Shleifer and Vishny (1997) highlight the enormous practical importance of GC. Despite the common-sense perception that investors are willing to pay more for firms with best CG practices, the doubt still persists over how the relationship between CG and performance is constructed in Latin America (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2007). Minority shareholder protection varies widely around the world and different legal origin partly explains it (Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1998). All Latin American countries, however, share a common origin in civil law and their capital markets may offer a below-average minority shareholder protection relative to other civil law nations (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2007). The voluntary adoption of better CG practices may partially compensate investors for this weak institutional environment (Garay and González, 2008). Our main objective is to produce a quantitative synthesis of CG and its correlation with performance in the region. We also intend to determine whether the differences between studies occur due to moderating effects, such as the mechanisms thorough which CG is exerted, and the performance measure used. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that seeks to undertake a systematic review of the Latin American literature on CG and performance using meta-analytic techniques and that also includes articles published in Portuguese and Spanish in the academic journals of the region, which may be overlooked by non-native speakers. Thus, we endeavor to be as inclusive as possible and our contribution is to provide a broad picture of the topic in the region at the time of our research. This consolidation also contributes to enable researchers throughout the world to glimpse at published results in Portuguese and Spanish in local journals as well as have a portrait of the regional literature about the topic. This article, however, is not a traditional literature review, and does not intend to offer a detailed account of the selected literature.