مشخصات مقاله | |
ترجمه عنوان مقاله | کاهش مالیات حقوق و دستمزد به عنوان پاسخی به COVID-19 چقدر هدفمند است؟ شواهد از چین |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله | How well-targeted are payroll tax cuts as a response to COVID-19? evidence from China |
نشریه | اسپرینگر |
سال انتشار | 2022 |
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی | 27 صفحه |
هزینه | دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد. |
نوع نگارش مقاله |
مقاله پژوهشی (Research article) |
مقاله بیس | این مقاله بیس میباشد |
نمایه (index) | JCR – Master Journal List – Scopus |
نوع مقاله | ISI |
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی | |
ایمپکت فاکتور(IF) |
1.308 در سال 2020 |
شاخص H_index | 50 در سال 2022 |
شاخص SJR | 0.618 در سال 2020 |
شناسه ISSN | 1573-6970 |
شاخص Quartile (چارک) | Q2 در سال 2020 |
فرضیه | ندارد |
مدل مفهومی | دارد |
پرسشنامه | ندارد |
متغیر | دارد |
رفرنس | دارد |
رشته های مرتبط | اقتصاد – مدیریت |
گرایش های مرتبط | اقتصاد نظری – بیمه |
نوع ارائه مقاله |
ژورنال |
مجله / کنفرانس | مالیات بین المللی و مالیه عمومی – International Tax and Public Finance |
دانشگاه | Allard Law School, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada |
کلمات کلیدی | مالیات بر حقوق – بیمه اجتماعی – غیر رسمی کار – کووید – چین |
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی | Payroll taxes – Social insurance – Labor informality – COVID – China |
شناسه دیجیتال – doi |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-022-09746-w |
لینک سایت مرجع |
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10797-022-09746-w |
کد محصول | e17249 |
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله | ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید. |
دانلود رایگان مقاله | دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی |
سفارش ترجمه این مقاله | سفارش ترجمه این مقاله |
فهرست مطالب مقاله: |
Abstract 1 Policy background 2 Data and sample 3 Results 4 Discussion and conclusion References |
بخشی از متن مقاله: |
Abstract Numerous countries cut payroll taxes in response to COVID-19, including China, which reduced employer contributions by up to 21 percentage points. We use administrative data on more than 800,000 Chinese firms to evaluate payroll tax cuts as a business relief measure. We estimate that the tax cuts cover 31.5% of the decline in business cash flow, but labor informality causes 53% of registered firms-24% of aggregate economic activity-to receive no benefits at all. We quantify the targeting of the policy in terms of how much benefits flow to small firms less able to access external finance and to sectors worse hit by COVID-19. We find that (1) small firms and vulnerable industries are comparatively more labor intensive, which leads to desirable targeting; (2) labor informality worsens, but does not eliminate, targeting by firm size; and (3) labor informality is uncorrelated with the COVID-19 shock, and therefore does not affect targeting by sector. Policy background In the mid- to late-1990s, China adopted a mandatory “pay-as-you-go” pension system, Basic Old Age Insurance (BOAI), for employed persons funded mainly through employer contributions (see Fang and Feng (2018) for a history of pension programs in China). Likewise, in the early 2000s, a medical insurance (MI) program for employed persons was established, also funded by payroll taxes (Huang, 2020). These two programs are the largest components of the SI system. As of 2019, the nationally prescribed employer contribution rate for BOAI and MI was 16 and 8% of wages, respectively. BOAI and MI also require employee-side contributions-8 and 2%-which are recorded in notional individual accounts that are efectively pay-as-you-go. Discussion and conclusion Many advanced economies responded to the COVID economic shock with fscal policies unprecedented in both scale and form. In comparison, China’s response to COVID by way of additional spending and foregone revenue is moderate as a proportion of its GDP and more typical for developing countries.28 Its payroll tax cuts amounted to about 1.68% of 2020 GDP, whereas in the USA the Paycheck Protection Program alone delivered government support equal to 4.55% of 2020 GDP.29 China’s choice of policy instrument was also conservative: instead of launching novel spending programs, it temporarily reduced rates under an existing tax. |