مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد اطمینان و شایعات در اداره کردن حسابداران مدیریت – الزویر ۲۰۱۸

۱- Introduction

۲- Literature review

۳- Theoretical framework: confidences and gossip in systems of secrecy

۴- Case and method

۵- Secrecy and the management accountants’ handling of social relationships

۶- Discussion

۷- Conclusion

References

Abstract

The article shows how secrecy – defined as the purposeful revelation of information to some and not others – is used by management accountants to pursue their roles as independent business controllers and nurture the social proximity required to be sought-after business advisers. The paper examines management accountants’ retentive and communicative strategies in reporting practices in a subset of a large multinational company. It conceptualizes systems of secrecy as the purposeful articulation between two types of revelations (confidences and gossip). It shows how confidences and gossip can be successive steps that structure informal reporting information flows and close social interactions helpful in dealing with tensions arising from attempts to manage interdependencies and to achieve individually specified targets. The article contributes to the literature on the dynamics of management accountants’ dual role by showing how they overcome the tensions between conflicting expectations through tactful and judicious distribution of information. It shows how the articulation of confidence and gossip creates a specific format of accounting talk which facilitates compromise through the succession of private one-on-one discursive spaces. It also complements the literature on management control systems (MCS) by giving a nuanced account of the virtues of secrecy in order to mitigate some of the unanticipated adverse effects of performance evaluations.

Introduction

Decentralized forms of management and the need for greater innovativeness are among the reasons that support the evolution of management accountants’ roles from ‘bean counters’ to ‘business partners’ (Jarvenpaa, 2007; Granlund and Lukka, 1998; Goretzki et al., 2013). Yet, this dynamic is not one of replacement but one of juxtaposition, leading many management accountants to endorse hybrid roles characterized by tensions between the two different functions (Caglio, 2003; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Horton and de Araujo Wanderlay, 2016). As a consequence, numerous management accountants are unsure of how to act as they experience the “divided loyalty” intrinsic to their roles as “partners of operational management” and as “financially objective informers of boards” (Ahrens, 1997, p.633). Articulating the two types of activities is indeed a difficult challenge (Busco et al., 2008; Lambert and Sponem, 2012). It is also an important issue of practical relevance because management accountants’ ability to combine control and advisory responsibilities increases the use and quality of reporting information (Byrne and Pierce, 2007) and allows for selective “before the fact control” (Sathe, 1983). An objective of this article is thus to better understand how management accountants simultaneously pursue their responsibilities as independent controllers and as collaborative advisers. It therefore contributes to the literature on professionals’ strategies to cope with role conflict (e.g. Hall, 1972; Hopper, 1980; Maas and Matejka, 2009) by identifying avenues to alleviate some of the difficulties experienced by management accountants confronted by multiple role expectations.