۱- Introduction

۲- Background

۳- Mutual assured destruction and its deterrent benefit

۴- Mutual assured destruction for information, influence and cyber warfare

۵- A theory of and framework for cross domain deterrence

۶- A theory of and framework for Multi-Domain deterrence and assured destruction

۷- Evaluation of models and their efficacy

۸- Conclusions and future work

References

Abstract

Mutual assured destruction is a key deterrent against the use of the most powerful weapons. The threat of it successfully prevented the deployment of a nuclear weapon during and since the United States versus Soviet Union Cold War. It has also prevented the escalation to total warfare scenarios (where countries fully deploy their arsenals and capabilities against each other). Cyber weapons are poised to potentially create more havoc, death and destruction than a single nuclear weapon would and there has been significant contemporary use of information and influence warfare. Given the foregoing, this paper investigates whether mutual assured destruction scenarios may exist which are (or could be) responsible for keeping the use of these warfare methods in check. Further, the paper considers whether the three types of warfare might be effective in holding the others in check.

Introduction

The advent of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed warfare. During the United States and Soviet Union Cold War, both sides developed enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other multiple times over [1]. Each side perceived the other to be a “sensible rational opponent” whose behavior was shaped by “threats of nuclear retaliation” from the other [2]. Each relied upon the other to be concerned about its own survival and to not take an action that would lead to its own annihilation by nuclear retribution. While some secondary [3] and proxy conflicts [4] occurred, neither side could risk deploying a nuclear weapon because of the anticipated response. The “strategic bi-polarity” model that defined the Cold War no longer represents the state of the world, in terms of physical conflict [2]. This was never an applicable model for cyber, information or influence warfare. Instead, the current status of physical world conflict is a state of “strategic multi-polarity” [۲] and this same model, albeit with different players and means of warfighting, is representative of cyber, information and influence warfare. Under a the model of strategic multi-polarity, Curtis [2] contends, mutual assured destruction isn’t effective. For this deterrent approach to work, each state would require the capability to assure destruction to all other states and combinations of states that might attack it. Given that not all states have nuclear capabilities, this standard would clearly not be met. However, Curtis’s conclusion is a bit extreme.