Abstract

There is a debate at the highest levels of government and civil society over whether the rise in fraud is a blip exacerbated by the pandemic or a more fundamental transformation (or flip) in the structure of crime. This paper examines this debate by exploring the social factors influencing the level of fraud. It does so by conceptualising these factors as a fraud field, offering a novel way to visualise and consider vulnerability through the broad categories of ‘threats’ and ‘safeguards’ which influence levels of fraud. In doing so it offers the first attempt to map the wide range of ‘forces’ that influence levels of fraud and produces a mathematical expression of this, which will provide a basis for further debate, refinement and research. The threats include the myriad of opportunities, the large population of fraudsters, and the range of human and technology enablers that support the fraudsters. The principal safeguards that resist the fraud threat are culture, the law and the defensive resilience of individuals and organisations. Using the fraud field and official crime statistics, the paper argues that the safeguards are so structurally weak that the fraud epidemic is not a blip, but an opportunistic flip from traditional acquisitive crimes. The forces influencing levels of fraud mean high volumes of fraud will continue at the current levels or even accelerate further, unless there is a collective national strategy to strengthen the safeguards.

Introduction

A recent report by the prestigious international relations think tank, the Royal United Services Institute, described fraud as an epidemic that threatens national security (Wood et al., 2021). In stark contrast, a senior official responsible for the counter-fraud policy in a large government agency expressed to one of this paper’s authors their frustration in failing to secure greater interest and resources from colleagues and politicians because of the prevailing perception that the recent rise in fraud in the UK is a ‘blip’, exacerbated by the COVID pandemic. In another illustration of the sanguine view regarding fraud, one of the authors of this paper was contacted by an undergraduate student from another university, who asked what they thought of their lecturer’s view that fraud was just another moral panic. These views attenuating the fraud problem might not be representative, but the fact of such views in ‘informed’ opinion in the face of the overwhelming evidence of the substantial fraud problem illustrated by the Crime Survey of England and Wales, illustrates the need for further exploration and exposure of the problem. Differential rationalisation theory suggests this sanguine view is dangerous because it justifies inaction (Shepherd and Button, 2018). The political perception is partly informed by a marked fall in traditional crimes since the early 1990 s in the UK and other Western nations (Tonry, 2014). It is also subject to the manipulative politicalisation of statistics. For example, former Prime Minister, Boris Johnson announced to the House of Commons in January 2022 that “we have been cutting crime by 14 %” (HC Deb, 2022). He was subsequently admonished by the head of the UK Statistics Authority for failing to explain that the fall excluded fraud and computer misuse (Norgrove, 2022). Had Johnson included fraud and computer misuse, he would have had to announce a 14 % increase in total crime. These political machinations do, nevertheless, point to a very important question. Can the fraud epidemic be ignored as just another cyclical change in crime that will eventually decline or is it a permanent feature of 21st century British society?

Conclusion

Galvanised by the dismissive attitudes of some senior leaders in the UK, this paper challenges the notion that the fraud epidemic in the UK could be described as blip. The examination of the official crime statistics shows that acquisitive crime has switched from theft to fraud because fraud has become a more accessible offence and, from the offender’s perspective, it is lower risk. Using the novel fraud field concept to visualise fraud threats and safeguards, the paper has noted the significant forces influencing fraud levels and developed a novel mathematical expression of this. From this assessment the paper argues that the threat forces in favour of fraud currently overwhelm the safeguard forces. The array of threat forces has been hugely amplified by the disruptive impact of new technologies. In particular, because the essence of fraud is a false communication, the digital communication and transaction technologies are powerful enablers that provide a whole generation of fraudsters across the world with access to victims anywhere in the world. Indifference is the essential cause of the weakness of the safeguard forces: an indifferent public, marginal interests within law enforcement, irresponsible organisations, and dismissive politicians. Consequently, it is naïve and reckless to regard the current level of fraud in the UK as a blip, and it will continue at the current levels or accelerate without strategic intervention. The fraud field analysis suggests that the threat field can be tackled by collective action: strengthening law enforcement, obliging large organisations to transition from enablers to disablers by investing in resilience that protects both themselves and the public, and by greater international efforts to tackle the international dimension of fraud.

