مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد ساختار مالکیت و عملکرد شرکت – امرالد 2017

Introduction

Extant literature shows that corporate governance explains 1997’s Asian financial crisis. Johnson et al. (2000) show that governance measures and ownership structures explain the collapse of the currencies and stock markets in the 1997 crisis, and that the effect of these variables was stronger than the standard macroeconomic variables. Mitton (2002) extends this idea to the firms’ level, and shows that ownerships concentration, disclosures’ quality and diversification affected the firms’ performance in the crisis. Lemmon and Lins (2003) show that cash flow rights leverage (defined as control rights divided by cash flow rights) negatively affected firms’ performance during the 1997 Asian crisis. The effect was stronger when managerial ownership was present. Thus, managerial ownership can be used as a vehicle for majority shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Even so, corporate governance seems to have an impact on trading strategies. A trading strategy based on corporate governance seems to produce abnormal profits. For example, using the decade of the 1990s, Gompers et al. (2003) show that a trading strategy consisting of buying stock in companies that are in the top 10 per cent of the governance index and selling stock in companies that form the lowest 10 per cent of the governance index would have yielded an abnormal return of 8.5 per cent. The year 2000 witnessed a growing awareness of good corporate governance (Bebchuk et al., 2013). Markets also seemed to learn this and incorporate this information into prices. The efficient market hypothesis predicts that trading based on widely held information will not yield abnormal profits. Consistent with this notion, Bebchuk et al. (2013) show that the profitability of a trading strategy based on governance, which produced abnormal profits in the 1990s (Gompers et al., 2003), disappears during the next decade. They attribute the disappearance to the governance learning process during this period. In 2008, the markets experienced another financial crisis, which was the subprime crisis. This event, along with the more recent developments in corporate governance during the 2000s, motivated our study. Specifically, our research question is, “Does the significant effect of the ownerships structure on a firm’s performance, as observed in the 1997 financial crisis, disappear during the 2008 financial crisis?” We hypothesize that the significant effect disappeared in the 2008 financial crisis. The use of the 2008 subprime crisis provides an advantage. As suggested by Lemmon and Lins (2003), the use of crisis periods may be appropriate when looking to disentangle endogeneity problems that may arise as ownership structures, investment opportunities and firms’ values may all be jointly determined (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Akbar et al., 2016). Akbar et al. (2016) show that after controlling for endogeneity problems, previous findings of positive associations between corporate governance and performance disappear. The 1997 crisis hit the Asian countries suddenly, so the crisis was exogenous to the firms. They have little or probably no opportunity to adjust to the crisis in the short-term.