مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد قدرت حاکمیت شرکتی و نقدینگی بازار بورس – امرالد ۲۰۱۷

مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد قدرت حاکمیت شرکتی و نقدینگی بازار بورس – امرالد ۲۰۱۷

 

مشخصات مقاله
ترجمه عنوان مقاله قدرت حاکمیت شرکتی و نقدینگی بازار بورس در کشور مالزی
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله Corporate governance strength and stock market liquidity in Malaysia
انتشار مقاله سال ۲۰۱۷
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی ۲۰ صفحه
هزینه دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد.
پایگاه داده نشریه امرالد
نوع نگارش مقاله
مقاله پژوهشی (Research article)
مقاله بیس این مقاله بیس میباشد
نمایه (index) scopus – master journals
نوع مقاله ISI
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی  PDF
شاخص H_index ۱۶ در سال ۲۰۱۸
شاخص SJR ۰٫۲۰۳ در سال ۲۰۱۸
رشته های مرتبط حسابداری، مدیریت، اقتصاد
گرایش های مرتبط حسابداری مالی، مدیریت مالی، اقتصاد مالی
نوع ارائه مقاله
ژورنال
مجله / کنفرانس مجله بین المللی امور مالی مدیریت – International Journal of Managerial Finance
دانشگاه School of Economics -Universiti Utara Malaysia – Malaysia
کلمات کلیدی مالزی، نقدینگی بازار سهام، قدرت حاکمیت شرکت
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی Malaysia, Stock market liquidity, Corporate governance strength
شناسه دیجیتال – doi
https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMF-10-2016-0195
کد محصول E10462
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله  ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید.
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فهرست مطالب مقاله:
Abstract
۱ Introduction
۲ Literature review
۳ Methodology
۴ Analysis
۵ Summary
References

بخشی از متن مقاله:
Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance strength on stock market liquidity in an emerging country, namely, Malaysia, by constructing a corporate governance score that captures both internal monitoring mechanisms (board of directors’ characteristics, audit committee’s characteristics and internal audit function) and external monitoring mechanism (audit quality). Design/methodology/approach – The study uses a sample of 2,020 yearly firm observations in Bursa Malaysia over the period 2009-2012. The ordinary least square regression and several estimation methods such as two-stage least squares using instrumental variables (IV-2SLS) and dynamic GMM are employed. Findings – This study finds a significant positive association between corporate governance effectiveness and stock market liquidity. The finding is robust to alternative liquidity measurements, to alternative estimation methods, and to endogeneity bias. Research limitations/implications – This result implies that the firms with effective monitoring mechanisms mitigate information asymmetry which leads to less adverse selection problems among traders. Practical implications – This study provides implications for regulators to help design regulations that enhance stock market liquidity. This study could also help investors and traders to formulate their trading decisions, and enables firms to know the importance of strengthening the corporate governance monitoring mechanisms. Originality/value – This study constructs a corporate governance effectiveness measure by combining both internal and external monitoring mechanisms. These mechanisms have not been constructed together in one score in the corporate governance literature and the impact of internal audit function, as an internal monitoring mechanism on liquidity, has yet to be examined.

Introduction

Stock market liquidity is a key factor for well-functioning stock markets due to its important repercussions for several parties. Having a liquid market is essential either for developed and emerging countries, as a highly liquid market means efficient allocation and a tool for economic growth (Bencivenga et al., 1996; Levine, 1991). Liquidity is a critical pre-condition for financial market growth and development (Wang, 2013). One of the issues that have been examined in terms of liquidity is corporate governance, in that effective corporate governance is a crucial for enhancing the investors’ confidence and broadening and deepening the capital market. Effective corporate governance serves to protect the shareholders’ rights by mitigating perverse insider behavior. It is recognized that developed and developing countries are introducing corporate governance reforms. However, empirical evidence about the impact of corporate governance on stock market liquidity is still limited. For developed countries, a study done by Chung et al. (2010) in the USA examined this relationship and found that highly effective governance leads to high stock liquidity. A recent study by Ali et al. (2016) examined the association between corporate governance quality and stock liquidity among Australian firms. However, their findings are based on the four dimensions of corporate governance, namely, board quality, audit committee, nomination committee and remuneration committee. Their study ignores IAF and audit quality as monitoring mechanisms which are more related with financial reporting quality than nomination committee and remuneration committee. In Karmani et al.’s (2015) study, the corporate governance effectiveness was found significantly associated with the stock market liquidity of French firms. However, the index included only four themes, namely, board of directors, audit quality, ownership structure and the disclosure of information. This means that IAF has been ignored also in Karmani et al.’s (2015) study. Furthermore, one of the key dimensions used to construct the corporate governance index in Chung et al.’s (2010) study is the antitakeover provisions. This dimension is not applicable for the Malaysian context as Malaysian firms have few antitakeover provisions available to them. Thus, their findings may not be generalizable to an emerging country, like Malaysia because of several regulatory and institutional differences. Malaysia also has underdeveloped equity markets, which are typified by unique characteristics, such as high agency problems (Kallunki et al., 2007); high earnings management practices (Abdul Rahman and Haneem Mohamed Ali, 2006; Al-Jaifi, 2017); poor information environment (Ball et al., 2003); high ownership concentration (Claessens et al., 2000; Tam and Tan, 2007); and high insider trading (Ali et al., 2011).

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