Abstract

1 Introduction

2 Data and Methods

3 Results and discussion

4 Conclusion

Appendix A

References

Declaration of interests

Abstract

     The COVID-19 pandemic is strongly affecting many aspects of human life and society around the world. To investigate whether this pandemic also influences crime, the differences of crime incidents numbers before and during the pandemic in four large cities (namely Washington DC, Chicago, New York City and Los Angeles) are investigated. Moreover, the Granger causal relationships between crime incidents numbers and new cases of COVID-19 are also examined. Based on that, new cases of COVID-19 with significant Granger causal correlations are used to improve the crime prediction performance. The results show that crime is generally impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, but it varies in different cities and with different crime types. Most types of crimes have seen fewer incidents numbers during the pandemic than before. Several Granger causal correlations are found between the COVID-19 cases and crime incidents in these cities. More specifically, crime incidents numbers of theft in DC, Chicago and New York City, fraud in DC and Los Angeles, assault in Chicago and New York City, and robbery in Los Angeles and New York City, are significantly Granger caused by the new case of COVID-19.

Introduction

     The COVID-19 pandemic is one of the most serious global public health events in recent years. The onset and spread of COVID-19 have affected nearly every continent. People’s daily lives and the whole society have been drastically influenced around the world [1], [2], [3]. For example, in many cities, traffic is completely restricted [4, 5]; non-essential businesses have closed for a very long time; travel became more and more difficult; and social gatherings are limited [6, 7]. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic is a huge challenge to education activities [8, 9], many courses are moved online. At the same time, unemployment among many groups of workers increased sharply [10, 11]. What’s more serious is that the pandemic has led to a dramatic loss of human life, economic losses and social disruption worldwide, presenting an unprecedented challenge to public health, food systems, and public safety [12]. This also raises attention to other questions related to our lives and security. Does the COVID-19 pandemic have an impact on crime? If so, is this impact strong or weak? If the COVID-19 pandemic has a strong impact on crime, will the pandemic be a factor for analyzing

Conclusion

     This study investigates the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on crimes in four large cities (namely Washington DC, Chicago, New York City and Los Angeles). The differences of crime incidents numbers before and during the pandemic are investigated, and the Granger causal relationships between crime incidents numbers and new cases of COVID-19 are examined. Then, significant correlations between COVID-19 and crimes are used to improve the crime prediction performance.

     Overall, the result shows that crime is indeed impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, but it varies in different cities and also with different crime types. Most types of crimes have seen fewer incidents numbers during the pandemic than before. For example, theft numbers decrease significantly in these cities. Moreover, in three of the US cities, theft numbers are proved Granger caused by the new cases of COVID-19. For some other crime types and cities, similar results are reported. This may be partially explained by the Routine Activity theory and opportunity theory that people may prefer to stay at home to avoid being infected with COVID-19 during the pandemic, giving fewer chances for crimes.

Highlights

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Search protocol

Criminal justice system data and social network analysis

Taking an archaeological approach to working with criminal justice records

Charting a way forward for social network researchers

Appendix A. Investigative records

Appendix B. Law enforcement intelligence reports and threat assessments

Appendix C. Offender databases

Appendix D. Prosecution files

Appendix E. Court files

Appendix F. Departmental inquiries or commissions

Appendix G. Multiple criminal justice sources

References

Abstract

The use of social network analysis to study groups of offenders engaged in illicit activities such as drug trafficking and terrorism has grown in popularity over the last three decades. Along with such growth, however, researchers have been confronted with a suite of challenges related to the use of data extracted from criminal justice records. In this paper, we review these challenges through a discussion of the extant empirical literature utilizing social network analysis approaches that draw data from the criminal justice system. First, we outline and discuss the different types of data used across this literature. Second, we chronicle the challenges that have emerged across the field of criminal networks via a comprehensive review of the literature. In particular, we draw on the documented experiences of researchers in the field, including our own, and detail “archeological” approaches that future researchers can utilize to adapt and overcome said challenges. The use of criminal justice records can suffer from a number of limitations, mainly with respect to accuracy, validity and reliability. Such data may include errors, both intentional (e.g. aliases, false information) and unintentional (e.g. transcription errors), including missing data. The use of criminal justice records present particular problems with defining the network boundary as the boundary as determined by law enforcement or prosecution agencies may not correspond to the boundary as defined by network members. We conclude by offering a number of recommendations for researchers about data collection and preparation when utilizing criminal justice records.

