مشخصات مقاله | |
عنوان مقاله | Pro-competition rules in airport privatization: International experience and the Brazilian case |
ترجمه عنوان مقاله | قوانین طرفدار رقابت در خصوص خصوصی سازی فرودگاه: تجربه بین المللی و مورد برزیلی |
فرمت مقاله | |
نوع مقاله | ISI |
نوع نگارش مقاله | مقاله پژوهشی (Research article) |
سال انتشار | |
تعداد صفحات مقاله | 8 صفحه |
رشته های مرتبط | علوم فنون هوایی |
مجله | مجله مدیریت حمل و نقل هوایی – Journal of Air Transport Management |
دانشگاه | دانشکده حقوق FGV، سائوپائولو، برزیل |
کلمات کلیدی | خصوصی سازی فرودگاه، محدودیت مالکیت حد وسط، رقابت فرودگاه، قوانین حراج |
کد محصول | E4126 |
نشریه | نشریه الزویر |
لینک مقاله در سایت مرجع | لینک این مقاله در سایت الزویر (ساینس دایرکت) Sciencedirect – Elsevier |
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله | ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید. |
دانلود رایگان مقاله | دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی |
سفارش ترجمه این مقاله | سفارش ترجمه این مقاله |
بخشی از متن مقاله: |
1. Introduction1
Brazil has recently joined the group of countries that have large airports operated by private companies. In 2011, the greenfield project of the International Airport of Sao Gonçalo do Amarante, in ~ the metropolitan region of Natal (Rio Grande do Norte), was awarded to a private company. In 2012, three different private consortiums won the concession contracts for the International Airports of Viracopos (VCP, at Campinas, S~ ao Paulo), Governador Andre Franco Montoro (GRU, at Guarulhos, S ao Paulo) and Brasilia – ~ Presidente Juscelino Kubitschek (BSB, in the Federal District). Finally, in 2013, the Brazilian government granted to private parties the International Airport of Rio de Janeiro/Galeao – Antonio Carlos Jobim (GIG) and Tancredo Neves International Airport (CFN, located in the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais). The recent Brazilian experience contained a noteworthy particularity: bidding rules were specifically designed to prevent cross-ownership among different airport operators. In the first round of biddings (in 2012), no single private entity could be awarded more than one airport concession. Moreover, the bidding rules of the second round (in 2013) provided that corporate groups responsible for operating one of the airports granted in the first round could not hold more than a 15% stake at a consortium bidding for an airport in the second round.2 These restrictions were designed to foster more intense competition among different airports, especially in thedevelopment of national and international hubs. During the preparation of the invitation to tender (ITT), there was intense discussion among government agencies and interested bidders on the scope and effects of such restrictions. Many argued that they would lower the competitiveness of the tenders by limiting the number of bidders. Ultimately, cross-ownership restrictions were adopted, and not only were the value of the awards significant, but the tenders attracted some of the world’s most prominent airport operators. |