During the last 25 years, Public–Private Partnerships (P3s) have become a popular method for major infrastructure delivery worldwide (Andon, 2012; Boardman, Siemiatycki, & Vining, 2016; Hodge & Greve, 2017; Opara, Elloumi, Okafor, & Warsame, 2017). With the growing P3 deployment by governments, and the contested financial value of P3s, Andon (2012) calls for research that questions the nature and functioning of P3s, including the complexities of P3s as a policy tool. Andon (2012, p. 877–۸) reviews and critiques extant accounting research in five major areas, including: the underlying nature and rationale of P3s; the processes and procedures aiding decisions to undertake P3s; processes and procedures for expost P3 evaluations; the merit and worth of P3s; and, P3 regulation and guidance. As an understudied area, we embrace Andon’s (2012) call to ‘‘extend our understandings of the motivations of and rationale for P3 schemes beyond the prevailing critical explanations offered in the literature” as a way to understand the growing adoption of P3s despite contrary evidence (p. 907). Specifically, Andon (2012) suggests investigation into the ‘‘conditions and elements” related to the motivations and rationales for P3 adoption (p. 907). Furthermore, Caperchione, Demirag, and Grossi (2017) invite critical research in the context of P3s as part of public sector reforms. In response to both Andon (2012) and Caperchione et al. (2017), this paper adopts a critical perspective and aligns with Shaoul (2005, p. 441) in questioning the ‘‘rationality and distributive implications of using private finance,” which studies suggest is more expensive than public borrowing (Boardman et al., 2016). Therefore, the suspension of the Alberta P3 program is an invitation to re-engage in the critical evaluation of P3s (Shaoul, 2005). Using the National Health Services (NHS) hospital P3s, Shaoul (2005) examined the process, financial methodology and assumptions made by NHS Trust hospitals arguing that their decisions during project planning and execution were based on ambiguous concepts of risk transfer and Value-for-Money (VfM), that were neither objective, value-free nor ensured distributive equity for all stakeholders. By revisiting the tools the government has hitherto employed to evaluate P3 projects (discounted cashflow/NPV, PSC, VfM, etc.), rethinking the concept and practice of risk transfer, and questioning the rationale behind the assessments leading to project approval, we demonstrate that a similar critical appraisal of P3 policy, including methodology adopted, can be effective even in other P3 domains. This approach may yield the best answer to the potential senescence of the P3 program in Alberta while also, perhaps, providing some nascent predictions as to the shape of what infrastructure assessment protocols will replace it. By adopting the New Public Management (NPM) philosophy (Broadbent, Gill, & Laughlin, 2003; Caperchione et al., 2017; Shaoul, Stafford, & Stapleton, 2012), governments are implementing a range of market-based reforms to improve the quantity and quality of public service delivery. Reforms of this nature are proclaimed as part of a public service ‘‘innovation” or ‘‘modernization” program (Caperchione et al., 2017; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Furthermore, NPM and its emergent hybrid variant, New Public Governance (NPG), envisages operating the government more like a business via savings in public expenditure and improving the quality of public services–especially the ‘‘marketization” and ‘‘accountingization” concepts (Caperchione et al., 2017, p. 2).