Introduction

In his seminal text, Outsiders, Howard Becker (1963) noted that “the most persistent difficulty in the scientific study of deviant behavior is the lack of solid data” (p.165). This sentiment applies to all types of research on crime, criminals and criminal behavior. Crime is usually hidden and often undetected, and criminals tend to maintain social barriers between themselves and out-group members including researchers. Not to be deterred, innovative researchers have sought out novel sources of data and analytical approaches to provide more robust understandings of crime. In recent years, social network approaches that involve the collection of criminal justice records on actors and the links between them, have provided powerful new ways to study crime and understand criminal networks. Criminal justice records can yield unique insights into offence and offender characteristics that can permit the mapping of the diverse connections that exist between criminal actors. Social network analysis (SNA) can then be used to enhance understandings of how emergent social structures shape various criminal activities, and how crime can be controlled (Brewer, 2017; Morselli, 2009b). The use of social network analysis to study groups of offenders engaged in illicit activities such as drug trafficking and terrorism has grown in popularity over the last three decades. Indeed, in a recent article, Faust and Tita (2019) predict that the field has been evolving such that “network methods [will] become part of the standard toolkit in criminological research” (p. 117). Along with such growth, however, researchers have been confronted with a suite of challenges related to the extraction and use of data collected from criminal justice records.

Highlights

Abstract

Keywords

JEL

1. Introduction

2. COVID-19 and crime

3. Empirical strategy

4. Results

5. Discussion

6. Conclusion

Declaration of Competing Interest

Appendix A. Appendix

References

Abstract

Objective
To investigate the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on conventional crime and organized crime in Mexico City, Mexico.

Methods
Mexico City’s Attorney General’s Office reported crime data, covering domestic violence, burglary, robbery, vehicle theft, assault-battery, homicides, kidnapping, and extortion. We use an event study for the intertemporal variation across the 16 districts (municipalities) in Mexico City for 2019 and 2020.

Results
We find a sharp decrease on crimes related to domestic violence, burglary, and vehicle theft; a decrease during some weeks on crimes related to assault-battery and extortion, and no effects on crimes related to robbery, kidnapping, and homicides.

Conclusions
While our results show a decline in conventional crime during the COVID- 19 pandemic, organized crime remains steady. These findings have policy implications for catastrophic events around the world, as well as possible national security issues in Mexico.

1. Introduction

After the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020, governments around the world imposed a series of lockdowns. Non-essential businesses closed for several weeks, travel became difficult, social gatherings were limited, and officials from national and regional governments advised people to stay at home. All of these restrictions sought to accomplish social distancing, a vital public health tool used to contain the rapid growth of emerging infectious diseases (Fong et al., 2020). In essence, these stay-at-home orders modified most social structures, including criminal activity.

Until recently, research on the net effect of a large-scale lockdown on criminal activity was non-existent. New efforts within the criminal justice discipline are filling the knowledge gap. We aim to expand this literature by studying the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on crime in Mexico City, using records from Mexico City’s Attorney General’s Office. The particular context of Mexico offers a glimpse into the effects of a lockdown on crime in a developing economy that shares many characteristics with other countries in Latin America. In particular, Mexico has a significant presence of organized criminal enterprises —besides conventional criminals—and institutional weaknesses in the criminal justice system.

The stay-at-home order time-line in Mexico City was similar to the rest of the world. In December 2020, an epidemic of a new coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, emerged in Wuhan, China. The virus spread quickly throughout Asia (e.g. Iran) and then Europe (e.g., Italy and Spain) during the first three months of 2020, and made its way to North America in February 2020. On March 11, 2020, COVID-19 became a pandemic, as pronounced by the World Health Organization (WHO). The following week, restaurants, gyms, clubs, and universities began to shut down voluntarily in Mexico City. On March 23, 2020, the federal government officially started the “social distancing” campaign, and the whole country went under lockdown. Schools, government offices, malls, parks, and non-essential businesses closed temporarily down in Mexico City.

