By expressing an opinion regarding whether the financial statements provided by management are fairly presented according to GAAP or IFRS, the external auditor performs a valuable service to capital markets and the economy. In particular, an independent audit opinion increases the flow of capital to corporations by protecting investors from managers who would misreport the financial condition of the firm in the financial statements. The effectiveness of the audit function, however, is significantly reduced when the auditor violates independence and acts in the interests of management rather than investors. Thus, auditor independence remains an important aspect of audit quality in the auditing literature. In a review of the auditing literature, King et al. (2012, 52) conclude that there is little research to inform recent efforts by the PCAOB to increase audit quality by requiring engagement partner sign-off or disclosure in the audit report. They identify various theoretical frameworks that might provide useful insights to policy makers, including accountability and the theory of affordances. However, they ignore theory and empirical evidence in business ethics and social norms. Schatzberg et al. (2005) argue that auditors may be less inclined to violate independence if they have the moral courage to satisfy their public interest obligations to thirdparty investors. Thus, moral reasoning or the consideration of right versus wrong behavior may affect auditor independence and audit quality. In an experimental audit market, however, Schatzberg et al. find that auditors and managers who score high on the ‘‘defining issues test’’ (DIT) violate independence more, not less. The DIT is a measure of a person’s capacity for moral reasoning based on Kohlberg’s (1969, 1976) theory of moral development, which has been challenged on philosophical, psychological, and empirical grounds (Modgil and Modgil 1986; Rest et al. 1999). Blay et al. (2017) argue that Kohlberg’s theory is of minimal use to empirical business ethics research because it is a normative theory that is silent regarding the effects of situational cues and information on moral reasoning. Based on insights from Bicchieri’s (2006) model of social norm activation, Blay et al. recommend that empirical researchers use alternative measures of moral reasoning based on social norm sensitivity. We assert that audit quality can be improved to the extent that social norms for honesty and responsibility are activated in the auditor.1 To test this assertion, we use the experimental audit market setting in Schatzberg et al. (2005) and manipulate factors expected to activate honesty and responsibility norms in the auditor. Calegari et al. (1998) first developed this experimental setting to test predictions of the two-period economic model in Magee and Tseng (1990). Using simulated investors, Calegari et al. manipulated whether the role of the manager was computer simulated or played by other human participants. In audit markets with human managers, a cooperative solution arose whereby managers paid high audit fees in exchange for the auditor misreporting low audit outcomes as high. This cooperative solution transferred wealth from the investor to the auditor and manager, and therefore presented the auditor with a moral dilemma. Calegari et al. called for further research examining factors that might reduce this threat to auditor independence, including moral reasoning on the part of the auditor.