مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد تنظیم رقابت در بازارهای دو طرفه – الزویر ۲۰۱۹

elsevier

 

مشخصات مقاله
ترجمه عنوان مقاله تنظیم رقابت پلتفرم در بازارهای دو طرفه تحت دوره آنلاین به آفلاین (O2O)
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله Regulating platform competition in two-sided markets under the O2O era
انتشار مقاله سال ۲۰۱۹
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی ۴۳ صفحه
هزینه دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد.
پایگاه داده نشریه الزویر
نوع نگارش مقاله
مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
مقاله بیس این مقاله بیس نمیباشد
نمایه (index) Scopus – Master Journals List – JCR
نوع مقاله ISI
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی  PDF
ایمپکت فاکتور(IF)
۶٫۳۴۴ در سال ۲۰۱۸
شاخص H_index ۱۵۵ در سال ۲۰۱۹
شاخص SJR ۲٫۴۷۵ در سال ۲۰۱۸
شناسه ISSN ۰۹۲۵-۵۲۷۳
شاخص Quartile (چارک) Q1 در سال ۲۰۱۸
مدل مفهومی ندارد
پرسشنامه ندارد
متغیر ندارد
رفرنس دارد
رشته های مرتبط مدیریت
گرایش های مرتبط بازاریابی
نوع ارائه مقاله
ژورنال
مجله / کنفرانس مجله بین المللی اقتصاد تولید – International Journal of Production Economics
دانشگاه  School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Haidian, Beijing 100190, PR China
کلمات کلیدی  بازارهای دو طرفه، تنظیم، رقابت، بازار تاکسی گرفتن
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی Two-sided markets; Regulation; Competition; Taxi-hailing market
شناسه دیجیتال – doi
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2017.10.031
کد محصول  E13613
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله  ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید.
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فهرست مطالب مقاله:
Abstract
۱٫ Introduction
۲٫ Literature review
۳٫ The model
۴٫ The analysis of government regulations
۵٫ Conclusions
Acknowledgement
References

 

بخشی از متن مقاله:
Abstract

Online-to-offline (O2O) services permeate our daily life and consumption along with the advanced technology in e-commerce. In this study, motivated by taxi-hailing market case, we analyze the effect of government regulations on competition in two-sided markets featured network externality under the O2O era. First, a model with Hotelling specification is formulated to describe the competition in taxi-hailing markets using subsides as decision variables. In the model, platforms subsidize two sides agents labeled drivers and passengers, and the subsidies are given based on whether a state of membership or every transaction. Second, government regulations are introduced into the model by adding corresponding modification into agents’ utility, and new consequent market equilibriums are compared with the benchmark status. Major findings of this work include: i) the effects of price adjustments regulation depend largely on relative size of mutual network externalities, which causes a negative impact on social welfare except for extreme size level; ii) butt joint with official platforms brings down platforms’ cost in both sides so that companies make more profits, where social welfare including consumer surplus and profits increases; iii) forbiddance setting in time limited usage scarifies a little economic effectiveness to ensure better safety.

Introduction

In recent years, the advanced mobile technology has led us into an online-to-offline (O2O) community, where the mobile payment technology plays an increasingly important role. O2O refers to an integration of offline commercial opportunities into online operation and services. An example of O2O is the popularity of taxi-hailing applications (apps), mobile software that matches drivers and passengers online to build offline connections. In addition, the advent of O2O has increasingly promoted transformation in many industrial sectors, most of which feature the characteristics of two-sided markets. Rather than going out to specific functional zones for services, customers now can enjoy services delivered to them at almost anytime and anywhere, so the way of bridging the supply chain from suppliers to customers has been changed (Xu et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2009). Various platforms are established to serve as intermediaries for ordering goods and service, e.g., clothing websites, online cosmetic retailers, and take-out delivery service. In all these cases, cross-group externalities exist, i.e., a platform connects two groups of agents and whether one group of agents attend and enjoy a platform or not relying on how the platform performs on attracting the other group of agents. For example, the take-out service platform will attract more customers if more restaurants would settle in. And restaurants are willing to participate into the platform if the platform shows its potential to have a large number of customers.

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