مقاله سال ۲۰۱۶

 مجله اسکاندیناویایی مدیریت – Scandinavian Journal of Management

۱٫ Introduction

International joint ventures (IJVs) are among the most prominent modes of international business today (Madhok, 1995; Mainela & Puhakka, 2008; Park & Harris, 2014). Yet IJVs have been reported as having a high rate of failure (Hsieh, Rodrigues, & Child, 2010; Kobernyuk, Stiles, & Ellson, 2014). This has led researchers to investigate the factors that enhance or impede their performance (see Ren, Gray, & Kim, 2009 for a review). In particular, inter-partner opportunism has been proposed in the literature as a major cause of unsatisfactory IJV performance, because it hampers inter-partner confidence, commitment and reciprocity; impairs collaborative effects and synergy creation; increases transaction costs; and impedes IJV evolution and growth by increasing uncertainty (Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Luo, 2007a). Researchers have identified various sources of interpartner opportunism in IJVs. These sources include: weak property rights of invested resources in IJVs (Hennart & Zeng, 2005), external uncertainty, inter-partner goal disparity, resource misfit, cultural dissimilarity, bargaining asymmetry, and internal uncertainty (Luo, 2006), external uncertainty and inter-firm psychic distance (Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello, 2009), inter-partner asymmetric dependence, payoff inequity, cultural diversity, goal incompatibility and pressures for quick results (Das & Rahman, 2010). These investigations advance our understandings of the sources of inter-partner opportunism, however we have limited understanding of the mechanisms that reduce opportunism in IJVs (Hennart & Zeng, 2005).

The study of IJVs has been a prolific area of research, even though there are different interpretations of IJVs. Hennart (1993) points out that IJVs are joint hierarchy, and therefore require many structural factors to curb opportunism. Ouchi (1979) suggests that IJVs are ‘clan-like’ organizational forms that require many relational qualities to curb opportunism. Corresponding to these interpretations, two different research streams have emerged (see Hennart & Zeng, 2005 for a literature review). One stream, rooted in transaction cost economics (TCE), is mainly concerned with examining the underlying structural characteristics of IJV as an explanation for reducing opportunism in IJVs. For instance, Parkhe (1993) and Zhang and Rajagopalan (2002) empirically verify the important role of inter-partner dependence in curtailing opportunism. Hennart and Zeng’s (2005) theoretical study proposes dependence and resource complementarity between IJV partners as potential solutions to opportunism. Luo (2007a) empirically validates the importance of contract and equity share between IJV partners in reducing opportunism. Das and Rahman’s (2010) conceptual study suggests inter-partner equity share and dependence as structural solutions to opportunism. Hence, in this stream, the various structural characteristics of IJV are considered to be mechanisms that reduce opportunism in IJVs.

The other stream, rooted in social exchange theory (SET), is mainly concerned with examining the underlying social characteristics between IJV partners as an explanation for reducing opportunism in IJVs. For example, Wathne and Heide (2000) introduce the notion that inter-partner socialization efforts, which are based on cultural adaptation and trust, can be potential deterrents to opportunism along with monitoring and control. Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter (2000) empirically show that relational capital between partners, which is based on trust and interaction, deters opportunism. Deeds and Hill (1998) find significant evidence that a strong relationship between partners is a more effective deterrent of opportunistic behaviour than hostages or rigorous contractual arrangements. Hence, in this stream, the various social characteristics between IJV partner firms are considered as mechanisms that reduce opportunism in IJVs. Rarely have the two streams been combined in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of social and structural mechanisms that reduce opportunism in IJVs (Luo, 2007a). Further, a growing number of studies share the view that the economic structure of IJV exchange is socially embedded, and therefore social and structural mechanisms jointly improve IJV performance (e.g., Luo, 2002a, 2002b, 2008; Yan & Gray, 1994). These scholars have views that both social and structural mechanisms have some weaknesses and when used together complement each other’s weaknesses and enhance IJV performance. However, prior research has not investigated the interactions between structural and social mechanisms in reducing opportunism. Hennart and Zeng (2005), Luo (2006, 2007a) and Jiang, Li, Gao, Bao, and Jiang (2013) maintain that future study is needed especially to investigate the interactions between structural and social mechanisms in reducing opportunism because understanding the way these mechanisms interact in curtailing opportunism is very important.