مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد تاثیر معرفی برند فروشگاه در رهبری قیمت کانال (الزویر)

The proliferation of store brands (SBs) has fundamentally impacted the relationship between manufacturers and retailers. Retailers are now allocating an increasing share of their already scarce shelf space to private labels, thus making national brand (NB) manufacturers vulnerable to power of retailers to demand steep discounts (Financial Times, April 13, 2009; Karp 2012; Matlack and Tiplady 2005). For NB manufacturers, a SB means not only fiercer competition for shelf space but also the pressure to accept smaller margins, because SB products set price ceilings (Creswell 2000; Martin and Brat 2010). On the other hand, retailers typically enjoy increased margins on NBs after the introduction of SB (Narasimhan and Wilcox 1998; Sayman, Hoch, and Raju 2001). Furthermore, a retailer actively dealing with SB suppliers may gain deeper knowledge of the manufac turers’ cost structures. All these factors point to the possibility of significant changes in the channel price leadership status between NB manufacturers and retailers after SB introductions. During the last two decades or so, scholars have paid increasing attention to the diverse channel price leadership and their impact on channel performance. For instance, Choi (1991) theoretically analyzed three possible price leadership scenarios between a manufacturer and a retailer: the absence of a channel price leader (the “Vertical Nash” game, labeled VN hereafter), the manufacturer’s price leadership over the retailer (the “Manufacturer Stackelberg” game, labeled MS hereafter), and the retailer’s price leadership over the manufacturer (the “Retailer Stackelberg” game, labeled RS hereafter). He found that these channel price leadership scenarios have a significant impact on channel member prices and profits, and consequently on their optimal channel strategies. Lee and Staelin (1997) extend the study of these three channel pricing games and show that the impact of price leadership on the profitability of individual channel members is moderated by the type of vertical strategic interactions present in the channel. Trivedi (1998) examines the effects of the two Stackelberg leadership scenarios on channel members’ performances considering competition at both manufacturer and retailer levels.