Abstract

۱٫ Introduction

۲٫ Option one: reject philosophy

۳٫ Option two: philosophy enfeebled

۴٫ Option three: a robust form of philosophy

۵٫ Justifying the robust form of philosophy

۶٫ From liberal education to liberal politics

References

Abstract

Hume’s longest analysis of man’s rational faculty—Book 1 of A Treatise of Human Nature 1—“concludes” with philosophy seemingly pronounced illegitimate, just before Hume then puzzlingly resumes the philosophic life. I argue that the section serves a crucial function in Hume’s overall project: it guides thinkers through a series of introspections, leading them to both reconceive and reorient themselves as driven by the passion of curiosity. This oddly truth-directed passion redefines both reason’s relationship to the passions and the nature of philosophy. Though reason and passion are prima facie antagonistic, I argue that the greater role Hume gives to the passions is the precondition for his subsequent justification of moral-political philosophy as oriented towards wisdom rather than merely towards pleasure. I then show how this justification for philosophy illuminates how Hume connects liberal education to liberal politics, and why his political philosophy emphasizes liberal maxims.

۱٫ Introduction

Hume frequently refers to nature’s secrets, suggesting he endorses Heraclitus’s famous maxim: nature loves to hide.1 Apparently imitating nature, Hume leaves a key insight concerning the nature of man’s mind opaque in A Treatise of Human Nature. 2 Though Book 1 of Treatise, “Of the Understanding,” provides Hume’s most sustained analysis of man’s intellect, only in the conclusion of Book 2, “Of the Passions,” does Hume disclose that a passion—curiosity—is “the first source of all our enquiries” (۲٫۳٫۱۰٫۱).۳ This central claim’s only clear precedent comes in Book 1s conclusion, when Hume remarks that “the origin of [his] philosophy” is the pleasure philosophy provides him (2.3.10.1, 1.4.7.12).4 Since he sees an idea’s origin as central to the proper understanding of it, Hume’s silence concerning philosophy’s origin in the passions is puzzling.

This silence is all the more remarkable given the stakes. Hume famously, albeit ambiguously, claims that “reason is, and ought only to be a slave of the passions” (۲٫۳٫۳٫۴). But philosophy’s legitimacy as the quest for wisdom hinges upon whether thinking is anything more than a passion’s nonrational pursuit of pleasure.5 If the pleasure of thought is not inextricably tied to a rationally justifiable pursuit of wisdom, then philosophy, the love and pursuit of wisdom, is illusory. Philosophy would be an incoherent way of life. And, of more widespread concern, if social-political philosophy is not directed towards truth, then there would be no possible ascent from membership in a party of passionate interest to genuinely understanding political life and perhaps thereby refining it for the better. My intention in this article is to elucidate the way in which Hume ties the pleasure of thought to a rationally justifiable pursuit of wisdom, and the distinctive understanding of philosophy that this tie entails. These epistemic roots of Hume’s approach to social-political philosophy are the vantage point from which we can understand the forcefulness of Hume’s political liberalism