مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد ورشکستگی برادران لمان – اسپرینگر 2016

While the facts about what happened and when are clear, the connections between them are not. Drawing inferences from any single event is problematic at best. Just as any single point on a plane is consistent with an infinite number of lines, a single event may not allow one to discriminate between numerous different hypotheses. Not surprisingly, there are two different interpretations of the facts associated with Lehman and they arrive at diametrically opposed positions as to causation, and the implications of it for the use of the Bankruptcy Code to handle failing financial firms. One of the most contentious issues emanating from the Lehman Brothers episode is whether the bankruptcy process is, or with modifications could be, a suitable method for handling the failure of complex, non-bank financial firms. Opinions are sharply divided on the adequacy of US bankruptcy law to resolve complex non-bank financial firms in an orderly fashion. Bankruptcy scholars argue that the market turmoil in the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy had little to do with the use of bankruptcy to resolve it, and that in the face of the complexity inherent in resolving an institution the size and scope of Lehman Brothers, the bankruptcy was orderly. In other words, there was no causation running from the bankruptcy filing to the disorderly markets that followed. Proponents of this view argue that the near collapse of markets following Lehman’s bankruptcy filing was the result of policy uncertainty: The US government decided to let Lehman fail when the market expected a government-assisted rescue. In fact, Lehman was not prepared for its bankruptcy filing, ostensibly because its management expected government intervention to prevent this outcome (Miller, 2010). The other view, which one might call the official view of the Lehman episode, is that Lehman’s filing for protection is articulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), among others, which interpreted the facts as supporting a causal relationship between the financial turmoil following Lehman’s bankruptcy filing and the use of bankruptcy to resolve Lehman. Under this view, the near collapse of markets in the days following the bankruptcy filing was a direct result of a disorderly windup of Lehman’s affairs. Under this interpretation of events in the autumn of 2008 the answer is clear – an orderly resolution of the insolvency of a large financial firm cannot be done in bankruptcy.