Abstract

Keywords

1. Introduction

2. Literature review

2.1. City of Buenos Aires Police (CBAP) organization

3. Data and methods

4. Results

4.1. Spatial descriptive statistics

4.2. Distance decay analysis and the buffer zone hypothesis

5. Discussion

6. Conclusion

Appendix.

References

Abstract

This paper discusses the empirical strategy used to test which approximation to journey-to-crime theory is more appropriate for modelling the crime deterrent effect of police stations. Using crime spatial analysis, this paper tests whether monotonic criminal distance decay from police stations or a buffer zone in the vicinity of police stations is the most appropriate way to model criminal behavior. The aim of the paper is to detect fixed patterns of spatial distribution of crime in relation to the location of police stations, independent of other variables. A new high-frequency daily dataset of the years 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 with reported property crimes (robbery, theft, car robbery and theft) and personal crime (homicide) in the City of Buenos Aires, is used to model the paper’s findings. The authors found empirical evidence of a non-random spatial concentration for all crimes. It was also found that the commission of crimes increases exponentially as the distance from the nearest police station increases, until reaching an interval of 500–600 m, at which point, it begins to descend once again. Evidence seems to show that police stations have a deterrent effect on crime.

1. Introduction

Modelling criminal location choice is fundamental for researchers and practitioners. Understandably, then, one of the most developed areas of research in recent years (other than offender/victims-based characteristics) to explain the spatial distribution of crime, is precisely, the geography of offenders. The majority of studies attempt to model journey-to-crime based on the hypothesis that either a) there is monotonic criminal distance decay from offenders’ homes, similar to that of the majority of human mobility (for example, the study by Gimpel et al., 2008; on voting patterns), or b) there is a buffer zone near offenders’ homes with significantly reduced criminality (O’Leary, 2011). Both hypotheses have implications for theories explaining criminal behavior (Rengert, Piquero, & Jones, 1999). However, studies attempting to prove the existence of a buffer zone, have had mixed empirical findings. For example, the recent literature review by Bernasco and van Dijke (2020) identifies 108 studies on the relationship between the frequency of crime and offenders’ homes, of which, only 33 provide solid evidence for the existence of a buffer zone, while the remaining 75 have contrary evidence.

Purpose: Scholars suggest that clearance rates reflect (a) the solvability of cases (Gottfredson & Hindelang, 1979; Roberts, 2007), and/or (b) the populations that the police choose to prioritize (Black, 1976). But few studies consider the totality of contextual and situational characteristics that may explain clearance rates and contribute to important disparities among them. The current study presents a framework that considers the effect of various types of devaluation and solvability on clearance. Methods: Linear probability modeling is used to test the framework’s utility and whether complaint, neighborhood, and police district characteristics affect the clearance of violent crimes in St. Louis, MO. Results: The findings suggest that while minority victims and neighborhoods may be devalued, specific crime features physically hinder crime-solving. Important interactions emerge between devaluation and solvability indicators, and crime types are found to have distinctive clearance predictors. The results suggest that witness and victim-offender relationship information might be particularly important in clearing crimes involving Black victims. Conclusions: Overall, the results highlight the importance of comprehensively studying crime-solving. Future research should continue to work toward developing a comprehensive conceptualization to explain police case clearance.

