مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد قیمت گذاری زنجیره تامین به منظور سفارش مقررات کلاهبرداری

مقاله سال 2017

 مجله امگا – Omega

It is a global consensus that carbon emissions are the main reasons contributing to global warming. To curb the carbon emissions, some legislations and mechanisms are proposed in many regions and countries. Emissions trading scheme (cap-and-trade regulation) is now generally accepted as one of the most effective market-based mechanisms (Hua et al., 2011). According to the report from European Commission (2013), the earliest and largest EU emissions trading scheme (EU-ETS) has covered 31 countries with more than 11,000 firms and limited around 45% total EU emissions1 . With cap-and-trade regulation, the manufacturers receive the cap from the government agencies and the emission permits can be traded through an outside market. Since carbon emissions incur in almost all stages of the production process, cap-and-trade regulation has significant effects on the manufacturers’ production decisions and it will indirectly affect the partners in their supply chains.

Most manufacturing firms produce multiple products and sell these products through retailers. For example, HeBei (Cheng De) Iron&Steel Group produces 16 kinds of products, such as hot rolled coil, wire products and so on. He produces these products based on MTO (make-to-order) production and these products are sold by sales agencies who order these products from HeBei (Cheng De) Iron&Steel Group2 . Lots of carbon emissions are generated in producing each of these products. To reduce carbon emissions, China has established 7 carbon trading pilots and is planning to establish a national carbon trading platform before 2015 which contains many manufacturing industries, especially electricity, steel, petrochemical and cement3 . HeBei Iron&Steel Group is the second largest steel companies in China. So, he needs to determine the products’ wholesale prices under cap-and-trade regulation and reasonably allocate emission permits to the products to maximize their profits, and the retailers determine their order quantities to meet market needs based on the manufacturer’s wholesale prices. Compared with a single product scenario, the investigation of two products will involve the allocation of the emission permits as well as the product portfolio selection and production. Due to the differences of production technologies or raw materials in the production process, these products have different production costs and carbon emissions intensity (i.e. carbon emission generated by producing per-unit product). Thus with cap-and-trade regulation, how to make the emission trading decisions as well as the product portfolio selection and production is an urgent problem of firms today and in the future.

In this paper, we investigate the production and pricing problems in MTO supply chain consisting of two risk-neutral firms, an upstream manufacturer who produces two products based on MTO production and a downstream retailer. The manufacturer determines its wholesale prices with cap-and-trade regulation and the retailer determines its order quantities. It is assumed that the two products can be substitutes or complements and the maximal potential profit per unit of emission permit of product 1 is no less than that of product 2. We find that the manufacturer buys (sells) emission permits from (to) the outside market when the cap is lower (higher) than a lower (higher) threshold and neither buy nor sell emission permits for intermediate levels of emission cap. The optimal total emissions and production quantities of product 2 are increasing in the cap while the optimal production quantities of product 1 may be decreasing in the cap. The emission trading prices are exogenous variables to the supply chain and the selling price per unit of emission permit is not higher than the buying price of emission permits, which can be seen in many trading markets, such as ECX (European Climate Exchange). We find that the manufacturer’s optimal profit is decreasing (increasing) in the buying (selling) price of emission permits, and that the retailer’s optimal profit is decreasing in the buying (selling) price of emission permits. We also find that the optimal total emissions and production quantities of product 2 are decreasing in the buying (selling) prices of emission permits while the production quantities of product 1 may be increasing in the buying (selling) prices of emission permits. Numerical examples are conducted to illustrate our findings and some managerial insights are presented.