Over the last two decades, Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs)1 have emerged as an important instrument for governments to provide public services, as well as construct and maintain infrastructure. European governments have been particularly active in using PPPs, especially in the transportation sector. A recent study by Roumboutsos (2015) indicates that in 2013, there were more than 1600 PPPs in Europe, with a cumulative investment of €۳۰۰ billion. PPPs have become increasingly used by governments to meet two main objectives: address the infrastructure gap or the population’s need for public services (within budgetary constraints), and bring the private sector’s higher level of efficiency to these projects and services (Grimsey and Lewis 2002, 2004, 2005a, b). In addition to these explicit objectives, PPPs have implicit benefits for many players. PPPs have been used for reasons of economic policy; by bridging the infrastructure gap, PPPs are an efficient way to promote immediate economic growth and maintain or even boost employment levels. Hence, the election cycle—whether national, regional, or local— will work as a strong promoter of PPP usage. Another critical implicit beneficiary of PPPs is the financing institutions, as they lend at a very low risk, particularly when the public sector guarantees payments. However, PPPs have been subject to substantial criticisms: (1) the real levels of enhanced efficiency are questionable (Glaister 1999); (2) the level of accountability of PPPs is unclear (Broadbent and Laughlin 2003; Froud 2003; Asenova and Beck 2010); (3) efficient government management of incomplete contracting (an unavoidable problem) is lacking (Blanc-Brude et al. 2006, 2009); and (4) the level of Value for Money generation for the public sector is often overestimated (Grimsey and Lewis 2002, 2005a, b). In recent years, a new criticism about PPPs has emerged: the high number of renegotiations. PPP contracts have frequently been subject to renegotiations; renegotiations occur when specific events (often referred to as ‘‘compensation events’’) change the financial conditions of the concession. We use the definition of Guasch et al. (2014), whereby ‘‘a renegotiation of PPP contracts involves a change in the original contractual terms and conditions, as opposed to an adjustment that takes place under a mechanism defined in the contract.’’ The PPP renegotiations literature has primarily focused on studying the critical factors in renegotiations and the critical renegotiations trigger. Guasch and collaborators (Guasch 2004; Guasch et al. 2003, 2007, 2008; Guasch and Straub 2006, 2009) used a database of over 1000 observations in Latin America, and analysed the renegotiation conditions and triggers. The Latin America experience was also studied in Estache et al. (2003), Engel et al. (2006, 2009) and Moore et al. (2014). Domingues and Sarmento (2016) collected data from renegotiations in the transport sector at the European level. The Asian experience was studied by Reside and Mendoza (2010). At a more local level, Cruz and Marques (2013a, b) and Miranda Sarmento and Renneboog (2016a) studied the Portuguese experience, Athias and Saussier (2010) and De Brux (2008, 2010) the French experience.