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Abstract:

This article explores ‘bad’ sex in an age of same-sex marriage, through an analysis of the ‘homoradical’ as a rejection of both hetero and homo-normativities. Drawing on qualitative data from 29 LGBTQ interviewees, the article considers resistance to the discursive privileging of same-sex marriage in the context of Gayle Rubin’s theories of respectability and sexual hierarchies. These hierarchies constitute a ‘charmed circle’ of accepted sexual practices which are traditionally justified by marriage, procreation and/or love. It examines non-normative sexuality through the example of the lived experiences of non-normative, anti-assimilationist identities, particularly non-monogamy, public sex, and kink sex, showing how the ‘homoradical’ deviates from the normative practices that same-sex marriage reinforces.

1. Introduction

The Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 (hereafter, the 2013 Act) allowed same-sex couples to enter into a marriage for the first time in England and Wales.1 This change in the law is a significant development in the relationship of law and sexuality, and is of particular significance for LGBTQ people who are now be seen as ‘equal’, ‘normal’, or ‘the same as’ different-sex couples when formally recognizing their relationship. LGBTQ people’s sexuality was seen, traditionally, as antithetical to marriage; abject, immoral, and dangerous. In the 1980s, LGBTQ couples were described by Parliament as ‘a pretended family relationship’ in s28 of the Local Government Act, while the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 explicitly removes the sex from same-sex marriage by omitting adultery and consummation provisions (see Maine 2021). Marriage is representative of notions of ‘good sex’, as the legitimate and appropriate location for sex and procreation to take place: marriage’s introduction occupied a large swathe of LGBTQ rights campaigns for the best part of the last decade, and reaffirms the normative centrality of marriage and promotions of good gay, bad queer narratives (Ashford et al. 2020). This article seeks to highlight the queer challenge to the normative ideals of marriage and, particularly, the homonormative ideals of same-sex marriage.

Heteronormativity describes the social norm in which heterosexuality is seen as a ‘default’ position. Heteronormativity sustains and fosters a sexual hierarchy (Rubin 1984) in creating an expectation of heterosexuality, monogamy, and procreativity. Comparatively, homonormativity may be viewed as a conduit of heteronormativity, a form of identity and relationship that closely mirrors and reinforces heteronormativity and that ‘straightens’ queer politics. Homonormativity describes a dominant politics of liberal equality that upholds and sustains desexualised and depoliticised perspectives of same-sex couples, defined by Duggan (2003) as a ‘politic of assimilation’.

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Austrian family law stands out in Europe because, in Austria, fault-based divorce is still legally valid. In these divorces, the suing partner attempts to prove in court that the other partner is at fault for the breakdown of the marriage. Thus, proving in court that a relationship is deficient in order to obtain a divorce is a common family transition practice in Austria. In this contribution, I seek to identify the practices that are associated with fault divorce proceedings and look at how these practices are related to normative and legal ideas of marriage. Based on a qualitative multiple case study, I analysed 17 fault divorce lawsuits filed by heterosexual couples in the 2014–2016 period. To do so, I used situational analysis, trans-sequential analysis, and an analytical framework that was developed within the research project. The spouses’ involvement in the proceedings relied on two main approaches: First, the divorce was justified by an event that was disruptive enough to ‘keep things short’. These narratives were related to the divorce grounds explicitly mentioned in family law. Second, the divorce was justified through narratives of a ‘normal’ marriage that became a ‘bad’ marriage over time. These narratives relied upon characterisations of the other spouse as deficient. These deficiencies were related to normative expectations associated with particular life stages and gendered life course trajectories and mirrored the nuclear family ideal.

1. Introduction

In recent decades, the relationship patterns and perceptions of divorce in Western societies have changed (Raley and Sweeney 2020; Perelli-Harris and Lyons-Amos 2015; Amato 2010), and these changes are also reflected in family law (Kreyenfeld and Trappe 2020). Whereas just a few decades ago, a divorce was seen as a disruptive event that was the fault of individual partners, and thus the last phase in the evolution of a family, there has been a shift in the social and scientific perspectives on divorce, starting in the early 2000s (Smart 2004; Kitson 2006). Since this shift, divorce has generally been seen as one transition in the course of multiple transitions in a family’s evolution that reorganises family relations and can lead to the divorced spouses forming new partnerships and remarrying (Amato 2010). Even though there appeared to be a slight backlash against liberal attitudes towards divorce in most European countries after the early 2000s, these overall changes in recent decades have been reflected in family law. Thus, in most European countries today, fault-based divorce has been abolished (Kreyenfeld and Trappe 2020).

Together with a few other countries, Austria stands out in Europe with regard to family law because, in Austria, fault divorce is still legally valid (for an overview, see Antokolskaia 2016; Zartler 2013). This means that a partner whose spouse does not agree with the decision to divorce either has to wait until the couple has been separated for six years to obtain a legal divorce or has to file for a fault divorce. In the latter case, the initiating partner has to prove to the court that the other spouse has failed to fulfil his or her marital obligations. The law states that a fault divorce can be granted ‘if the other [partner] has culpably disrupted the marriage through serious misconduct or through dishonourable or immoral behaviour to such an extent that the restoration of a normal marital union cannot be expected’ (Ehegesetz 1999).

1- Introduction

2- Data & sample

3- Empirical results

4- Identification and endogeneity issues

5- Conclusion

References

Abstract

Studies in social sciences suggest that a normative commitment to stable, biological married life is a potent catalyst for inculcating and nourishing prosocial values, preferences and behaviors among family members. Extrapolating from this literature, we investigate whether firms led by married chief executive officers (CEOs) are associated with better corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our analysis of 2163 U.S. public corporations from 1993 to 2008 shows that firms led by married CEOs are associated with significantly higher scores on a popular CSR index, after controlling for a wide range of firm characteristics and CEO attributes. Further, the observed positive relation is particularly sharper with the diversity and employee relations components of CSR. Our findings highlight CEO marital status as an important driver of socially responsible corporate decision making.

Introduction

There is a large body of literature on the virtues and drawbacks of marriage. Although the overall effect of marriage on the economic and physical health of the family is debatable, the social benefits of the union appear to be significant. Also, prior research has shown that personal attributes, values and experiences of top managers, such as gender, political affiliation, religion, having children, and education, affect corporate policy. Marital status of CEOs is one such personal attribute that may be correlated with both socially responsible activities of corporations as well as several other personal traits. The main objective of this study is to explore how the marital status of CEOs affects corporate social responsibility (CSR). Corporate social responsibility is broadly defined as a firm’s commitment to minimizing potential harmful effects of its operations on its stakeholders (owners, employees, customers, community and the society at large) and maximizing its long-run beneficial impact on society. There is considerable debate regarding the economic and social desirability of CSR, i.e., whether it is value creating or destroying (Berman et al., 1999; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Chatterji et al., 2009; Boehe and Cruz, 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Barrios et al., 2014; Cheng et al., 2014; Jiraporn et al., 2014; Bereskin et al., 2016; Smith and Smith, 2016). Another body of literature indicates that top managers’ values, personal attributes, and experiences (including their marital status) affect a wide range of corporate policies (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Dahl et al., 2012; Roussanov and Savor, 2014). Managers’ personal values, attributes, attitudes and behaviors can influence employees’ response to the work environment and firm activities (Ambrose et al., 2013). CEOs’ religious affiliations (Catholic or Protestant) affect corporate decisions with respect to leverage, geographic diversification, and firm value (Baxamusa and Jalal, 2016).