مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد ساختار مالکیت و عملکرد بانک – امرالد 2018

Bank distress can induce systemic effects (Stulz, 2015): banks played a central role in the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, too often failing in their mission to allocate resources efficiently and attenuate systemic risk[1]. This crisis, along with the consequences of the Eurozone crisis, brought about a surge in empirical research investigating its causes and effects, including the role of ownership and shareholding structure[2]. Indeed, scholars generally agree that the recession was partly due the shortcomings of the banking sector, and that banks’ excessive risk-taking before the crisis is related to their respective corporate governance mechanisms (Brunnermeier, 2009; De Young and Torna, 2013). Furthermore, Peni and Va¨ha¨maa (2012) document that US bank holdings with better corporate governance practices performed better during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In support, Berger et al. (2016) provide evidence that, during the downturn in the USA, banks’ ownership structures play a substantial role in explaining the likelihood of bank failure: failure dramatically increases with the shareholding by lower-level managers, due to their moral hazard incentives. In the light of this framework, this paper aims to use new data and methods to reconsider two particular pitfalls present in the literature, both extensively reported in Section 2: the impact of ownership concentration and its nature on bank performance, with a special consideration of the channel of banks’ technical efficiency. The literature mainly focuses on the impact of the nature of the ultimate shareholders and their concentration (dispersed vs concentrated) by adopting dummy variables related to the ownership structure. Against this background, the present paper provides further insights that contribute to the literature in three significant ways. First, this paper is the first to study how different types of shareholders and ownership concentrations affect banks’ profitability, technical efficiency and risk aptitude, using continuous variables that precisely and extensively express the participation of each type of shareholder (government institutions, banks, institutional investors, industrial companies, families and managers). This empirical strategy enables the authors to capture the marginal effect of each type of shareholder on bank performance more accurately than with qualitative analysis; it also clarifies the interaction effect between ownership type and concentration.