likely to affect how norms manifest. Indeed, these constraints are central assumptions about the behavior of individuals within TCE (Williamson, 1975, 1991, 2005). However, there has been relatively little exploration of how these constraints relate to relational norms in relationship decline. The concept of bounded reliability can help explain this. Bounded reliability refers to the efforts of individuals to being reliable, but only boundedly so, with these efforts being imperfect due either to opportunism, benevolent preference reversal (i.e. where the preferences of decision-makers shift over time in accordance with new and emergent priorities) and inconsistent behaviors (i.e. where individuals’ behaviors contrast with an agreed set of requirements) (Kano & Verbeke, 2015; Verbeke & Greidanus, 2009). These considerations could help explain the root causes of relationship decline and, as such, there is a need to explain how and why this is so.