مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد مکانیسم حاکمیت شرکتی و محافظه کاری حسابداری – امرالد ۲۰۱۷

This paper investigates the effect of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on the extent of accounting conservatism in Egypt. Separation between a firm’s principals (shareholders) and managers (insiders) can result in managers having greater access to information relating to its operations and management. Meanwhile the primary source of information for shareholders is financial statements published by management. Shareholders are always concerned with how managers implement the principles of accounting conservatism in their financial estimates, as this often results in better protection for shareholders (Cullinan et al., 2012). One reason for the increasing interest in accounting conservatism is that not all areas of accounting are covered by accounting standards (Chung et al., 2003), with some areas requiring a manager’s judgement, which could range from neutral or aggressive, and finally to conservative behaviour and decisions. Therefore, the level of accounting conservatism arguably depends on a manager’s estimates. To control managers’ estimates and maintain conservative reporting, managers should be monitored by instituting a number of CG mechanisms. For instance, the presence of a large number of outsiders on the board can enhance the monitoring process, making managers more conservative in their financial reporting (Garcı´a Lara et al., 2007). Several studies suggest that CG mechanisms can enhance the level of accounting conservatism (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Ahmed and Henry, 2012; Elshandidy and Hassanein, 2014; Kukah et al., 2016). Indeed, other studies have demonstrated that CG mechanisms, such as board size and board independence, can reduce accounting conservatism (Chi et al., 2009; Lim, 2011). Meanwhile previous literature emphasises that effective CG mechanisms restrict a manager’s opportunistic behaviour, and thus induce them to be more conservative in their financial reporting. However, the link between CG mechanisms and accounting conservatism varies across different institutional settings. For instance – and using a sample of US firms – Garcı´a Lara et al. (2009) note that there is a positive association between CG mechanisms and the level of accounting conservatism. Similarly, Lim (2011) evinces that CG attributes enhance the level of accounting conservatism in Australian firms. This study, therefore, examines the effect of CG attributes on the level of accounting conservatism in Egypt. As with the CG mechanisms examined in previous literature, the common CG mechanisms that have been used in past studies include board size, board independence, separation between the roles of chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) positions, and auditor type. Noticeably, the decision to focus on Egypt is motivated by a number of reasons. First, most empirical evidence examining the association between CG and accounting conservatism has been conducted in developed countries (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Garcı´a Lara et al., 2007; Cullinan et al., 2012) rather than in developing countries, such as Egypt.