مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد ارتقای سیاسی و بهره وری سرمایه گذاری کار – الزویر ۲۰۱۸

elsevier

 

مشخصات مقاله
ترجمه عنوان مقاله ارتقای سیاسی و بهره وری سرمایه گذاری کار
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله Political promotion and labor investment efficiency
انتشار مقاله سال ۲۰۱۸
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی ۲۱ صفحه
هزینه دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد.
پایگاه داده نشریه الزویر
نوع نگارش مقاله مقاله پژوهشی (Research article)
مقاله بیس این مقاله بیس میباشد
نمایه (index) scopus – master journals – JCR
نوع مقاله ISI
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی  PDF
ایمپکت فاکتور(IF) ۱٫۸۰۰ (۲۰۱۷)
شاخص H_index ۵۶ (۲۰۱۸)
شاخص SJR ۱٫۰۷۷ (۲۰۱۸)
رشته های مرتبط اقتصاد، مدیریت
گرایش های مرتبط اقتصاد مالی، مدیریت منابع انسانی
نوع ارائه مقاله ژورنال
مجله / کنفرانس بررسی اقتصاد چین – China Economic Review
دانشگاه School of Economics – Huazhong University of Science and Technology – China
کلمات کلیدی ارتقاء سیاسی، تخصیص نامناسب سرمایه انسانی، کارآیی سرمایه گذاری کار، چين
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی Political promotion, Human capital misallocation, Labor investment efficiency, China
شناسه دیجیتال – doi
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2018.05.002
کد محصول E9353
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله  ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید.
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فهرست مطالب مقاله:
Abstract
۱٫ Introduction
۲٫ Institutional background and literature review
۳٫ Data and variables
۴٫ Empirical results
۵٫ Further evidence
۶٫ Conclusions
References

بخشی از متن مقاله:
۱٫ Introduction

Considering that human capital is the most important factor that determines firm productivity (Erosa, Koreshkova, & Restuccia, 2010; Lazear, 2009; Moretti, 2004), investment efficiency of human capital is essential for a firm sustaining competitive advantage and high productivity level. However, there has been a great deal of literature on the factors affecting the capital market investment, such as information asymmetry in capital markets affects firm investment decisions and often results in inefficiencies in the form of over- and under-investment (Hubbard, 1998; Stein, 2001). Probably due to the data unavailability, prior studies mainly focus on the investment efficiency of capital expenditure,1 and there is surprisingly little empirical evidence examining the determinants of labor investment efficiency (Pindyck, 1988; Koeniger & Leonardi, 2007; Pinnuck & Lillis, 2007; Jung, Lee, & Weber, 2014; Alesina, Battisti, & Zeira, 2018; Ben-Nasr & Alshwer, 2016; Ghaly, Dang, & Stathopoulos, 2015). This study attempts to fill the above gap in the literature. In particular, we investigate the determinants of labor investment efficiency from a novel channel, i.e., promotion incentives of politicians. This investigation is economically significant because labor costs typically represent roughly two-thirds of economy-wide value added (Jung et al. (2014)), and labor investments are more flexible and reversible than capital investments (Pinnuck and Lillis (2007); Hall (2016)). For example, the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Manufacturers reports that the payroll and employee benefits in the manufacturing sector totaled $829 billion in 2015 but capital expenditures only amounted to $263 billion.2 In China, the labor adjustment is costly. For example, in January 2008, China adopted a new “Labor Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China”. The law requires employer to provide employees with written contracts that contain the term of employment, wages, social insurance, labor protections and so on. This new law includes not only employment contract viscosity, but also the minimum wage and the broad pay more of the economic compensation when firms dismiss employees. That means China’s labor adjustment is very costly because it has legal barrier. Some related studies discuss on relevant issues. For example, Cooper et al. (2012) demonstrate that one of the most economically important provisions is the requirement of severance payment, and the severance is twice the amount (the basic amount specified in the law) if a contract is terminated unlawfully. They also point that in China, increased severance payments lead to a reduction in productivity, since reallocation is very costly. Chen and Funke (2009) claim that the improvements design to protect workers from casualization and arbitrary firings would raise costs for employers by raising requirements for severance pay, and they view the law as the twilight of the age of cheap labor in China. Meanwhile, the economic consequence of incentives from political promotion on labor investments has yet to be investigated.

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