مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد مدیریت درآمد تحت رقابت اتحادیه هواپیمایی
مشخصات مقاله | |
عنوان مقاله | Revenue management under horizontal and vertical competition within airline alliances |
ترجمه عنوان مقاله | مدیریت درآمد تحت رقابت افقی و عمودی در اتحادیه های هواپیمایی |
فرمت مقاله | |
نوع مقاله | ISI |
نوع نگارش مقاله | مقاله پژوهشی (Research article) |
سال انتشار | |
تعداد صفحات مقاله | ۳۰ صفحه |
رشته های مرتبط | مدیریت |
مجله | |
دانشگاه | دانشکده مدیریت، دانشگاه دیزسبورگ-اسن، دویسبورگ، آلمان |
کلمات کلیدی | خطوط ارتباطات شبکه مدیریت درآمد شبکه، به اشتراک گذاری کد ، رقابت افقی / عمودی |
کد محصول | E4463 |
تعداد کلمات |
۶۲۴۱ کلمه |
نشریه | نشریه الزویر |
لینک مقاله در سایت مرجع | لینک این مقاله در سایت الزویر (ساینس دایرکت) Sciencedirect – Elsevier |
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله | ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید. |
دانلود رایگان مقاله | دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی |
سفارش ترجمه این مقاله | سفارش ترجمه این مقاله |
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۱ Introduction
The deregulation of the airspace in the US, followed by deregulations in other countries in the past two decades, allowed airlines to enlarge their networks (Oum and Park, 1997). In order to avoid many of the efforts connected to the entry into new markets, airlines allied in alliances. See e.g. Oum and Park (1997) and Park (1997) for further reasons for alliance formation as well as its (economic) effects. Chapter 3.2 in C¸ etiner (2013) provides a detailed treatment of this topic as well as a thorough literature overview. A key characteristic of airline alliances are code sharing agreements that allow the airlines to sell products which involve utilization of partners’ capacities as if they were their own (Oum et al., 2001, p. 57). Code sharing allows the partners to extend their networks, improve customer service, and raise their efficiency through a higher capacity load factor, among other things. With code sharing agreements in use, the problem is not only to allocate capacity to different products, but also to divide the available capacity among the partners within the alliance. O’Neal et al. (2007) presented a mixed-integer problem to select those flights which should be made available for code sharing. Given these decisions, it must be decided how much of an airline’s capacity should be made available to the alliance partners. Graf and Kimms (2011, 2013) have developed procedures based on real options to solve this problem for a two-airline alliance. However, with more than one airline involved in the sale of tickets, the problem of how to divide the profit amongst them arises. Kimms and C¸ etiner (2012) as well as C¸ etiner and Kimms (2013) introduced procedures to allocate the alliance’s revenue among the partners in fair ways so that none of them has an incentive to leave the alliance. Their procedures are based on the nucleolus concept from cooperative game theory and turned out to be very effective. Topaloglu (2012) proposed a decomposition approach for determining alliance booking limits and transfer prices based on a centralized Deterministic Linear Program (DLP). Belobaba and Jain (2013) described the technical difficulties involved in the information sharing process faced by alliance RM and proposed information sharing mechanisms to overcome these. |