Introduction

Racial disparities appear to be persistent in clearance rates, with crimes involving Black victims and occurring in disadvantaged, minority communities having particularly low clearance rates (Petersen, 2017; Roberts & Lyons, 2009). But important conceptualization and measurement issues surround the study of crime-solving, and research has yet to determine whether clearance rates reflect the solvability of cases (Gottfredson & Hindelang, 1979; Klinger, 1997; Roberts, 2007), and/or the populations that the police choose to prioritize (Black, 1976; Jarvis & Regoeczi, 2009). Two theoretical perspectives have been developed to explain crime clearance rates: (1) the devaluation thesis, which claims that disadvantaged, minority individuals and neighborhoods will not be prioritized by the police and therefore cases involving these characteristics will have lower clearance rates (Black, 1976; Jarvis & Regoeczi, 2009; Petersen, 2017); and (2) the solvability perspective, which argues that police and situational characteristics, such as police workload and physical evidence, determine the likelihood of clearance (Gottfredson & Hindelang, 1979; Roberts, 2007). But research examining the influence of such factors on crime clearance has been limited in a number of respects. First, devaluation and solvability perspectives have overlapping constructs, and research has yet to disentangle their competing operationalizations. Secondly, few studies have considered the interaction of devaluation indicators, such as victim race, and solvability factors, such as weapon type (Petersen, 2017; Regoeczi & Jarvis, 2013). Exploring these interactions is an important first step in disentangling alternative perspectives and their relative influences on clearance. Finally, few studies have considered the clearance of crimes other than homicide (Taylor, Holleran, & Topalli, 2009). Since police departments are pressured to solve homicides, they may be less impacted by extralegal factors, such as victim and neighborhood race (Klinger, 1997).

In recent years two Swedish companies, Telia and Lundin Petroleum, have had to work hard to legitimate their actions as a result of allegations of criminal activity. In this paper, the corporate framings employed to deal with allegations of crime will be analysed on the basis of Stanley Cohen’s (2009) theoretical work on processes of denial and neutralization techniques. More specifically, the paper focuses on the temporalization of neutralizations of corporate crime and aims to answer the following questions: How have the corporations’ defence mechanisms changed over time? How might the types of crime of which they have been accused, and their corporate structures, affect the ways in which particular defence mechanisms are employed? The analysis demonstrates that although there are similarities, such as both companies framing their businesses as contributing to the development of democracy, human rights, prosperity and peace, the companies follow two different lines of development in their defences. While Telia moves from literal denial to confession, Lundin Petroleum stays with its literal denial in parallel with a strong condemnation of the condemners. These differences seem to be grounded both in the crimes of which the companies have been accused and their respective corporate structures.

Introduction

In recent years two Swedish companies, Telia and Lundin Petroleum, have had to work hard to legitimate their actions as a result of allegations of criminal activity. The telecommunications provider Telia’s1 dealings in Central Asia, and in Uzbekistan in particular, have attracted a substantial amount of media attention and criminal investigations both in Sweden and abroad. In 2012, the so-called “Uzbekistan affair” was uncovered, resulting in criminal charges against the former CEO and two other senior officials for their involvement in the company’s bribery scheme, and in legal proceedings against the company in Sweden for a disgorgement (i.e. giving up illegally gained profits) and a global settlement in which Telia agreed to pay $965 million to resolve charges relating to violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The Swedish government is the company’s principal shareholder with almost 40 percent of the company’s shares. Lundin Petroleum was awarded a contract for Block 5A in southern Sudan in early 1997, and ever since that time the company’s operations have faced allegations of participating in crimes against humanity. A report entitled “Unpaid Debt”, written by the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS),2 led to the initiation of an ongoing police investigation in Sweden into violations of international law. The Lundin family are the largest shareholder in the business, with 30 percent of the company’s shares. As a result of these allegations, the two companies have for more than a decade been faced with a need for ‘crisis management’ in order to legitimate themselves and their business in relation to public opinion, the media and their shareholders. Corporate selfdefences, which belong to a broader category of offenders’ neutralizations and denials, constitute a form of speech acts known as accounts (Scott and Lyman, 1968) that are employed when someone has to explain a gap between actions and expectations.

Under the influence of religious extremism, terrorists in China have used crime and violence as a means of creating terror and spreading panic in order to achieve the goal of splitting China. While criminal law could be an effective instrument for fighting against terrorism, the essential characteristics of terrorism in China require a reconstruction of the criminal legal system around the Absichtsdelikte model by introducing terrorist motivation into the constitutive elements of terrorist crimes. This article argues that this rather innovative legislative model can help to align the crime with the punishment in the field of counter-terrorism legislation and would be helpful for crime prevention as well.

