Firms have good reasons to disclose private information. The benefits of disclosure involve lower cost of capital, higher stock valuation and greater ability to raise funds, which altogether promote firm growth (Pownall and Waymire, 1989; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Botosan, 1997; Francis et al., 2005). However, concerns related to product market competition may prevent firms from disclosing their private information (Verrecchia, 1983; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990; Newman and Sansing, 1993). Attitudes toward disclosure also vary across shareholders. Institutional investors require accurate and timely information to allocate their funds more efficiently (Healy et al., 1999; Bushee and NOE, 2000; Ajinkya et al., 2005). In contrast, controlling blockholders prefer fewer disclosures since their longer horizons imply that they have little to gain from a prompt reevaluation of their shares. Furthermore, Sengupta (2004) argues that controlling blockholders have greater access to the firm’s private information and would prefer to maintain their informational advantage by discouraging timely and detailed public disclosures. Empirical studies based on US firms indicate that quality of disclosure is linked to firms’ ownership structure. Using management earnings forecasts as a means for firms to convey private information, Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that institutional ownership is associated with more accurate and less biased disclosures. While their focus is on the role of internal governance structures, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) show that firms with high institutional ownership are more likely to issue management earnings forecasts that are also more precise, whereas insider ownership is associated with fewer and less precise forecasts. Both studies control for the endogeneity of ownership. However, their variable of interest may not accurately capture firms’ disclosure quality. In an environment where forecasts are voluntary, firms can freely choose whether and when to issue forecasts. Accordingly, the decision not to issue forecasts does not necessarily indicate poor disclosure, as firms can choose not to issue forecasts simply because they have no incentive to do so. Since prior studies use non-issuers as the control group, the question of whether and how governance structure is associated with the decision to disclose management’s private information has not been fully resolved.