Introduction

In criminology, understanding and examining why people commit a crime is very important in the ongoing debate of how crime should be handled, reduced and prevented (Byrne, 2008; Caspi et al., 2006; Mackenzie, 2006; Wilconx and Cullen, 2018). In the conventional sense, while the legal system typically allows motive to be proven in order to make plausible the accused’s reasons for committing a crime, motive in itself is not a core element of any given crime. However, this rule may not be applicable to a special category of crime – terrorist crime. Terrorism has not featured significantly in the criminology literature until recent years (Chermak and Gruenewald, 2015; Freilich and LaFree, 2016; LaFree et al., 2009; Schmid, 2013). Questions have arisen as to how to define terrorist activities in criminal law terms as a special offense and whether they can be distinguished from ordinary violent crimes as defined in criminal codes or by the common law. As most acts that constitute terrorism are also covered by criminal laws, some analysts have argued that terrorist motivation is the key to distinguishing between a terrorist crime and an ordinary violent crime (Buker, 2017; Cassese, 2006; Pi and Zhang, 2014). Overall, however, there appears to be a lack of research discussing whether motivation should be included as one of the constitutive elements of terrorist crimes from a criminological perspective. Although there is still no commonly accepted definition of terrorism, especially in an international context (Begorre-Bret, 2006; Cronin, 2003; Grozdanova, 2014; Hoffman, 2006; Hu, 2001; Schmid, 2013), terrorist crimes can generally be seen as criminal activities that exhibit the features of terrorism, i.e., the use of violence to attack civilian targets for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause (Blackbourn et al., 2013; Greene, 2014; Hoffman, 2006). It is important to highlight the motive element of terrorist crimes and that terrorist acts are both illegal by legislation and inherently immoral (Matusitz, 2013).

Purpose: The article revisits the negative effect of welfare state schemes on crime rates with a focus on the pathways of that effect. Social support theory (SST) and institutional anomie theory (IAT) are two related theoretical approaches to explain why – and how – the welfare state might prevent criminal behavior. This article tests the relevance of these theories for cross-country and over-time variation in homicide rates with more precise disaggregated welfare state indicators than used previously. Methods: We use panel regressions with country fixed effects and data for 18 OECD countries between 1990 and 2011. Disaggregated cross-national social expenditure and benefit generosity data is used to discriminate between pathways of welfare state influence on cross-national homicide. Results: The welfare state suppresses crime particularly through social support via generous unemployment benefits. Overall decommodification, the key measure to test IAT, however, does not have any effect on homicide. Conclusions: Only some welfare state interventions matter for homicide rates.

Introduction

Thinking about the connection between social programs and crime is as old as the modern welfare state itself. Famously, German criminologist Franz von Liszt stated already in 1898 – i.e. about a decade after Chancellor Bismarck had introduced the first national social insurance schemes in the world – that social policy “represents the best and most effective crime policy” (von Liszt, 1899: 22). In 1939 President Franklin D. Roosevelt claimed that “[t]hrough a broad program of social welfare, we struck at the very roots of crime itself” (cited in Fishback, Johnson, & Kantor, 2010: 715). In more recent decades, the public discourse and public policy in the United States (US) rather reflected the opinion that generous welfare policies do not reduce, but may even foster criminal activity and that stricter criminal prosecution would be the best way to reduce crime (Brown, 2016; Cullen, Wright, & Chamlin, 1999). Punitive responses to crime became widespread (Garland, 2001), together with harsher views on welfare (Wacquant, 2009). This stands in contrast to the criminological literature which, since the 1980s, has taken the idea of a negative association between welfare and crime more seriously and empirically tested it, first for the United States and later also crossnationally. These studies overwhelmingly show that more generous welfare policies are associated with lower levels of crime, hence unambiguously confirming Franz von Liszt’s early intuition. Yet, the literature is also marked by two interrelated shortcomings: First, while there exists a variety of theoretical approaches to explain the relationship, their empirical implications at the hypothesis level are often hard to distinguish. Second, at the operational level, we find that scholars often employ the same, highly aggregate measures of welfare state size such as total social spending to test different theories, although a range of much more specific indicators are available. Hence, while evidence of a negative effect is by now sufficiently well-established, we still do not know how the welfare state may reduce crime across countries. The view of the welfare state in this literature is quite simplistic and does not consider that different social policy schemes work in very different ways. We therefore need to disaggregate the welfare state to better understand which elements of social protection are responsible for the effect (see Worrall, 2005: 368).